Vetting Ourselves to Death Posted by Patrick Barry

Paul Farmer wasn't alone as he languished in State Department limbo this summer.  According to Dave Herbert of National Journal, a crop of would-be interns also fell victim to a vetting process that is receiving increased criticism for going too far: 

"...while the trials and tribulations of top-level appointees are well-documented, security clearance delays are much worse at the lowest rungs of the State Department. Half a dozen current and former interns complained to National Journal.com that start dates are routinely pushed back because of the slow pace of clearances."

Given what I've heard about the average internship experience at State, it's tough for me to fully sympathize. While State is doing these prospective civil-servants a disservice by stringing them along like this, the fact that we still don't have a USAID administrator seems like a far bigger tragedy.  But as Herbert points out, these interns' woes point to a much bigger flaw with State's clearance and vetting process:

Looming in the background are charges of even more serious dysfunctions. Concerned Foreign Service Officers, which is made up of current and former State Department employees, alleges that investigators sometimes practice ethnic and religious profiling, robbing Foggy Bottom of applicants with critical language skills. And Hirsch argued that unlike the Office of Personnel Management and the Department of Defense, which conducted the majority of clearance applications, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security doesn't have enough checks against profiling.

This is a serious, serious problem.  Take Afghanistan. Where exactly is State going to get the Dari or Pashto speakers so critical for the U.S. to have any chance of stabilizing the country?  As of the publication of this Gareth Porter article from last May, there were only 18 Pashto-speaking FSOs in the entire department, and only 2 stationed in-theater.  One obvious way of quickly correcting this deficiency would be to heavily recruit Afghan-born U.S. citizens.  But its unclear whether such a push can be successful, given the dysfunctional vetting process that Herbert describes.    

State Department Reform Posted by David Shorr

Many thanks to Mark Goldberg at UN Dispatch for helping foster discussion a favorite topic: how to remedy the weakened state of our civilian international affairs agencies. The latest catalyst was an expression of despair by public diplomacy expert and blogger Matt Armstrong, who asked whether the State Department's weaknesses demand that we scrap its entire set-up and rebuild from the ground up. In response, Spencer Ackerman then offers thoughts about the nature, difficulty, and history of bureaucratic reform, with reference to Goldwater-Nichols.

I'd like to add some points about the 'why' of reform -- what should reform give us? This being a favorite topic, I might need to do a little recycling, first from a December 2008 Foreign Service Journal piece I wrote with Derek Chollet and Vikram Singh:

Every international problem confronting the United States includes more variables than ever before. This is an age of stakeholder proliferation — from the private sector and powerful NGOs to rising powers, and from criminal and terrorist networks to workers in the globa supply chain. To have any chance of shaping world events, Washingtonmust be alert to this panoply of actors and engaged at many levels in the intricate dynamics that determine political trends and policy decisions around the globe.

Accordingly, the essential aim of any effort to strengthen the U.S. civilian agencies must be to extend America’s lines of communication and cooperation to reach those on whom future peace and prosperity hinge. In the same way that globalizing trends have broken down international barriers for information and business, the United States must break down communication barriers to understand others’ concerns, by expanding ties further beyond the confines of officialdom in national capitals, and by responding more diligently and creatively to emerging problems. We won’t be able to do this without more effective — and better resourced — civilian agencies. Just as we need to invest in education and science to ensure that the American work force can compete and thrive in the globalizing world, wemust likewise transform our government to be competitive in the effort to sustain America’s global power in the 21st century.

Standish in the Line of Fire Posted by Adam Blickstein

Chris Bodenner over at Sullivan's blog flags an important story out of Standish, Michigan, where the possibility of turning the soon to be shuttered Standish Maximum Correctional Facility into a detention facility for Guantanamo detainees, has made the small town an epicenter for the often hyperbolic and politicized detainee debate. Of course it doesn't help the cause of having a rational and reasonable conversation over the issue when Pete Hoekstra, no stranger to politicizing national security debates, is also running for Governor. Which is why it shouldn't be surprising that a recent town hall there turned into a three ring circus replete with stark mischaracterizations and over the top rhetoric. According to the Washington Post:

"He [Hoekstra] told me things that really scared the heck out of me," Munson said. "He told me about soft targets and safe zones, that if they came to this country they would have rights, visitors and friends would come who could be jihadists."

