Crazyland Posted by Patrick Barry

At times over the last few months, the debate over the way forward in Afghanistan has been bitter, with strong opinions on all sides.  As heated as it's been, I think it's mostly an important exercise, that can help push policy in the right direction.  But a special exception has to be made for people like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who think the best way to responsibly fund America's mission in Afghanistan, is by re-directing money from the United Nations. Apparently financing what she defines as a critical national security mission means slicing funding from a U.N. umbrella which includes under it such enterprises as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan.

You Must Incentivize Posted by Patrick Barry

Last night, I wrote about how the loose time frame the administration has announced for the mission in Afghanistan reflects an understanding that the promise of disengagement can leverage better, more constructive involvement from Afghanistan's neighbors - particularly Pakistan, but Iran, China, and others as well.  Matt Yglesias highlights why this is so important by pointing out that right now, the U.S. doesn't have much leverage over Pakistan, particularly when it comes to things like maintaining civilian rule.

Especially given the administration’s just-made commitment to send more troops, more civilians, and more money to Afghanistan do we really believe that if there’s a coup next week the Obama administration is going to cut Pakistan off? This strikes me as on a par with the problematic “no blank check” for Karzai part of the speech. If you want to make American commitment to something conditional (on good-faith anti-corruption efforts by the Afghan government, or on the Pakistan military’s willingness to stay out of politics) then you need to define the rationale for engagement in terms that make the conditionality seem credible.

Frankly, I don't see an easy way out of this dilemma in the short-term.  The best way for the U.S. to make conditionality more credible would be to reduce dependency.  And sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan (troops that will be supplied via transit routes running through Pakistan) doesn't accomplish that. 

So what is there for the U.S. to do, if imposing conditions lacks oomph? Anticipating the blogosphere's interest in this question last month while testifying on the Hill, Christine Fair suggested that "[n]egative inducements alone will not succeed: Washington must also consider new positive inducements." Well wait a minute! Didn't we just give Pakistan like a bajillion dollars? And didn't they raise a big stink about it? Well Fair's oral testimony went into more detail, describing how basic military and civilian assistance hasn't really worked to change behavior, and recommending that the U.S. consider things like security guarantees and trade agreements as alternative vehicles to generate cooperation. I'm not going to wade through the precise details of how an arrangement like that would work.  Instead I'll end by observing that U.S. foreign policy thinking generally seems preoccupied with coercion and conditions, but not nearly as concerned with incentives\inducements.

Lingering Questions for the President Posted by The Editors

This post is by Center for American Progress Senior Policy Analyst Caroline Wadhams.

The Administration hit the right tone in terms of making the case for why the United States should remain engaged in Afghanistan while acknowledging our own economic crisis and that “we are passing through a time of great trial.”  His timeline for transitioning security to Afghans beginning in 2011 was key and matches with a position a few of us have taken at the Center for American Progress – that the war in Afghanistan can no longer be open-ended and that we need to establish a timeframe for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Obama’s rhetorical skill was again on display with his remarks to foreign publics, especially to the Afghans when he stated, “I want the Afghan people to understand – America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country.”  He reached out to the Pakistani public, reminding them that we are the biggest contributor to their displaced population and that “going forward, the Pakistani people must know: America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.”  But he also rallied the American public around good old traditional American values.  I especially liked this line:  “For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations.” This was a delicate juggling act appealing to such a diverse audience.

I do, however, have a few questions and concerns regarding elements of the speech.  Here they are:   

No mention of justice: While Obama mentioned supporting agriculture as a top U.S. priority, he made no mention of improving justice in his civilian strategy despite this being a top grievance for Afghans, a mobilizing tool for insurgents, and an essential way to battle corruption. 

Personalization of aid: He implied that the U.S. government would increase funding to individuals at the local level. “We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people.”  Did he mean to say that we will support Governorships, Provincial councils and local institutions? A personalization of our assistance could be dangerous because of our limited knowledge of the players.  It could also further weaken government institutions and undermine coordination with our partners.

