as they file in... Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Susan Rice is rocking the house, right behind Peter [insert your own joke] Orszag.   Hillary Clinton, remember, is in London for the Yemen and Afghanistan conferences.  Thus making herself the absent Cabinet member in case of disaster.

Gov. McDonnell's Soiled Thoughts on Intel & the Underwear Bomber Posted by Adam Blickstein

The new governor from Virginia would make you think he was personally on hand for the interrogation of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed Christmas Day bomber. From his rebuttal to President Obama's State of the Union address:

Americans were shocked on Christmas Day to learn of the attempted bombing of a flight to Detroit.  This foreign terror suspect was given the same legal rights as a U.S. citizen, and immediately stopped providing critical intelligence.

While McDonnell was celebrating the holidays in Virginia, Federal officials were busy gathering actionable intelligence from Adbulmutallab and helping protect the American people. As AG Eric Holder stated:

"This investigation is fast-paced, global and ongoing, and it has already yielded valuable intelligence that we will follow wherever it leads,” Mr. Holder said. “Anyone we find responsible for this alleged attack will be brought to justice using every tool — military or judicial — available to our government.”

But if McDonnell doesn't trust the Attorney General, he should trust the actions of the brave men and women on the front line of the war on terror that unequivocally demonstrate Abdulmutallab provided critical intelligence about the genesis of the plot and any future attacks:

Captured after a bomb hidden in his underwear ignited but failed to explode, Abdulmutallab spoke freely and provided valuable intelligence, officials said. Federal agents repeatedly interviewed him or heard him speak to others. But when they read him his legal rights nearly 10 hours after the incident, he went silent.

The Associated Press piece continually shows McDonnell was just plain wrong in tonight's speech:

Abdulmutallab's interview ended when the suspect was given medication and the investigators decided it would be better to let the effects of the drugs wear off before pressing him further.

He would not be questioned again for more than five hours. By that point, officials said, FBI bosses in Washington had decided a new interrogation team was needed. They made that move in case the lack of a Miranda warning or the suspect's medical condition at the time of the earlier conversations posed legal problems later on for prosecutors.

Even if Abdulmutallab's statements are ruled out as evidence, they still provided valuable intelligence for U.S. counterterrorism officials to pursue, officials said.

In the end, though, the "clean team" of interrogators did not prod more revelations from the suspect.

So the decision to Mirandize Abdulmutallab came only after they had gleaned important and valuable intelligence from him and issuing the Miranda did not in any way actually inhibit intelligence gathering according to officials. As Spencer Ackerman points out:

Collins said in a statement that the fact that the FBI read Abdulmutallab his Miranda rights “likely foreclosed the collection of additional intelligence information.” But over the weekend, The Associated Press published the most comprehensive account to date of Abdulmutallab’s interrogation and found no evidence that Mirandization inhibited interrogators’ access to valuable information. FBI interrogators, to the contrary, read him his Miranda rights after they were satisfied that he had no further information about any further attacks.

Which from the AP article cited previously:

The suspect spoke openly, said one official, talking in detail about what he’d done and the planning that went into the attack. Other counterterrorism officials speaking on condition of anonymity said it was during this questioning that he admitted he had been trained and instructed in the plot by al-Qaida operatives in Yemen.

The interview lasted about 50 minutes. Before they began questioning Abdulmutallab, the FBI agents decided not to give him his Miranda warnings providing his right to remain silent.

So, as is the federal agent's prerogative in emergency situations, they didn't actually Mirandize Abdulmutallab unitl after they were satisfied and sufficiently determined they had gleaned all the important intelligence from him.

Despite this clear record, McDonnell would have you think that no intelligence was gathered, that the underwear bomber is hiding behind the constitution, and that the men and women on the front lines of the war on terror are either lying or can't do their job correctly. The bottom line is false and fearmongering rhetoric on issues he seems to know little about will do nothing to actually keep America safe.

Live Blogging SOTU Posted by The Editors

We are liveblogging the State of the Union tonight. 

Let the games begin...

SOTU Before the Storm Posted by Heather Hurlburt

I've been predicting to anyone who would listen that there would be "more than nothing" about national security in the State of the Union, that it would come either at the beginning or end of the speech, and that it would make some news, and that the news would be related to terrorism/war.  check me on video at bloggingheads if you don't believe me.

So:  the Administration is in fact trying to make news with an initiative on bioterror preparedness.

All the pre-briefed phone calls and pre-relased talkers suggest national security coming at the end, after transparency and before the soaring close.

