One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Posted by Michael Cohen

It's Josh Rogin day here at DA, because today over at the Cable he has two interesting stories about the internal workings of the State Department that unintentionally complement and contradict each other.

First, Secretary of State Clinton is delivering a speech today at the Newseum on the interplay between the internet and foreign policy. She is going to argue that freedom on cyberspace is a basic human right and must be protected - and the US is going to set up a $15 million fund to promote Internet freedom. This will include measures to:

Expand access to the Internet for women and other groups; train and support civil society groups and NGOs in the use of new media technologies; and support a series of new media pilot projects starting to expand civic society in the Middle East and North Africa.

In addition, Clinton plans to make US diplomacy a more robust presence on the web:

Clinton also plans to integrate the internet into all of the other tools of diplomacy, a mission she calls 21st Century Statecraft, another shift that could change the way the U.S. government approaches the Internet.

When I left the State Department in 1999 I was just beginning to transition away from a Wang computer to a PC, so this is all very exciting. And in general, I think anything that promotes civil society empowerment and encourages Internet freedom is exceptionally important, particularly as a tool for democracy promotion.

But here’s the thing; when you scroll down the page you read this:

The Pentagon has won a major internal battle over control of foreign assistance funding

One big chunk of funding at issue is in foreign security assistance, known as the "1206" account, which could total about $500 million next year. This is money used to do things like military training and joint operations with countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Indonesia and Somalia. Since the military doesn't have the lead in those countries, the funding should flow through State, right? Well, not in 2011. The president's budget will keep those funds in the Pentagon's purse in its Feb. 1 budget release, following a pitched internal battle in which the State Department eventually conceded.

And why did State lose this inter-agency battle:

"Eventually State backed off," the source said. "They're not sure they have the capacity to actually run the 1206 programs."

The capacity issue has hampered State's ability to take over many of the programs it professes to want to own. In a related case, top senators wanted to give State control over another fund, called the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, but couldn't do so last year because State wasn't prepared to take on the mission. 

Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Levin, D-MI, told The Cable. "There's probably an effort being made to build their capacity so that they are better positioned the next time this comes around," he said, referring to the State Department.

So State is going to establish a robust online presence and protect Internet freedom around the world . . . but they lack the basic capacity to administer security assistance programs that are at the heart of is diplomatic capabilities. And if you want to know what happens when the military drives decision-making on military assistance (and doesn't act in concert with State) read this book,particularly the chapter on Indonesia. To sum up, when the military makes decisions on military assistance and training, larger issues about human rights, respect for the rule of law and larger political imperatives occasionally take a back seat to "security" concerns.

And there is something almost sad about Hillary Clinton talking about a $15 million initiative to increase Internet freedom at the same time that security assistance programs are being ripped out of her hands because her own department lacks the ability to run them effectively. The bottom line is that we have a State Department that is increasingly incapable to doing its job as a diplomatic agency and a Pentagon that is taking on more of these core responsibilities. And once these responsibilities migrate over to the Pentagon it will be next to impossible to get them back - especially when State's long-term capabilities (or lack thereof) are not being addressed.

And as Rogin's piece makes clear; there is little reason for optimism on that front either:

Overall, State is expected to receive a hefty increase in its top-line budget request for fiscal 2011, but much of that money will be for Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing little growth in the rest of the State-USAID accounts.

 And the beat goes on . . 

Four Horsemen: How to Protect our Nuclear Deterrent Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn have once again joined forces and published an op-ed that focuses on a two-pronged approach to reducing nuclear dangers. 

The four of us have come together, now joined by many others, to support a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. We do so in recognition of a clear and threatening development.

The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and nuclear material has brought us to a tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.

But as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety, security and reliability of our own weapons. They need to be safe so they do not detonate unintentionally; secure so they cannot be used by an unauthorized party; and reliable so they can continue to provide the deterrent we need so long as other countries have these weapons. This is a solemn responsibility, given the extreme consequences of potential failure on any one of these counts.

