Still More Hillary's Speech (With Exclusive E-Backgrounder) Posted by David Shorr

The Secretary of State is already onto India, but emails I exchanged on Friday with a senior State Department official gave me further grist for the CFR speech-reaction mill. One point I stressed in my earlier review of the speech traces back to a pet peeve in debates over multilateral cooperation. I liked Clinton's speech very much, but was concerned about the stress on the world architecture. I always worry that the cause of multilateralism is undermined whenever we talk more about its form and structure than the political 'deciders' who determine its results. 

As the official explains, though, Secretary Clinton is not talking about a blueprint with a set structure in which the US will work, but instead an awareness of the many different levels of cooperation that will be needed:   

The new architecture of cooperation starts from reforming and transforming international and regional institutions but then says we have to go further in several ways -- a web of partnerships w/ traditional allies and w/ rising powers and new partnerships w/ non-state actors and individuals. This is a kind of open archtiecture of cooperation which, unlike a condominium of power[s], creates any opportunities for any nation ... countless middle powers and a number of smaller ones -- to contribute what they can and earn a place at the table.

Contrast [this with] the exclusivity of visions of a G-2. It also taps into the vast potential of global networks and coalitions of ngos, corporations, universities, foundations -- just as the clinton global initiative and other efforts like it do. Both of those dimensions of this architecture are deeply consistent w/ our values of inclusion, entrepreneurship, and individual responsibility.

So smart power's twin is smart cooperation (or smart internationalism?) -- which uses all the international dynamics in our toolbox for what they have to offer. The official says open architecture is needed to overcome the limitations of the two best-known paradigms of international relations:

The central issue of our time are these global problems that cannot be solved by any one nation alone, so you have to get global cooperation to turn commoin interest to joint action. There are 2 classic approaches to this kind of a problem. One is a global condominium of power whereby the great powers agree on solutions and try to impose them on everyone else and the other is a liberal internationalist approach of binding nations in international institutions where they are committed to common purposes and then have to negotiate under rules designed to overcome collective action problems to get to solutions. The speech rejects the first solution as inconsistent w/ our values and traditions and says that the second solution does not go far enough.

How Big A Threat is the Taliban? Posted by Michael Cohen

One of my biggest bugaboos about the current policy in Afghanistan is the extent to which we overestimate the threat from the Taliban not only to America, but also to Afghanistan.  Over at abu muqawama, ibn muqawama disagrees:

A common refrain I hear is that the Taliban has limited appeal, they're fragmented, the Afghans don't want them back, they're not that strong, etc. . . While the past isn't necessarily a predictor, I do think it's important to remember that between 1994-2001, the Taliban was able to take over nearly all of the country.  Its leadership proved adept at exploiting Afghan disenchantment and religious symbolism to attract supporters, and at gaining the allegiance of numerous warlords to bolster its ranks.  Once in power, it facilitated the expansion of violent extremist groups in other Central Asian countries.  Obviously things have changed a lot since 2001, but if we were to withdraw combat troops I'm not sure what prevents that from happening again.  The Taliban is not an unstoppable army of holy warriors and they may not directly attack the United States, but I don't think we should underestimate their ability to reassert themselves in a way that undermines regional security.

I think it's very important to recognize that the differences between 1994 and today are legion. Back then, Afghanistan was wracked by terrible civil war - fighting that was in some ways worse than the Soviet occupation (particularly in Kabul).  The Taliban took advantage of the anger at dismay directed toward the warlords for basically destroying the country. Hard to believe now, but the Taliban was seen then as the country's savior.

The situation today could not be more different; not to mention the fact that after 7 years of Taliban rule the group is deeply, deeply unpopular. And of course, even if by some far-fetched possibility that the Taliban were to take over it doesn't mean they will give free reign to Al Qaeda to set up a terrorist safe haven. It's not to say the Taliban can't wreak some havoc but from a narrow definition of US vital interests the threat they pose is way down on the list.

This recent article in the London Review of Books from Rory Stewart (flagged by the new and very good Inkspots blog) makes the case far more effectively:

The Taliban are very unlikely to take over Afghanistan as a whole. Their previous administration provided basic road security and justice but it was fragile and fell quickly. They are no longer perceived, as they were by some in 1994, as young student angels saving the country from corruption. Millions of Afghans disliked their brutality, incompetence and primitive attitudes. The Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek populations are wealthier, more established and more powerful than they were in 1996 and would strongly resist any attempt by the Taliban to occupy their areas. The Afghan national army is reasonably effective. Pakistan is not in a position to support the Taliban as it did before. It would require far fewer international troops and planes than we have today to make it very difficult for the Taliban to gather a conventional army as they did in 1996 and drive tanks and artillery up the main road to Kabul.

