On Top of a Pile of Money, with Many Copies of 'The World is Flat' Posted by Patrick Barry

Browsing the New York Times website today, I noticed that a lot of people are reading Tom Friedman's column opposing the President's decision on Afghanistan.  That's really too bad, because the column is one of the silliest pieces of commentary I've read about the war.  The man is entitled to his view, but anyone seeking to base their opinion on Afghanistan on the what Friedman says should really think twice.  Certainly, it's within reason to assert that Afghanistan "is just too expensive, when balanced against our needs for nation-building in America, so that we will have the strength to play our broader global role."  That's some compelling cost-benefit analysis.  In fact, you might even say it should be the principle that's applied everytime the U.S. considers a larger-scale operation on foreign soil. But, as Friedman's stubborn refusal to issue a genuine mea culpa on the Iraq war illustrates, he has decided to ignore his own advice.

It's astonishing to me that Friedman can argue (somewhat persuasively) that Afghanistan is not worth the investment, when the long-term vitality of the country requires that investment be directed elsewhere, and in the same breath say that the Iraq War, costly though it may have been, was somehow worth doing because of fantastical idea that the U.S. military could transform the entire Middle East.  I feel like mashing my finger down on the question mark key.

Cause and Effect is Based on Perspective Posted by The Editors

This post is by NSN Executive Assistant Luis Vertiz.

As Pat noted below, Senator Ben Cardin proposed the best question of the morning so far, asking how metrics and benchmarks we place on the Afghan government will determine the pace we will transition troops out of Afghanistan starting in July 2011. He wanted to know what specific metrics would be in place to measure progress of our renewed efforts. Admiral Mullen offered the ability of the Karzai government to place government representatives in districts across the country, and not just in the most currently secure districts, as metric to measure Afghan improvements towards governance reform. Cardin quickly cut in, asking if that doesn't happen, does that mean we ought to stay longer to help the Afghans or does that mean we cut our losses and accelerate a troop withdrawal?

Pat is right in noting Secretary Clinton's evasion of that question. Making a hard declaration of US policy could help Taliban forces to better plan for a US withdrawal. However, not answering that question will hasten support from a fickle left wing of the Democratic Party which hopes to see less blood and treasure spilled in Central Asia. I doubt this question will get an explicit answer from this, or any administration, as the President would want to maintain as much flexibility in future policy deliberations as possible.

Cardin Posted by Patrick Barry

Ben Cardin (my Senator!) asks an excellent question that gets at what could wind up being the most important dilemma facing the administration in 6-months: whether a governance failure in Afghanistan will hasten or slow down plans to transition over responsibility.  Sec. Clinton's response didn't do much to reassure me: 'we aren't aiming at some zero-corruption standard, we just want a more responsive government.' 

Corked Posted by Patrick Barry

Senator Corker sullies his burgeoning reputation as a sensible conservative somewhat, by alleging that the Administration's reduced ambitions in Afghanistan and use of a loose, conditions based timetable for its strategy is a political bone for frustrated progressives.  Two things in response. First, skeptical progressives deserve way more credit than that and two, as Gates, Mullen and Clinton and the President have repeatedly stated, U.S. strategy has to be grounded in realistic expectations of our capacity, and what is achievable.  This entails resisting the pull into any kind of long-term and unsustainable occupation of the country.  People can disagree on whether they fully appreciate their own wisdom, but to suggest its just petty politics is a mis-characterization.

Symbiotic Relationship Posted by The Editors

This post is by NSN Executive Assistant Luis Vertiz.

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John Kerry, just asked the panelists to clearly explain the national interest in Afghanistan, specifically asking why the US is operating in Afghanistan when most Al Qaeda operatives are located in Pakistan. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave an interesting answer, in that he described Al Qaeda was using the Taliban and associated terrorist groups in the region as a force multiplier.   

This is an interesting change to the more common analysis , particularly from the 1990's and earlier part of this decade, which usually saw Al Qaeda as a force multiplier for the Taliban and their movement to govern the whole of Afghanistan. Now, the panelists at the SFRC see that equation flipped, with the Taliban's campaign of destabilization helping creating breathing room for Al Qaeda to plan attacks in the against the Afghan and Pakistan government, as well as attacks against Western targets.