For the past 15 years these tasks have been successfully performed by the engineers and scientists at the nation's nuclear-weapons production plants and at the three national laboratories (Lawrence Livermore in California, Los Alamos in New Mexico, and Sandia in New Mexico and California). Teams of gifted people, using increasingly powerful and sophisticated equipment, have produced methods of certifying that the stockpile meets the required high standards. The work of these scientists has enabled the secretary of defense and the secretary of energy to certify the safety, security and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile every year since the certification program was initiated in 1995.
[Schultz] David Klein

The three labs in particular should be applauded for the success they have achieved in extending the life of existing weapons. Their work has led to important advances in the scientific understanding of nuclear explosions and obviated the need for underground nuclear explosive tests.

Yet there are potential problems ahead, as identified by the Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries Perry and James R. Schlesinger. This commission, which submitted its report to Congress last year, calls for significant investments in a repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and added resources for the three national laboratories.

These investments are urgently needed to undo the adverse consequences of deep reductions over the past five years in the laboratories' budgets for the science, technology and engineering programs that support and underwrite the nation's nuclear deterrent. The United States must continue to attract, develop and retain the outstanding scientists, engineers, designers and technicians we will need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as the nation's security requires it.

This scientific capability is equally important to the long-term goal of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons—with all the attendant expertise on verification, detection, prevention and enforcement that is required.

Our recommendations for maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal are consistent with the findings of a recently completed technical study commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy. This study was performed by JASON, an independent defense advisory group of senior scientists who had full access to the pertinent classified information.

The JASON study found that the "[l]ifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in Life Extension Programs to date." But the JASON scientists also expressed concern that "[a]ll options for extending the life of the nuclear weapons stockpile rely on the continuing maintenance and renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, technology, engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons program." The study team said it was "concerned that this expertise is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and degradation of the work environment."

These concerns can and must be addressed by providing adequate and stable funding for the program. Maintaining high confidence in our nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of these weapons goes down. It is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in nonproliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction goals.

By providing for the long-term investments required, we also strengthen trust and confidence in our technical capabilities to take the essential steps needed to reduce nuclear dangers throughout the globe. These steps include preventing proliferation and preventing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material from getting into dangerous hands.

If we are to succeed in avoiding these dangers, increased international cooperation is vital. As we work to build this cooperation, our friends and allies, as well as our adversaries, will take note of our own actions in the nuclear arena. Providing for this nation's defense will always take precedence over all other priorities.

Departures from our existing stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent. But as our colleague Bill Perry noted in his preface to America's Strategic Posture report, we must "move in two parallel paths—one path which reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international programs to prevent proliferation." Given today's threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, these are not mutually exclusive imperatives. To protect our nation's security, we must succeed in both.

Beyond our concern about our own stockpile, we have a deep security interest in ensuring that all nuclear weapons everywhere are resistant to accidental detonation and to detonation by terrorists or other unauthorized users. We should seek a dialogue with other states that possess nuclear weapons and share our safety and security concepts and technologies consistent with our own national security.

Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The World According to Gant Posted by Michael Cohen

Over the past couple of weeks, there has been a some rather interesting debate about Jim Gant, a 35-year old Green Beret, and his plan for tribal engagement in Afghanistan. Gant published a paper this past Fall called One Tribe at a Time that Sunday got the Washington Post treatment . . . with a glowing article about Gant's rising profile and the tag line, "The Green Beret Who Could Win the War In Afghanistan":

In recent months, Gant, now a major, has won praise at the highest levels for his effort to radically deepen the U.S. military's involvement with Afghan tribes -- and is being sent back to Afghanistan to do just that. His 45-page paper, "One Tribe at a Time," published online last fall and circulating widely within the U.S. military, the Pentagon and Congress, lays out a strategy focused on empowering Afghanistan's ancient tribal system. Gant believes that with the central government still weak and corrupt, the tribes are the only enduring source of local authority and security in the country. We will be totally unable to protect the 'civilians in the rural areas of Afghanistan until we partner with the tribes for the long haul," wrote Gant.