Even if – as seems most unlikely – the Taliban were to take the capital, it is not clear how much of a threat this would pose to US or European national security. Would they repeat their error of providing a safe haven to al-Qaida? And how safe would this safe haven be? They could give al-Qaida land for a camp but how would they defend it against predators or US special forces? And does al-Qaida still require large terrorist training camps to organise attacks? Could they not plan in Hamburg and train at flight schools in Florida; or meet in Bradford and build morale on an adventure training course in Wales?

Read the whole article here - it's excellent

NSN Daily Update: 7/17/09 Posted by The National Security Network

What we’re reading

A top aide to exiled Honduran President Manuel Zelaya said the ousted leader was heading home Thursday to set up an alternative seat of government inside the country, setting up a  headquarters in a "final battle" against the coup leaders.

India and Pakistan agreed Thursday to increase communication and information-sharing in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks and discord between the two nations.

Japan's unpopular Prime Minister Taro Aso survived efforts within his own party to oust him ahead of elections next month.

Commentary of the day

Ehud Olmert in the Washington Post said the United States provides Israel with crucial security and economic aid while sketching out a path to achieving lasting peace in the region. Meanwhile, the Crown Prince of Bahrain Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa asserts we need fresh thinking if the Arab Peace Initiative is to have the impact it deserves on the crisis that impoverishes Palestinians and endangers Israel's security.

The LA Times asserts that in the wake of Chechen human rights advocate Natalia Estemirova killing, President Ramzan Kadyrov's vow to oversee the investigation is a “cynical joke”.

 

 

Where the Real Fight Is Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Foreignpoliy.com my fellow NAFer Parag Khanna and I have a new piece up arguing that the real fight for the United States should be in Pakistan and not Afghanistan:

The conventional wisdom in Washington -- and the core of U.S. President Barack Obama's "Af-Pak" policy, which he announced in March -- is that Afghanistan is now the central front in the conflict formerly known as the war on terror. Pakistan is essential too, of course, and indeed, the thinking goes, you can't have a successful Afghanistan policy without a successful Pakistan policy. The problem with this conventional wisdom is that it gets the situation entirely backward: The real fight is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and a successful Af-Pak policy would be to minimize the "Af" part and maximize the "Pak."

Although Obama has committed an additional 20,000 troops to Afghanistan, as well as additional resources, some recent and far more discrete successes in Pakistan suggest that the United States might be putting its eggs in the wrong basket. With improved U.S.-Pakistani intelligence-sharing, U.S. drones killed more than 40 commanders loyal to Baitullah Mehsud, head of the Pakistani Taliban, in Waziristan last week. The U.S. ability to rout the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan is increasingly showing results while the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan is wracked with uncertainty and dubious prospects for success.

Read the whole thing here

Also Hillary's Speech Posted by David Shorr

Everybody's seizing on their favorite (or most disappointing) points in the speech, so why should I be any different. For me, it was "turning commonality of interest into common action." For reasons I'll explain, I agree with Peter Scoblic's emphasis on "cooperation," but I'm not crazy about "architecture." Our own Michael Cohen and Peter Beinart both think Clinton missed the mark; I think they're missing the point. In terms of the purpose of the speech, and therefore how we should read it, Spencer Ackerman hits it on the head.

In Heather Hurlburt's excellent read-between-the-lines analysis, she hears Clinton saying: "The administration knows some of us think it’s trying to do too much. And it doesn’t care." And why do they have this attitude? Because when you look at this forbidding to-do list of international chores, none of it is optional. They really do have to take care of the "urgent, important, and long-term." Seriously, which one would you punt? Which of them doesn't cry out for a strenuous effort? And what would be the price if you did let global health, global warming, Mideast peace, good governance, or food security slide? So international cooperation is vital for two reasons. Of course it's true that few if any of today's problems can be solved by a single power or even a handful of powers. But when it comes to the whole gamut of issues, we're not going to get anywhere without cooperation, common action, diplomacy, and cooperation.

Hillary's Speech Posted by Michael Cohen

So I've re-read Hillary Clinton's "big" foreign policy speech from yesterday at the Council on Foreign Relations and I keep coming back to one graf in particular - the final one:

More than 230 years ago, Thomas Paine said, “We have it within our power to start the world over again.”