Use of troops: Obama stated that additional U.S. troops would be used to protect population centers and train Afghan security forces. While he didn’t mention this in the speech, many have reported that these troops will go the south and east where the Taliban insurgency is strongest.  Will a surge of U.S. troops in these regions, where we are largely disliked, feed into the Taliban narrative of foreign occupation?   Will we serve to inflame more than resolve despite our best intentions?   Can we protect populations who do not like us from insurgents that they may now support?

Pakistan partnership: Obama described an expansion of the Pakistan partnership.  I like the idea of this, but I do not know what it means now.  Are we going to provide more military aid?  Our main vehicle for this partnership was money in the Kerry-Lugar bill ($1.5 billion per year for five years for non-military assistance).  However, that legislation has caused outrage in Pakistan, increasing tensions between the civilian and military establishments.   What tools do we have now to improve the relationship?  

Threat conflation: His characterization of the threat was a little sloppy – equating those attacking the Pakistani state as the same as those attacking Afghans was not accurate. “Gradually, the Taliban has begun to take control over swaths of Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.”  Intelligence assessments indicate that they work together, but  Mullah Omar (head of Afghan Taliban) has also distanced himself, at least publicly from the Pakistani Taliban’s attacks. 

Speech Thoughts - UPDATED Posted by Michael Cohen

Perhaps not surprisingly, I had a somewhat different view of the President's speech than my blogmates here at Democracy Arsenal.  Just a few scattered thoughts below:

• The back third of the speech was lovely and a wonderful description of what a progressive foreign policy might look like. But only a speaker as rhetorically gifted as President Obama could use an escalation of troop levels in Afghanistan as a time to call for a more modest and restrained foreign policy!

• Where was the beef? Nothing on benchmarks, no explanation of what conditions on the ground would cause a delay in transfer of authority to the Afghan government, no clear sense of the Administration's expectations of the Karzai government. The American people deserved more specifics than they got - and less scare tactics.

• The war on terror is back! I suppose I shouldn't be surprised that the President raised the specter of al Qaeda and 9/11 repeatedly, but it was unseemly and even crass. I thought we were going to de-emphasize the threat of al Qaeda terrorism in an Obama Administration.

• Along those lines, I can't believe Obama conflated the Pakistan Taliban with the Afghan Taliban even though the former is at war with the Pakistani government and the latter is a recipient of its protection.

• I note with great irony that he didn't use the word counter-insurgency once . .  or counter-terrorism

• In the end, big on platitudes, short on substance. I can't say I walked away with a clear sense of what the strategy is for Afghanistan and whether the President even endorses the McChrystal review. Didn't we go through this exact situation 8 months ago? But again this is the public launch; hopefully more details will be forthcoming for Congress this week.

UPDATED: Here are a few additional thoughts over at AOL News

A Reaction from Europe Posted by The Editors

This post is by Center for American Progress Senior Fellow Brian Katulis

A Reaction from Europe:
Europe Watches as America Shoulders a Heavier Burden in Afghanistan

Rome is about the halfway point between Washington DC and Kabul, but it might as well be on another planet when it comes to Afghanistan.

I just watched the speech in the middle of the night here in Italy, where I was speaking on a panel with the European Union’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Ettore Sequi, among others.

Seeing the day-long media frenzy in America via almost breathless blog posts and Tweets about White House pre-briefs and CNN’s John King running his finger across his magic maps, I was struck by how much more distant Afghanistan feels from Europe than when I’m back in the United States.

Bemused indifference is what the mood feels like in the cafes and wine bars out on the streets here when it comes to Afghanistan.  The war there is not the Iraq war, and no one’s about to rush out in protest against more troops to Afghanistan, particularly if they are mostly US troops.  It’s not considered an illegitimate war, and I think many would like to see it all come to an end.  But because there haven’t been huge costs in terms of lives and money, the impact is not felt as strongly here in Europe.  Don’t get me wrong - America’s key allies have troops and diplomats risking their lives in Afghanistan.  Some European families have paid the ultimate price in losing family members to the conflict.   But the burden doesn’t feel as heavy over here as it does in America, and the debate on Afghanistan, when it occurs, seems much more distant than it does in the U.S.