"Maj. Jim Gant's paper is very impressive -- so impressive, in fact, that I shared it widely," Petraeus said, while McChrystal distributed it to all commanders in Afghanistan. One senior military official went so far as to call Gant "Lawrence of Afghanistan."  

I'm not really in the best position to judge the merits of Gant's arguments, although I would note that smart people like Josh Foust, Christian Bleuer and the ever-astute Judah Grunstein have criticized the basic idea of bribing Pashtun tribes to turn on the Taliban. Beyond the problem of figuring out which tribes to support/bribe; Gant's advocacy of taking sides in tribal conflicts seems like it might risk involving the US in conflict that are tangential to the overall US mission in Afghanistan . . . and getting a lot of innocent Afghans killed at the hands of the United States.

But here's the part I really find confusing. A couple of months ago, after first reading the Gant paper, I also read this document, put out by the US military training and doctrine command (TRADOC). It is written by actual experts on Afghanistan . . . and it comes to a very different conclusion about the effectiveness of trial engagement:

Military officers and policymakers, in their search for solutions to problems in Afghanistan, have considered empowering “the tribes” as one possible way to reduce rates of violence. In this report, the HTS Afghanistan RRC warns that the desire for “tribal engagement” in Afghanistan, executed along the lines of the recent “Surge” strategy in Iraq, is based on an erroneous understanding of the human terrain.

In fact, the way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi culture that calling them both “tribes” is deceptive. “Tribes” in Afghanistan do not act as unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical, meaning there is no “chief” with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results). They are notorious for changing the form of their social organization when they are pressured by internal dissension or external forces. Whereas in some other countries tribes are structured like trees, “tribes” in Afghanistan are like jellyfish.

Pashtuns’ motivations for choosing how to identify and organize politically—— including whether or not to support the Afghan government or the insurgency—are flexible and pragmatic. “Tribe” is only one potential choice of identity among many, and not necessarily the one that guides people’s decision-making.

So why if the Army's own Afghanistan experts concluded that tribal engagement doesn't work and may actually be counter-productive is Major Gant being feted in the Washington Post as the man who can win the war in Afghanistan, praised by P4 an M4 and being asked to return to Afghanistan to work on tribal issues? I don't really have an answer to this question, but it does seem curious. Doncha think?

Covering the Muslim Brotherhood's Election of a New General Guide Posted by Shadi Hamid

As some of you may have heard, yesterday, the Muslim Brotherhood announced the election of a new general guide, Mohammed Badie. It turned out to be a fraught and controversial internal election, pitting "conservatives" against "reformists" (for background see here and here). There has already been quite a bit of speculation on what these internal divisions might mean for the Middle East's largest and most influential Islamist movement. One hopes the Obama administration is watching carefully, particularly as Egypt is soon to hold both parliamentary and presidential elections.

I will have more to write on this in the coming days and weeks. In the meantime, I will be covering Badie's election, the aftermath, and, possibly, the fallout on twitter. You can follow me on twitter here. I will try to use the hash mark #MBegypt for my tweets, so feel free to use it as well to join the conversation.

The Navy Looks to the Future on Energy Security Posted by James Lamond

The Navy Times reports yesterday that:

The Department of the Navy is set to sign a deal with the Department of Agriculture that officials say will better enable both agencies to cooperate in developing alternative ways to power tomorrow’s fleet.

This is a great move for a number of reasons.  First, DoD is the world largest single consumer of energy and as a Brookings report from this summer by Pete Singer says:

Access to reliable and affordable energy resources is absolutely fundamental to the operations and readiness of the U.S. military. In recent years, rising costs, variability in supply, and a host of challenging technical and environmental objectives have elevated the issue of energy security for our armed forces.

This move by the Dep. of Navy is the most recent in a growing trend of national security organizations adapting to double challenges of climate change and energy security.  One of the first agencies was the National Intelligence Council, who in the 2008 "Global Trends" predicts that the national security implications of climate change will be one of the greatest challenges we will face in the coming years and decades.  This summer the CIA opened up a center on climate change and national security, which will analyze and coordinate  how the effects of climate change (desertification, rising sea levels, increased competition for resources, climate refugees and other population migration).  The CIA's center will also provide declassified images and information to climate change scientists to assist in their research. Additionally the Army is developing hybrid hummer. 