The subtext seems to be, after the 8 years of a disastrous and counter-productive foreign policy . . . we're pressing the reset button. Look for example at the five key elements of Clinton's approach to smart power:

First, we intend to update and create vehicles for cooperation with our partners; second, we will pursue principled engagement with those who disagree with us; third, we will elevate development as a core pillar of American power; fourth, we will integrate civilian and military action in conflict areas; and fifth, we will leverage key sources of American power, including our economic strength and the power of our example.

Except possibly for number three, pretty much every single policy here represents a none too subtle reversal of everything George Bush did wrong.  It's just a further reminder that so much of the Obama Administration's foreign policy agenda is basically cleaning up the mess that Bush left them.

There are a few other things from the speech that merit attention - both good and bad.

We also will reach out beyond governments, because we believe partnerships with people play a critical role in our 21^st century statecraft. President Obama’s Cairo speech is a powerful example of communicating directly with people from the bottom up. And we are following up with a comprehensive agenda of educational exchanges, outreach, and entrepreneurial ventures. In every country I visit, I look for opportunities to bolster civil society and engage with citizens, whether at a town hall in Baghdad – a first in that country; or appearing on local popular television shows that reach a wide and young audience; or meeting with democracy activists, war widows, or students.

This is very smart and dovetails nicely with a brilliant report that came out last Spring about the need for US policymakers to more effectively engage with civil society groups. Missing however, is a clear sense of how the US will strengthen civil society groups. Talking to citizens and getting beyond the halls of government should be a key task for our overseas diplomats, but examining ways we can use our foreign assistance programs to strengthen and bolster civil society needs to be part of this discussion. (It would be nice to see MCC and NED at the end of the spear on this one).  Still, having the Secretary of State acknowledge, as she does in the speech, that we are entering a non-state actor future - I love the phrase multi-partner world -- is music to my ears.

Secretary Clinton also made the important argument that we need to shift the balance in foreign policy away from the military and back toward civilian agencies, but in that context I found this graf really odd:

Just as we would never deny ammunition to American troops headed into battle, we cannot send our civilian personnel into the field underequipped. If we don’t invest in diplomacy and development, we will end up paying a lot more for conflicts and their consequences. As Secretary Gates has said, diplomacy is an indispensable instrument of national security, as it has been since Franklin, Jefferson and Adams won foreign support for Washington’s army.

I understand that Hillary is still a politician, but the reason we invest in diplomacy and development is not because we want to avoid future conflicts (although its not a bad idea to keep that in mind) it's because it, supposedly, furthers our interests and it is also the right thing to do. I realize that I am nitpicking here, but it would be really helpful if we stopped talking about diplomacy, development and democracy in the context of war-fighting.

This brings me to my meta complaint about the speech. I should say, first of all, this is sort of unfair critique, particularly in the context of my initial comments, but what was missing from Hilary's speech were two words I've been thinking a lot about recently - national interests.  To be sure, Hillary talks a lot about interests and priorities and shared values, but harder to discern is the strategic glue that holds it all together. The unspoken definition of US interests in HRC's speech is breathtaking? (Is there any place in the world where we don't have vital interests?)

On one level Hillary's speech reflects a more modest approach to foreign policy (certainly compared to the Bush Administration) but on the other hand it is an incredibly ambitious agenda (a point that she clearly makes).

To my mind, a more modest foreign policy would involve a far more conscripted description of vital US interests than is indicated in this speech. This isn't just a question of partnering with other countries and institutions; it's also a question of recognizing that there are many places around the globe where  stepping back and forcing other countries to lead might be the better approach.  Since the end of the Cold War the mindset of the United States has been, for the most part, we need to be everywhere and we need to lead. On some issues that is true, but on others not so much. The job of the Secretary of State and President is to identify those issues and places that are most vital to US interests. This speech doesn't do that; instead it's a recipe for more not less US involvement in the world.

For what it's worth, there are hints of that latter approach in the empowerment theme that animates some of Obama's foreign policy rhetoric and can also be seen, to a limited degree in this speech. But, if we really do want to change the mindset that got us involved in the Iraq War - and led to the disastrous Bush foreign policy -- then an effort to more clearly determine our national interests and lay out a realistic and achievable foreign policy is vitally important. That wasn't evident in Secretary Clinton's speech.

Again, I recognize that this is not a completely fair critique, 6 months into a new Administration and with the wreckage of the Bush years still around us. In that context it was actually a pretty smart speech. After the somewhat ad hoc Clinton years and the disastrous Bush years, Barack Obama and in turn, Hillary Clinton, has a unique opportunity to chart a new course for American foreign policy. He has the chance to define America's role in the world in a way that offers a new conception of the country's most vital national interests.