Inside the policy conference hall, it was a different story.  The Middle East peace panel probably attracted the most attention and passion, but the Afghanistan/Pakistan panel I was on was well attended too.  The EU equivalent of Richard Holbrooke, more or less, Ambassador Sequi was very impressive - he knows Afghanistan well, and had served as Italy’s ambassador in Kabul from 2004 to 2008.  Sequi makes a very strong case for the important component President Obama talked about in his speech - the “civilian surge,” that I wrote about here.

The Council of the European Union earlier this fall issued this statement on “Strengthening EU action in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” which is chock full of ideas on strengthening governance, rule of law, and the economy.  Not surprising - Europe is, after all, the land of “soft power.” And all of this is quite possibly very helpful - these efforts are core to the mission, as General Stanley McChrystal’s assessment highlighted earlier this year: 

“ISAF cannot succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts.  Effective civilian capabilities and resources mechanisms are critical to achieving demonstrable progress.”

Some European governments seem prepared to help on certain fronts like the civilian surge, but we’ll have to wait for a conference in London next month to see if substantially more resources will come from Europe.  Let’s not hold our breath.

Nice try, McCain Posted by The Editors

This is a post  by NSN Executive Assistant Luis Vertiz

As my fellow commentator Michael Signer noted, Senator John McCain was just speaking on CBS news with Katie Couric. And he was asked how we could pay for the escalation of US troops in Afghanistan. He proposed eliminating earmarks to try to pay for the escalation. However, his failed amendment to the FY 2010 omnibus spending bill, which would have eliminated over 9,000 budgetary earmarks, would have only cut $7 billion dollars from a $410 billion dollar budget.

In his speech, President Obama said he would be candid and tell the American people the total costs of his new Afghanistan policy. He estimated that the cost would be around $30 billion dollars a year. Somebody get McCain an abacus, because $7 billion does not even come close to coming to $30 billion dollars.

The right commitment to Pakistan Posted by Patrick Barry

One of the problems of live-blogging is that you get hung up on some things and miss others.  And big surprise, I missed the President's comments on Pakistan.  While I'll caveat what I'm about to say that the U.S. has got to do a better job of managing the Pakistan element of this strategic equation - since its stability is in many ways far more important for U.S. interests than Afghanistan's - I was heartened by a few things the President said.  What struck me was how he framed the U.S.' long-term commitment to the Pakistani people.  It wasn't in terms of the military effort poured into Afghanistan, or the assistance to Pakistan's military.  Instead he called for the U.S. to "remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent."  This is the kind of support that shows resolve, and that sways public opinion in the long-run.  Not tens of thousands of troops. 

Cost Posted by Michael Signer

I just watched John McCain be interviewed by Katie Couric and concede that cost and budgeting the war were crucial concerns.  I was struck by one change: the President's speech has already shaped a new landscape for his opponents, one where cost, containment, and an overt strategy (by definition, debatable) are the defining features.  It's unfamiliar terrain, to be sure -- not just given the recent history of the Bush administration but also other conflicts such as LBJ's conduct of Vietnam or Reagan's Nicaraguan policy.  But probably for a nation grappling with a new direction in a new age, grounding us in hard concerns before groping for the clouds is the right path. 

What an Example Means on the Battlefied Posted by Patrick Barry

Setting an example back home by sticking to our best principles, enshrined in our constitution may seem like a nice-sounding rhetorical point.  But it's worth remembering that our example, good or bad, has very serious repercussions for our men and women in uniform.  There is clear evidence that practices like torture and symbols like black sites and Guantanamo Bay are a huge boon for terrorist recruiters.  So when the President re-commits the country to a higher standard, he's undercutting extremists who target Americans in places like Helmand and Kandahar. 

Now if only he could get Bagram straightened out... 

Timelines and exit strategies Posted by James Lamond

In the speech the president said:

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort – one that would commit us to a nation building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what we can achieve at a reasonable cost, and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

This is a line that some conservatives have been pushing this week.  John Kyl and John McCain were both pushing that line this weekend.  Frankly, i just dont understand how someone can seriously argue that we should NOT have an exit strategy.