Hoekstra, ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, told those in the crowd that they have much to fear if the detainees are transferred to Standish, a town of 1,500 about 150 miles north of Detroit.

But what is more striking about the coverage is the lack of balance in the Post piece as compared to the local Standsh paper, which covers the townhall with a far more skeptical eye then the Post, whose only counterbalance is a wavering local political official who asserted that federal officials said they "would not send detainees to Standish in the face of intense local opposition." But the the context and tenor of the town hall are important to gauging the overall coverage of the event and the issue, and the Standish paper includes a few extremely important points the Post misses:

Hoekstra was asked later if a federal detention center in Florence, Colo., which also houses terrorists, was ever the site of an attempted jailbreak by terrorists’ allies.

Hoekstra said that the Colorado facility, which he said only detains terrorists captured on American soil, not in foreign countries during wartime, had never had an incident like that.

And:

One person in the crowd, Brent Snelgrove, a Standish businessman, agreed that there was a lack of information, but showed displeasure with one-sidedness of the meeting.

“I’m disappointed in this panel,” he said. “I don’t see both sides of the conversation

“20 years ago I heard some of the same concerns… almost identical,” he added.

This is key. The Post's coverage makes it appear that, from the town hall, there is consensus in the commmunity that turning the Standish facility into a domestic detainee prison is a bad idea. There is not consensus:

The group wasn't protesting the prospect of Guantánamo Bay terrorism suspects coming to the town about two hours north of Detroit: They're picketing over their prison's scheduled closure.

The Gitmo detainees are welcome, if they keep the 604-bed prison in this city of about 1,200 up and running.

"If it keeps jobs in the community, it would be fine," said Dave Horn, 29, of Bentley, who was among those picketing over the scheduled Oct. 1 closing of the 19-year-old state prison.

But reading the Post's piece makes it seem like an open and shut case. And this has been the problem with both cable and print news coverage of town halls across America this summer: often the loudest, and most vocal, and usually most factually invalid arguments, get taken as gospel simply do to audible superiority. It's undercut the healthcare debate, but the detainee debate is almost more susceptible to this kind of action and coverage simply because the issue is far more visceral for folks, with good reason. But as Hoekstra said:

"It's possible that people will come to a different conclusion than I have," he said. "But this is too big a deal to make a decision based on only partial information."

Yes, Rep. Hoekstra, I agree too big a deal to make decision based on partial information, which is why it is essential the Administration put forth a clear and concrete plan (and strategy--both in implementation and media) so that the process of closing Guantanamo and transferring detainees is done so in a responsible, transparent and safe manner. But it is also too big a deal to imbue it with false information and political fear mongering, something Rep. Hoekstra seems to have no problem forcing to the forefront of the debate for his own political gain. And this kind of political grandstanding from a gubernatorial candidate in the context of closing Guantanamo will make it politically very difficult to utilize the Standish facility as a place to detain and possibly try terror suspects currently being held at Gitmo.

It's pretty clear that for the GOP, making "death panel" arguments across the political spectrum in order to incite public panic and skew the media coverage seems to be the only strategy they have left.

Who's Being Myopic Here? Posted by Michael Cohen

Jari Lindholm has an excellent blog that is wrongly titled the Stupidest Man on Earth: he is anything but.
Unfortunately, however, his blog post today on the safe haven question in Af/Pak misses the mark. Speaking of the Taliban, he says:

After years of jihad alongside al-Qaeda and other international militants, they would not merely allow terrorist organisations to use Afghanistan as a base; they would encourage it. Naturally, toppling the Pakistani government by supporting their Pashtun brethren would be high on the Taleban to-do list, as they would want to see a friendly, ISI-backed general return to power in Islamabad. In turn, they would gladly help in providing him with the terrorist cannon fodder he would need for his covert operations in India.

But if this is the case and the Afghan Taliban represent an existential threat to Pakistan, why is the Pakistan government continuing to allow the presence of an Afghan Taliban safe haven in their country? And surely Jari knows that when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan they relied in great measure on the support of Pakistan. If the Afghan Taliban represent such an existential threat to Pakistan then why doesn't the Pakistani military do something about it? Now I suppose Jari might argue here that Pakistan's civilian government has little power over the military or ISI, which views the Afghan Taliban as strategic depth against India. But didn't the Pakistani military willingly just wage war against other Pashtun insurgents? Does he really believe that if the Afghan Taliban represented an existential threat to Pakistan - or created terrorist bases for attacking Pakistan -- that the military wouldn't step in? I'll admit I'm not sure I even understand the argument being made here.

Also, while I suppose it's entirely possible that high on the Taliban to-do list would be to topple the Pakistani government - so what? Without Pakistani support how would the Taliban even stay in power no less cause the toppling of a neighboring country with a fairly powerful military. Where else are they going to go for support?

As for the notion "we need 101,000 soldiers in Afghanistan to prevent Pakistan and India from going to war" I don't get this either. Is there really no other option at our disposal to prevent two nuclear armed nations from going to war? Is he arguing that we have to keep American troops ad infinitum in Afghanistan because these two countries hate each other and might fight a war. Talk about a rather expansive view of American national interests and responsibility.

5 Thoughts on the Afghan Elections Posted by Patrick Barry

With the Afghan elections having taken place today amidst extraordinarily difficult circumstances, I thought I would offer up a few things to keep in mind when reading the coverage:

You go to Afghanistan with the elections you have, not the elections you wish you had.  Given the escalating violence, reports of corruption and vote-rigging, and evidence of the Afghan government's lack of capacity, many observers have asked: "Why even have the elections in the first place?"  As news of violence and possible fraud flows in, I expect more and more will question the wisdom of holding elections at this time.  I think the simple, if not entirely satisfying, answer is that there really are no alternatives.  Afghanistan's electoral commission has already suspended the elections once, a decision in conflict with the country's constitution.  To do so again, via a state of emergency or something along those lines, would be a disaster.  Think back to Pakistan in 2007, when ruler Pervez Musharraf instituted marshal law following a contested election. The country is still recovering from that crisis. As the International Crisis Group noted in their report on Afghanistan's elections, opening the polls today is simply the "least bad option."

Can the Taliban take it too far? Posted by Patrick Barry

Spencer is justifiably concerned that there doesn't appear to be a plan in place for quelling violence in Afghanistan post-election.  Given the impetus for insurgents to make good on their threats, not to mention the various other contingencies that could arise due to a contested election outcome, its not reassuring to hear that NATO-ISAF is betting that Afghans' resilience wins the day.

Still, I wonder whether the insurgency's campaign of violence and intimidation reaches a point of dimishing returns.  When do attacks on voters become too much for Afghans to bear?  So far the Taliban appears to prefer symbolic strikes that inspire fear, rather than a large-scale crackdown, which could spin out of control, diminishing their base of support. But when, if ever, does the threat of force become insufficient for disrupting the elections? And later, after the polls close, does the Taliban really expect to reap revenge on every Afghan who voted?  Is there a cost for failing to follow-up fully on such threats?

9 GOP Senators Who Don't Closely Follow U.S. Intelligence Posted by Adam Blickstein

Manu Raju reports that 9 Republican senators, led by GOP Whip Jon Kyl and Minority Chair of the Senate Intel Committee Kit Bond, sent a letter to Eric Holder expressing concern over reports that he may name a special prosecutor to investigate officials for transgressions during the interrogation of terrorist detainees. That debate aside, the letter again contains a patently false and demonstratively manipulated assertion over the value of intelligence gathered during the torture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed:

The interrogation of KSM yielded information that was vital to apprehending other al Qaeda terrorists and preventing additional attacks on the United States, including the plot to destroy the Library Tower in Los Angeles.

This argument has been used time and time again to justify the Bush administration's use of torture, even if the facts don't back up the claim, as Timothy Noah succinctly pointed out in Slate in April:

What clinches the falsity of Thiessen's claim, however (and that of the memo he cites, and that of an unnamed Central Intelligence Agency spokesman who today seconded Thessen's argument), is chronology. In a White House press briefing, Bush's counterterrorism chief, Frances Fragos Townsend, told reporters that the cell leader was arrested in February 2002, and "at that point, the other members of the cell" (later arrested) "believed that the West Coast plot has been canceled, was not going forward" [italics mine]. A subsequent fact sheet released by the Bush White House states, "In 2002, we broke up [italics mine] a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest building on the West Coast." These two statements make clear that however far the plot to attack the Library Tower ever got—an unnamed senior FBI official would later tell the Los Angeles Times that Bush's characterization of it as a "disrupted plot" was "ludicrous"—that plot was foiled in 2002. But Sheikh Mohammed wasn't captured until March 2003.