They need to seize that opportunity because yesterday's speech, for all its intelligence, was a status quo address, not a game changer.

NSN Daily Update: 7/16/09 Posted by The National Security Network

For today's complete NSN update click here.

What We’re Reading

U.S. Marines pushing deeper into Taliban territory in Afghanistan’s Helmand River Valley are short of basic equipment and supplies ranging from radios and vehicles to uniforms. Similar issues face British soldiers in Afghanistan, with reports of a limited number of helicopters being used, fueling the criticism that the government is trying to conduct the war in Afghanistan without adequate financing.

Alleged 9-11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four others have boycotted a hearing at a US military court in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The Canadian arctic will see its second straight “open water” summer, with another opening of the ice-free northern passage, threatening wildlife and underlying the negative impact of climate change.

A six month investigation resulted in the capture of a man suspected of being one of western Mexico’s top drug bosses. But retaliation came swiftly, as his lieutenants struck repeatedly in the two days after his arrest. The recent violence has already claimed the life of the mayor of a small town in the state of Chihuahua.

Pakistan and India have pledged to work together to fight terrorism - "the main threat to both countries".

Commentary of the day

Daniel Byman discusses America’s reliance on drone strikes and its effects.

In an op-ed published by the New York Times, a Cambodian refugee questions the recent move by the UN to place elderly Khmer Rouge leaders on trial.

John Yoo explains why he authorized warrantless wiretaps after 9-11. Spencer Ackerman is not convinced.

A Plan for Middle East Peace Posted by Michael Cohen

I know, I know, where have you heard that title before? Still, fresh from a trip to the region, Brian Katulis, Marc Lynch and Robert Adler have a really interesting after-trip report about what they saw. They offer some smart recommendations for US policymakers that hopefully will be getting passed around Foggy Bottom soon:

The Obama administration sees a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the cornerstone of its evolving Middle East strategy. Yet the window of opportunity for achieving a viable two-state solution is rapidly closing—at a time when Israelis and Palestinians seem incapable and unwilling to achieve a sustainable peace agreement. In the coming months, the Obama administration needs to build on its first steps on the Israeli-Palestinian front with specific actions to shore up Israeli and Palestinian political support for a possible two-state solution.

. . . The Obama administration needs to win over more Israelis to its strategy for the region and consolidate a Palestinian leadership able to negotiate an enduring agreement in order to achieve a two-state solution. To address this stalemate, the Obama administration needs to take four concrete steps in the coming months:

• Plan for the possibility of Palestinian elections in the coming year.
• Develop an integrated program to strengthen Palestinian institutions in a broad range of sectors to lay the foundations for statehood.
• Take immediate action to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
• Conduct a public outreach and strategic communications effort in the Middle East outlining U.S. regional strategy, with increased attention to Israeli public opinion.

Check out the whole thing here.

The Power Of Example And Hard Cases Like Iran And North Korea Posted by David Shorr

Our hard-liner friends are having a grand old time ridiculing the idea that reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals will help induce greater cooperation from Tehran and Pyongyang. The slam is popping up in so many places all at once that you start to wonder about a spin campaign. I don't know anyone who believes that nuclear arms cuts will cause a spontaneous change of heart in Iranian or North Korean leaders, but here's what I do believe:

• that disarmament moves by the nuclear 'haves' will serve the ball into their court, lessening US policy as the topic of focus in nonproliferation diplomacy and putting the spotlight squarely on the nuclear wannabes
• that living up to our end of the bargain will give us a strong argument to draw greater international support and increased pressure on Iran and North Korea
• that no regime is immune to outside pressure and that such regimes have countervailing interests that weigh against building nuclear arsenals (otherwise there wouldn't be such a hot debate in Iran over relations with the West)
• that moral authority must be combined with tough diplomacy and the remote but implicit threat of hard (conventional armed) power
• that we have many times more nuclear weapons than can be reasonably justified
• and that taking a hard line -- preserving military strength regardless of strategic rationale, issuing demands rather than bargaining hard over possible solutions -- makes even less of an impact and offers zero possibility of inducing cooperation.

In other words, we have no choice.

The Other Cheney Posted by James Lamond

So Liz Cheney, who has been in the news a lot lately, has a piece in the Wall Street Journal today, that is, to say the least, misrepresenting.  Here are a couple of the highlights: