The Elusive Civilian/Political Solution Posted by Heather Hurlburt

So why can't we talk about Pakistan?  Let me suggest a couple of paradoxes and one central problem:

after eight years (and more, if we're honest) of flabby discussion and flabbier media coverage, the chattertocracy in its left as well as center and right variants is much more comfortable talking about military responses than other kinds.  So Afghanistan has American lives at risk and units of "measure" -- troops killed, enemy killed, land cleared or held -- that our writers and readers feel much more comfortable addressing.  The fact that this is as true for the left as for the right is, I think, indisputable -- certainly I've moderated enough panels on the subject.  People are fascinated by the military.  The things it does, as I just noted, are more measurable and tangible.  An educated girl looks just the same on the outside -- assuming she ever gets outside her family compound -- as an illiterate girl.  A dead insurgent is easy to tell from a live one.

This has a bunch of sub-effects:  Pakistan is harder to talk about because the solutions don't involve American troops directly.  Civilian activities in Afghanistan get short shrift... because who really understands what they are?  Nobody can make a political career demanding better civilian activities... and, on the flip side, when people make claims for the efficacy of civilian activities, most of the commentariat is ill-placed to evaluate them.  

As a result of today's panel, I've begun nagging the IRC and similar groups to develop and publicize benchmarks on the civilian effort in both countries -- to give armchair commentators an easy follow-along tool.  But it's worth remembering to ask that question one's self -- and to develop a broader, deeper theory of the case about what civilian efforts actually can and can't accomplish.  More on that another time when I am not trying to elbow my way onto a flight. 

The Real Fight Updated Posted by Michael Cohen

Listening to the Netroots Nation discussion on Afghanistan, Matt Yglesias makes the following observation - and references the moderator of the panel, NSN's own Heather Hulrburt:

Hurlburt observed that everyone on the panel kept acknowledging that Pakistan is really the more important half of this equation and yet all the talk had been about Afghanistan. So she got her panelists to briefly address Pakistan. But then with that done the discussion shifted again, as if by force of gravity, back to Afghanistan.

That’s reflected my general experience of how these discussions go, and I think it’s a real problem. It’s genuinely true that the situation in Pakistan matters more and that the Afghanistan situation is worrying primarily because if its possible implications for Pakistan. That means we really do need to be talking about Pakistan.

My colleague Parag Khanna and I agree - and we said the same thing a few weeks ago. Now we took some grief on some of our specific Pakistan suggestions: some of them deserved. But the larger point stands; the real fight is in Pakistan not Afghanistan and that's where US energy needs to be focused and not just militarily, but also economically and diplomatically.

Beware the Surge Narrative Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at the New York Times, Thom Shanker buys the COIN narrative about the surge in Iraq, hook, line and sinker:

Under General Petraeus’s leadership at Fort Leavenworth, the military released a counterinsurgency field manual credited with helping turn around the war in Iraq and ending the armed services’ focus on heavily armored conventional warfare.

With that manual’s release, the American military was forced to embrace the messy irregular warfare that had been the core competency solely of a small specialty branch in the armed services — the Army Special Forces, known as Green Berets.

Well I suppose it's true that FM 3-24 is "credited" with turning around the Iraq war, it's also not accurate - or at the very least fails to reflect the complex number of reasons why Iraq has become more stable.  Credit must also go to the Shiite and Sunni death squads in Baghdad that helped turn that city from one that was once 65 percent Sunni to one that became 75 percent Shiite. Also the Medhi Army cease fire and the support for the Sunni Awakening in wiping out Al Qaeda in Iraq. It's not that the surge didn't have an impact, it's that it didn't have the level of impact the Shanker is ascribing to it.

But the more important problem here is one that I raised yesterday. The Times argues that the American military was forced to embrace "messy irregular war" and move away from "heavily armored conventional warfare."  Well it's not like they eschewed messy regular, conventional war in the process. From IraqBodyCount.org:

While the USA has used a variety of means in its surge strategy, military force has remained central, with the predictable outcome of new civilian lives lost. Airstrikes — the most frequent mode of US military attack involving civilian victims — have continued with regularity throughout the surge, killing 252 civilians in 2006 then — in the surge years — 943 in 2007 and 365 in 2008 (by end November).