One hope for the Navy Department's -and the overall move by DoD -move is that it will increase production and technology of alternative fuels, eventually making it more efficient and cheaper for more widespread.  For years DoD investment in technologies have often led to this pattern.  Technologies like the airplane, the SUV, the internet and GPS have either been invented by the military, or the investments in those technologies by the military helped bring them into the main stream of society.  Hopefully as the military invests more in "green technologies" we will see similar effects. 

ClintonBushHaitiFund.org Posted by The Editors

A new site for former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton's efforts for Haiti:  http://clintonbushhaitifund.org/  

The advice from organizations and officials seems to be to that cash donations are the best way to help.

Why a New START Will Make Us Safer Posted by The Editors

The following post is by William D. Hartung, Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation.

I'm glad to see that Ariel Cohen and Baker Spring of the Heritage Foundation took the time to read my recent post on the security benefits of a follow-on to the U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  My piece was a rebuttal of Mr. Cohen's recent New York Times op-ed on the issue, so I welcome their rebuttal of my rebuttal.  Perhaps this can be the start of a beautiful friendship.

I only wish that Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring had read my post more carefully.  If I were to respond only to their references to arguments that were actually in my piece, this would be a short post indeed.  But I think it's worth addressing their main arguments in any case.

Cohen and Spring's main concerns about a New START are as follows: 1) modernization of the U.S. arsenal in a post-START environment; 2) verification of the treaty; and 3) a possible link between the "performance of the treaty" and limits on missile defense.  I will take these three points in turn and then address some of the other points they raise.

As referenced in my prior post, the United States already has an extensive nuclear weapons sustainment  program in place.  As we reduce our arsenal, we don't need new warheads; we just need to know that the existing ones work. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) already spends billions of dollars per year on "stockpile stewardship" - a science-based initiative that has done an excellent job of assuring the safety and reliability of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal without resorting to nuclear testing.  Specific components are refurbished or replaced as needed, and, as noted in my earlier essay, the widely respected JASON Group has indicated that the current approach can maintain the reliability of the U.S. stockpile for decades to come. A new warhead - which Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring seem to desire - would actually be less reliable than current designs.  Current warheads have undergone hundreds of tests; a new warhead would not (and should not) be tested.

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring seem to want to trust our security to an untested (and unnecessary) new warhead - unless of course they are suggesting an end to the current moratorium on nuclear testing among the major nuclear weapons states. The fact is, the United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992--a policy supported by four successive administrations.  Reversing this position would be a disastrous development for arms control, validating the notion of testing (and then building) nuclear weapons at a time when we should be moving towards a global ban on all testing, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

As for verification of a New START agreement, it is hard to criticize the verification measures included in a treaty that has yet to be concluded.  Perhaps Mr. Spring and Mr. Cohen have a crystal ball, but I do not. I trust that the Obama administration is seeking procedures that will be more than adequate to detect any meaningful violations of a New START agreement, and I look forward to evaluating them once we have a treaty to analyze.  In the mean time we shouldn't be distracted by unsupported claims that we need to have inspectors near Russian ballistic missile factories. As I noted in my earlier post, we can develop adequate means to monitor Russian missile production without continuing a Cold War era practice that is no longer necessary.

Which gets us back to Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring's embrace of the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), a three-page document with no verification procedures that is scheduled to expire in 2012. As one of my colleagues pointed out, this is not a treaty, it's "sort of" a treaty.  We deserve a legally binding, verifiable and enduring treaty to ensure our security, not an unverified handsake deal written on the back of an envelope after President George W. Bush stared into Vladimir Putin's soul (as the former president claims to have done).