Since it's clear that basic facts don't matter too much for the GOP during the health care debate (and for that matter the energy debate), why should we expect a different standard for matters of national security and counter-terrorism?  The impending reality of "death panels," the vital information gathered during the torture of high level detainees, to the GOP's singular political aspirations, they're one in the same.

Hey Bob, I Think You're A Little Late to the Game Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at abu muqawama, Andew Exum links approvingly to Robert Kaplan's attack on the choice of Chris Hill as the US ambassador to Iraq.

Most everyone seems to agree that Hill is a star diplomat, but Kaplan's problem seems to be that Hill isn't an Arabist. It was a criticism that was raised during his confirmation hearings and at the time I found it an unfair critique, particularly since Hill has shown an ability to move effectively from one troubled hot spot to another: in Hill's case, from the Balkans to North Korea.

Indeed, it's hard to reconcile Hill's pretty extraordinary diplomatic experience with Kaplan's snide tone:

At this sensitive juncture, the U.S. ambassador’s role as trusted facilitator who can keep the various parties talking and cooperating with each other is crucial. A successful behind-the-scenes deal or two could mean the difference between war and peace in Iraq—and by inference in the wider Middle East. Shouldn’t this job go to someone in whom we can have supreme confidence?

Why should we assume that another possible Ambassador, because they happen to speak Arabic, would be any better at this job? Why should we assume that any US ambassador would be able to do what Kaplan is demanding of Hill?  Doesn't this depend, just a little, on the Iraqis themselves. And again, Hill has repeatedly shown an ability to negotiate with a tough band of interlocutors.  And it is pretty much par for the course that Robert Kaplan thinks retired general, Anthony Zinni would be perfect for the job. After all, when a job calls for a seasoned diplomat, who would be better than a retired general.

Nonetheless, Kaplan is certainly welcome to his opinion.

But here's the part about this piece that I find really odd. Chris Hill was confirmed four months ago to be Ambassador to Iraq. Allow me to repeat that: Chris Hill was confirmed four months ago to be Ambassador to Iraq. His nomination was announced 6 months ago.

Now I know that Atlantic is a monthly, but would it be fair to say that the train has left the station on this one. Clearly Chris Hill is not going to be recalled and it seems interesting that even though he's had the job for four months, Kaplan doesn't come up with a single substantive critique of his performance to date. Indeed, Kaplan's entire vein of criticism is based almost exclusively on conjecture.

So it sort of begs the question: what the hell is the point of this piece?

Pre-Election Violence in Afghanistan Posted by Patrick Barry

With Afghans traveling to the polls tomorrow, security is on everyone's mind.  One thing that's striking is the sophistication with which the insurgency goes about undermining the electoral process, fueling perceptions of insecurity, without tilting too far in the direction of mass-violence that could provoke a backlash.  This reflects the insurgent's calculation that they can win the contest over the elections simply by keeping enough Afghans home for the process to appear illegitimate.  

I think what you're seeing is essentially a three-pronged strategy for disrupting the elections.  First is the ongoing, but intensifying attacks on coalition forces.  By increasing the number of daily attacks on NATO-ISAF troops, the insurgency contributes to an overall dynamic of insecurity in the run-up to the elections. Such attacks have the added benefit of enhancing the insurgents' status as defenders against a foreign occupier, critical for drawing continued support from ordinary Afghans.

The second is a campaign of intimidation and so far targeted violence, carried out against Afghans wanting to participate in their countries electoral process.  Using fearsome tactics as night letters and attacks on election officials, insurgents are clearly hoping to stir up enough anxiety amongst the public that people will decide to avoid the polls.  What strikes me is that insurgency appears to recognize that if it engages in too much pre-election violence directed at Afghans, they increase the possibility of a backlash against them.  Better to keep the powder dry for now.

Third, and most recent of the three, have been the attacks on Kabul. From what I can tell these strikes are meant to accomplish a few things.  One, as the hub of political activity in Afghanistan, Kabul represents an enticing target for insurgents hoping for a multiplier effect. A bombing in Afghanistan's center forces Afghans on the country's periphery to ask, 'if they can strike there, where can't they strike?' adding to fears that political participation will be met with violence.  Two, attacks on Kabul further destabilize an already corrupt, and an unpopular central government, adding to the disaffection felt by most Afghanistan for their political leadership.  And finally, given the close scrutiny of these elections worldwide, Kabul functions as a prime target for insurgents hoping to weaken international resolve.