COIN kills. In fact, all wars kill people. A new army manual that recommends "building relationships with wavering village elders and trust among distrustful village residents" is not going to change that basic fact.

Exit Strategies Posted by Patrick Barry

The panel moves to exit-strategies:

Spencer says a 1-2 year, intensive military mission, weighted toward the rapid development of Afghanistan's security forces, paired with a similtaneous effort aimed at governance and development.  Bottom line - it's going to take 3-5 years before U.S. operations can wind down to any significant exent.

Robert wants a re-orientation of focus to civilian and development, away from the military. He'd also like to see emphasis placed on re-integration of insurgents into Afghan (and also Pakistan?) society.

With a more than a touch of skepticism, Anne emphasizes the need for development efforts, led by Afghans, but then goes on to suggest that at best you're looking at a divided Afghanistan, with the insurgency remaining strong, particularly in the south and east.  

Richard answers the exit-strategy question differently, stating that there are simply too many developments that have to play out to divine the parameters of U.S. dis-engagement.  One thing that is simply not an option is to continue the incoherent, and under-resourced policies of the Bush administration.  

and then there was Pakistan Posted by Patrick Barry

The panel finally gets to Pakistan, a topic they admit is as crucial, if not more so, than the mission in Afghanistan. One obvious, but still unanswered question comes to mind.  There's been a sea-change in the U.S.' thinking on Pakistan, with congress recognizing that our assistance relationship requires a dramatic re-orientation of focus toward development and governance, away from Pakistan's military.  But given the Pakistan government's inability to project its writ into the country's most volatile areas, is the assistance going to be any more helpful or accountable than the money we previously funneled to Musharraf under the Bush administration? 

Making Afghans Responsible Posted by Patrick Barry

Touching on some observations made by Spencer about making Afghans the focus of governance and development initiatives, Anne argues that it's an excellent theory, but it remains to be seen how those good intentions manifest themselves. 

I'd add that the subject of Afghan capacity building tends to get mentioned as an off-ramp, a pathway to a future where the U.S. is not so actively involved in the region.  This sounds nice, particularly to those of us who are interested in an eventual end-date to U.S. operations. But let's not kid ourselves, getting Afghan capacity to a base-level that allows the U.S. to take a back-seat is a daunting project. 

Afghanistan's security forces are a prime example of this.  If you assume that the ANSF needs to get to the numbers mentioned by members of Gen. McChrystal's civilian advisory team, you're looking at a mission requiring substantial training aimed at professionalization and billions of dollars in military assistance.  

Mission Creeps Posted by Patrick Barry

Spencer, ever the agonostic, describes the Obama administration's thinking on Afghanistan, suggesting that there is an increasing awareness that the mission is much tougher than they imagined.

At the same time, there's a feeling - discussed by Stephen Biddle in a recent CFR conference call - that since the effort has been so pitiful to this point, the U.S. is somewhat obligated to put forth an actual, resourced strategy.  

More of the same Posted by Patrick Barry

Picking up from an observation made by panelist Robert Greenwald, Anne observes that the Obama administration's policies in Afghanistan so far resemble policies implemented by the Bush administration.  

Leaving aside the broader strategic picture, I'm not sure that's true in every case.  The Obama administration has pretty dramatically increased attention and resources directed at operations in the region.  One example of this is the Administration's increase in non-military assistance to Afghanistan by 25% in this year's budgeting.

Where is our focus? Posted by Patrick Barry

Anne Richard, Vice-President for Government Relations and Advocacy at the International Rescue Committee, notes that the preponderance of reporting on Afghanistan and Pakistan has to this point focused on troop levels.  This focus ignores the moral and humanitarian dimensions bound up within the region's challenges.  

Why are we in Afghanistan? Posted by Patrick Barry

Heather opens up the panel with an 'easy question' - what are the U.S.' core interests in Afghanistan?

Spencer observers that a syndicate of insurgents and terrorists operating in the region is at the core of discussions of American interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  All other issues affecting the region are secondary to this problem.

Stephen Biddle did a nice job of analyzing the justifications for our presence in Afghanistan in a piece for the American Interest.