Why is everyone asking Ambassador Eikenberry about his cable being leaked, but not McChrystal about his strategy review getting leaked? Seriously, the leak of an entire military strategy review and its impact on the civilian strategy should be just as important to congress, if not more important, than the negative repercussions of the leak of fragments of a state department cable.
John McCain just doesn't understand strategy. If by 2011 the United States hasn't accomplished any of their objectives for Afghanistan, than I'd say its time to take a good hard look at whether there's anything more we can do (if we haven't already reached that point.) That's why you set objectives, so as time goes on, you can assess whether you've achieved them, and whether the continued pursuit of them is worth risks in other areas. In John McCain's view, achieving victory is worth whatever cost.
General McChrystal defines success in part by achieving what he calls "contiguous security," something that will allow Afghans to move freely, engage in commerce, etc. Look for this concept to become a buzzword in the Washington debate.
Here I was, distracted for a few minutes, and McChrystal goes ahead and takes all the sexiness out of the concept of "defeating the enemy." Defeat, in McChrystal's view, is not an absolute term, but instead means "rendering the enemy incapable of completing its mission." So much for squashing the Taliban out of existence.
McChrystal's response to Chairman Skelton's question about U.S. goals
are highly revealing about the disproportionate space taken up by
Afghanistan in the Washington debate. McChrystal defines U.S.
strategic objectives in terms of thwarting Al-Qaeda, and enabling the
Afghan government to better take charge of its own affairs, something
pursuant to the main goal. But that says absolutely nothing about
Pakistan, where U.S. interests are arguably much greater. Now that's
not exactly McChrystal's (or Eikenberry's) fault, since their commands
don't extend into Pakistan. But you have to wonder whether the fuss
over their testimony is giving Congress and the American people a
proper appreciation for how U.S. interests should be balanced on either
side of the Durand line. Why, for instance, isn't there complimentary testimony from Pakistan Ambassador Anne Patterson and CENTCOM Commander General
Petraeus?
McChrystal begins by going into surprising detail about the nature of the insurgency threatening Afghanistan, in an overview that moves from the Qetta Shura to the Haqqani Network to Hezbi Islami. This analysis is more disaggregated than anything I've seen from Obama's team so far, and it contrasts particularly with the testimony given by Gates and Clinton, which suggested that the insurgency had morphed into a kind of multi-headed, but cohesive syndicate.