As for missile defense, even Baker and Cohen admit that "it may well be true" that the text of a New START treaty will not include limits on missile defense.  I think it will be true, based on statements from Obama administration officials that missile defense is not on the table in the START follow-on talks.  Furthermore, the Obama administration has not abandoned missile defense in Europe, it has restructured it. He has shifted from a land-based system aimed at long-range Iranian missiles that won't  exist for a long, long time (according to the current intelligence estimates) to one built on sea-based and shorter-range land-based missiles that will address the more immediate concerns raised by possible development of medium-range missiles by Iran.  Given the recent statement by top intelligence official Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess that there is no evidence that Iran has made a final decision to build nuclear weapons, it appears that we have more time to address Iran's nuclear aspirations than many analysts have been suggesting. To be a threat to Europe Iran would not only have to build a nuclear weapon but it would have to build one that could be launched on a ballistic missile, a daunting challenge.

Rather than take Mr. Cohen and Mr. Spring's other charges one-by-one, I will just say that as an advocate of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, I advocate a step-by-step process that takes seriously the actions of other nuclear states and the need to verify any and all reductions.  President Obama has indicated his commitment to maintaining a "robust deterrent" until such time as we can safely move to zero, and that this goal may not be reached in his lifetime. That's hardly a "rush to disarmament," as Cohen and Baker claim.

A Defensive Egypt and US Foreign Policy Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

First off, I wanted to thank the folks here at Democracy Arsenal for inviting me to join the blog. As for a very brief bio, I am a fellow at The Century Foundation in New York, and I work on U.S. foreign policy in the greater Middle East. I am also a lawyer, so every once in a while I might stray on to international legal topics as well.

For my inaugural post, I wanted to draw attention to yesterday’s article by Hamza Hendawi of the Associated Press discussing the recent political moves of Mohamed el-Barade’i, the Egyptian former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (with the added bonus that I am quoted in the piece). el-Barade’i has pointedly challenged the Mubarak regime and flirted with the notion of competing to be Egypt’s president. It is hard to imagine a scenario whereby el-Barade’i could become Egypt’s next president, but his provocative comments and his interest in fundamental reform of Egypt’s political superstructure are an important development − particularly in light of the reactions his recent comments have provoked.

The desperation among many Egyptians for any hint of an opportunity for a political breakthrough is indicative of the general malaise that has become Egypt’s status quo and is the reason for much of the hype surrounding el-Barade’i. Part of this is biography in that el-Barade’i is untainted by political corruption and is a compelling and competent figure of international stature. With all other avenues for political reform blocked, people understandably are drawn to the proverbial silver bullet.

But the harsh, defensive reaction of regime supporters has been equally instructive, with the government-controlled press attacking him and attempting to discredit him in the eyes of Egyptians. Issandr Amrani notes that “pro-regime newspapers immediately went on an offensive of insinuations (ElBaradei was accused of being a tool of both Washington and Tehran, out of touch, and secretly Swedish).”

Here in the United States, the issue of succession in Egypt is often understood through the lens of regime stability, which is seen as the paramount concern and the avenue by which to guard U.S. regional interests. This has been a hallmark of U.S. policy in the Middle East, particularly after the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah. But not enough thought is given to how the current defensiveness of the Egyptian regime negatively impacts U.S. interests. We should be as concerned with the here and now and not simply with the potentially destabilizing effects of a transition.

The regime’s increasing defensiveness, driven by the looming question of succession and the regime’s attempts to ensure a hereditary hand-off to Gamal Mubarak, has distorted the Egyptian regime’s worldview and narrowed its perception of its own interests. In addition to supporting U.S. regional diplomacy, our allies such as Egypt should provide us with a reality check based on their more textured and nuanced understanding of their own surroundings and current political dynamics. A true and useful alliance should incorporate channels for open and honest communication. 