While I spent the most time analyzing the intents behind the recent attacks on Kabul, I actually think the second aspect will be the most critical for whether these elections are considered a success or not.  For evidence of how seriously both sides are treating this contest over the electorate, look at this Wall Street Journal article about a tribal scheme for election security, or this Guardian piece discussing the Taliban's plans to shift rump commanders to areas where their writ is being contested. It's likely that the outcome of this struggle won't be clear till well after the polls are closed, making it troubling that the international coalition hasn't got a clear plan for post-election security.  

The Safe Haven Myth and Other Dubious Assumptions Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at FP.com, Stephen Walt has an excellent take down of the Al Qaeda safe haven myth, which has become the dominant rationale for maintaining the US presence in Afghanistan. While many of Walt's arguments are similar to ones that I've made here - he does the all-important job of exposing many of the fallacies and dubious assumptions in the safe haven argument. For example:

While it is true that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden a sanctuary both before and after 9/11, it is by no means clear that they would give him free rein to attack the United States again. Protecting al Qaeda back in 2001 brought no end of trouble to Mullah Omar and his associates, and if they were lucky enough to regain power, it is hard to believe they would give us a reason to come back in force.

It's worth a read.

While we're on the subject of dubious assumption, Bernard Finel, who has been yeoman's work writing about COIN and Afghanistan, offers a takedown of Stephen Biddle's "Is It Worth It?" article from the American Interest. I wrote about this a few weeks ago, but Finel reminded me of something that I had forgotten to mention in my initial analysis - this argument from Biddle:

If the Taliban regained control of the Afghan state, their ability to use the state’s resources to destabilize the secular government in Pakistan would increase the risk of state collapse there. Analysts have made much of the threat that Pakistani Taliban base camps pose to the stability of the government in Kabul, but the danger works both ways: Instability in Afghanistan also poses a serious threat to the secular civilian government in Pakistan. This is the single greatest U.S. interest in Afghanistan: to prevent it from aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems and magnifying the danger of an al-Qaeda nuclear-armed sanctuary there.

I have to admit, I don't understand this argument at all. One of the big takeaways from reading Seth Jones new book on Afghanistan was that in the years after the Taliban was dislodged from power and took up safe haven in Pakistan they received support and protection from the Pakistani government. Indeed, perhaps the greatest impediment to stopping the Taliban insurgency is the failure of the Pakistani government to crack down on Taliban sanctuaries - a point raised by the New York Times in July:

Obama administration officials . . . express frustration that Pakistan is failing to act against the full array of Islamic militants using the country as a base. Instead, they say, Pakistani authorities have chosen to fight Pakistani Taliban who threaten their government, while ignoring Taliban and other militants fighting Americans in Afghanistan or terrorizing India.

The United States maintains that the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, leads an inner circle of commanders who guide the war in southern Afghanistan from their base in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. American officials say this Taliban council, known as the Quetta shura, is sheltered by Pakistani authorities, who may yet want to employ the Taliban as future allies in Afghanistan.

According to Biddle's argument the Pakistani government should at least be theoretically concerned about a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. But if they are, they're not showing it. It sure seems as though without active Pakistani support the Taliban insurgency would be much weaker than it is today. I got to say, if your key rationale for maintaining a robust troop presence in Afghanistan is to prevent "aggravating Pakistan’s internal problems" wouldn't it be helpful if the Pakistanis had the same view?

In fact, back in July the Pakistanis were complaining that the US war in Afghanistan risked doing the exact opposite and destabilizing Pakistan by forcing Taliban across the border into Baluchistan.

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan does not have enough troops to deploy to Baluchistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with its archenemy, India, the officials said. Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

Now I think we can agree that the Pakistanis have the troops to take on the Taliban - but the fact that they choose not to do so should speak volumes about Biddle's argument. Pakistan has long viewed Afghanistan as a sort of strategic reserve depth - that certainly was the case in the 1990s and their support for the Taliban then.  While it seems hard to imagine they necessarily want to a return to a pre-9/11 situation it's even harder to buy the notion that we need to be in Afghanistan in order to protect Pakistan.

At the very least, we haven't done a good job of convincing Pakistan.