Wrong Place, Wrong Time (Frame) Posted by Michael Cohen

I spent most of yesterday on a plane back from the West Coast so I'm a bit late to the post-speech analysis party. But I did want to flag Gilles Dorronsoro's comment about the lack of regional prioritization in the President's strategy - and why that might be a problem:

President Obama has announced that the United States will deploy an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, mostly to the Pashtun provinces of Helmand and Kandahar in the south, where the Taliban are in control. Though it suggests a goal of helping the Afghan state weather a Western withdrawal beginning in July 2011, Obama's plan is likely to make the circumstances of the withdrawal more unpleasant.

. . . The new troops will not stay in southern Afghanistan long enough for the Afghan army to establish control there and build functioning government institutions. And, indeed, the presence of foreign troops fighting on behalf of a corrupt government in Kabul only makes that government more unpopular, which helps the Taliban grow more entrenched, even as they take losses.

Obama's speech was just a speech. His point about arming Afghan militias and building security from the ground up is where the country is actually headed. But as the Taliban continue to gain on Kabul from several directions -- including the north, where new troops would make more of a difference -- Obama's plan will make it harder for the government to survive and likely that the United States will leave Afghanistan looking worse than it does now.

This is perhaps my greatest concern about the President's overall strategy; we're going to send the lion's share of troops into the one place where the presence of US soldiers probably most strengthens the cause of the insurgency - and where the lack of a significant Afghan military and political suppot presents the greatest challenge. I understand the desire to go after the Taliban more aggressively (and I'm sympathetic to the notion), but it seems like that should be happening in the North and West and not necessarily in the South . . . at least not for now.

Even harder is squaring this approach with a timetable that says there will be a turnover of security responsibility to the Afghan government in 18 months. The problem I suppose is that if you focus on the "easy" parts of Afghanistan first and then tackle the heavier Pashtun areas later you're there for a lot longer than 18 months. But if you try to do everything at once and pacify the entire country, as Dorronsoro suggests, you run the risk of not necessarily making a decisive dent in the insurgency.

More Live Blogging Posted by Patrick Barry

With so much to do around the Afghanistan roll-out, your beloved Democracy Arsenal contributors are a little pressed for time.  Still, we're going to try to do some light posting on this morning's SFRC hearing w\ Sec. Clinton, Sec. Gates and Admiral Mullen.

Trust, But Verify Posted by Michael Cohen

Over at Newsweek, I make the case for Congress to do more than just rubber stamp troop increases for Afghanistan, but actually hold the President's accountable on his Afghanistan policy:

Instead of simply following the president, Congress must now lead as well. As the only institution directly able to hold the president's feet to the fire on Afghanistan policy (short of the American people in 2012), Congress must hold hearings that pose difficult questions to the president's advisers. It must demand far more specific and detailed answers than the president offered Tuesday about his exit strategy for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the benchmarks that he will use to define success on the ground.

. . . During the 2008 campaign, Barack Obama said his goal as president would be to "change the mindset" of American foreign policy and prevent repeating the mistakes of the Iraq War. It will be up to Congress to ensure that he lives up to his words.

Read the whole thing here

Conservatives - Fuzzy on Commander in Chief Concept? Or Can't Accept This Commander? Posted by David Shorr

Much can be debated about the difficult decision President Obama has just made. I'm really stunned by right-wing critiques that essentially deny the president's prerogative to make it. Take for instance, this column by the New York Post's Charles Hurt, which asks how dare the president not commit himself to the only course Hurt considers worth the courage of our troops. I can't read that line of critique without hearing an implied question about Obama's authority. For a more humorous treatment of this issue, of course, we thankfully have Stephen Colbert's send-up of Glenn Beck.

I Don't Mean to Give the "Wrong Impression" Posted by David Shorr

Senator McCain's sound byte about how setting a deadline will give a wrong impression of America's commitment to our enemies took me back to the debate over a deadline for the Iraq presence. This post from 2007 pretty much says what I want to stay. The key point is that regardless of whether we set a timeline or not, insurgents can always wait us out. After all, they live there.