Aside from Egypt’s diminished regional status, the Mubarak regime’s current defensive posture, driven largely by its own narrow domestic considerations, makes it a particularly poor regional reference point. Nowhere is this clearer than with respect to the issue of Gaza and its continued isolation. Setting aside the broader issue of U.S. policy with respect to Hamas, the current efforts to undermine their control over Gaza have created a humanitarian crisis that has undermined the President’s message of reconciliation with the Muslim world delivered in Cairo last June. The lack of any U.S. efforts to alleviate the suffering of Gaza’s people has helped to frustrate many of the hopes that followed the Cairo speech. It has also created a significant barrier to the administration’s efforts to revive credible Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

This policy has been carried out with unstinting Egyptian support. But the Egyptian regime is primarily motivated with undermining its own domestic opposition in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and is concerned with the prospects of contagion from next door. This convergence of the Egyptian regime’s narrow interests with our current attempts to isolate and weaken Hamas has blinded us to many of the serious downsides of our current policy. While we have Arab support for our policy to isolate Gaza in the form of Egypt’s closure of its border crossings, we should be careful to understand the motivations behind Cairo’s decision-making and not draw overly broad conclusions about the wisdom, effectiveness, or sustainability of this policy due to Egypt’s involvement − the narrow, short-term desires of the Egyptian regime are not a good guide in determining our regional priorities. 

Please Welcome Michael Hanna Posted by The Editors

Democracy Arsenal's newest contributor is Michael Hanna.  Michael is a fellow at The Century Foundation where he focuses on issues of international security, human rights, post-conflict justice and U.S. foreign policy in the broader Middle East. His full bio and publications are here.

Will the Real Reinhold Niebuhr Please Stand Up? Posted by David Shorr

Despite having been a religion major in college, I won't try to dissect Joseph Loconte's interpretation of Reinhold Niebuhr's theology over in AEI's magazine, The American. But the ways Loconte blatantly contorts President Obama's foreign policy intentions? Well they're like fish in a barrel; I can't resist.

As with every other cheap dig at the new policy, we inevitably have the A word:

Supporters of Obama’s apologetic foreign policy devour Niebuhr’s trenchant analysis of America’s social and political failings. They forget that he repeatedly scorned the tactic of using America’s sins to avoid confronting dangerous ideologies. “When the mind is not confused by utopian illusions,” he wrote, “it is not difficult to recognize genuine achievements of justice and to feel under obligation to defend them against the threats of tyranny and the negation of justice.” [Boldface not in original.]

Here's what I've concluded: if the right wing can't have an actual liberal president who blames America first, they'll make one up. You have to be listening extremely selectively to miss the parts where President Obama's been telling the rest of the world that anti-Americanism is used too often as an excuse and that there's been a lot of free-riding on American hard power over the past 60 years. Would somebody please do a content analysis? How much apologizing has there been, and how much calling on others to help deal with Iran, climate change, Middle East peace, Afghanistan...?

There are just two choices, you see. You can insist that the United States does no wrong, knows better, and gets to tell everyone else what to do. (Done that.) Or you can show a little humility, make reasonable accommodations to the interests of others, and undercut those who argue the US is the source of the problem. Loconte himself notes the pitfalls of arrogance as a general matter and even cops to mistakes having been made in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what's his beef, then?

Ah yes, that other inevitable slam: lack of moral clarity with regard to the malevolence of the governing regimes in other nations:

What might Niebuhr say, for example, about Obama’s fruitless attempts to engage Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon? He probably would caution against oversimplifying the character of the regime or ignoring the unintended consequences of military action. Yet surely Niebuhr would draw attention to Iran’s extensive record of repression, religious extremism, and support for terrorist atrocities. He would be clear about Tehran’s flagrant deception over its nuclear ambitions and its provocative testing of long-range missiles. And there would be frank talk about Iran’s vile anti-Semitism and threats to “wipe Israel off the map.”

This passage contain the shortest distance ever between the phrase "oversimplifying the character of the regime" and an actual oversimplification of the character of a regime. Pardon me, but I think President Obama's clarity about what's at stake with Iran's nuclear program is why he's conducting a diplomatic full-court press to deal with it!!!!   By the way, in the category of unintended consequences, an impressive array of regional experts last summer gave very clear warnings that making too flamboyant a show of Iran's repression would give the oppressors just the pretext they were drooling over.

To be perfectly frank, I'd rather engage in reasoned discourse than snark. But to do that, we'll have to talk about real foreign policy, not all these ridiculous cartoon depictions.