Nobody shares pre-briefs on the GOP response to me, but I would bet that it complains about "Mirandizing" terror suspects and claims Obama has made us less safe.

More later. 

Bonus best wonky pre-read: NSN board member Nina Hachigian of CAP writes the piece I wish I'd written, about what Obama won't brag about, but should, on HuffingtonPost.  (Hint:  quietly revolutionizing the way Americans conduct foreign affairs).

Iran: Making the Regime-Change Calculation Posted by David Shorr

Having used Robert Kagan as a stand-in for skeptics of engagement more than once, let me give a more measured response to the argument he made today for supporting Iranian regime-change (Pat Barry will give you a snarkier take if you need it). I'll start with the core points of agreement and disagreement. I certainly agree that the success of the Green Revolution would be a great thing, with positive strategic implications. Bob says that if President Obama helps bring it to pass, this alone would secure his foreign policy legacy, so I guess it would be nice to collect on that promisory note. On the other hand, Bob downplays the value of the ongoing nuclear negotiations -- saying "regime change ismore important than any deal the Obama administration might strike with Iran's present government on its nuclear program" -- and I can't really go along with that assessment.

Even more than his WaPo column, the discussion just now between Kagan and some Talk of the Nation listeners helped clarify some tests I would apply for any ramping up of US support of Iranian reformers. Bob had kind words for the administration's diplomatic efforts, saying Obama had "made clear the US isn't the issue; Iran is." Recognizing that we're no longer in the highly sensitive immediate aftermath of the sham elections in June, I think we need to maintain the same concern about playing into the hands of the hard-liners in Iran. Beyond the simple affirmation that the reformers have the sympathy of the American people I'd want to avoid any moves that might make the United States "the issue" in the struggle among Iranians. The wishes of reformist leaders is one important factor.

Then there are the potential trade-offs with the nuclear negotiations. I've heard it argued that support for democratic forces could be mutually reinforcing with the nuclear diplomacy, and I'm open to that. The difficult is an issue that also came up on Talk of the Nation. In disussing sanctions on Iran, Bob said the questions is "sanctions for what?" My concern exactly. If it's a matter of putting added pressure on Iran's current regime, then great. But to the extent that supporting the Green Revolution undercuts pressure for a nuclear deal, that's not a price worth paying.

On Reconciliation . . . Posted by Michael Cohen

So I've been meaning for a few days now to write something on this issue of Afghan political reconciliation; but every time I delve into the issue I find myself more confused. Take for example this quote from today's New York Times:

Any grand bargain is bound to be messy, with the Taliban most likely to demand government jobs or control of large areas of territory in Afghanistan's south, where it now rules by fear. What the United State would be willing to tolerate has become a hot issue inside the Administration. Already, the Pentagon has expressed skepticism about coming to terms with high-ranking Taliban figures anytime soon.

Forgive me for perhaps asking an impertinent question; but what the hell was that whole Afghan strategy review about last year?

How does a question like whether the US is willing to come to terms with high-ranking Taliban figures not get debated and decided then? If, as the President suggests, the goal of US policy is NOT to destroy the Taliban then how far you are willing to down the road of political reconciliation is an utterly crucial issue to decide. In fact, you could argue that IT IS the crucial question: to not have a plan in place to achieve reconciliation - and an answer to the question of whether you'll cut a deal with Mullah Omar - is truly a head-shaker.

For what it's worth, this is pretty much a no-brainer: of course the United States should be willing to cut a deal, particularly since Obama has already announced that troops will begin withdrawing in 18 months. Considering that the US has made clear that it's not going to be in for the long haul I'm not sure how we think that we have any leverage to demand that top Taliban leadership will not get a starring (or at least best-supporting) role in a future Afghan government.

And it seems clear that the Afghan government is on board as well; in fact President Karzai is expected to announce a new reconciliation initiative at the the London Afghan conference this week. According to the NYT:

The Karzai government envisions a two-track program. One track is reintegration of fighters - to entice the Taliban's rank and file fighters to lay down their weapons and rejoin Afghan society. The core of that is a massive jobs program and an amnesty for the estimated 20,000 to 30,000 fighters in Afghanistan's villages and mountain redoubts.

This all sounds well and good on paper; but of course wars are not fought on paper - and I can't help but feel skeptical about this. First this assumes a consistent level of support from Western donors to fund this effort; it assumes that the Afghan government will rise above its usual incompetence and corruption to implement the plan effectively and finally it assumes that the Taliban core fighters will even be interested in switching sides, particularly since they are basically winning the war militarily.

I guess I'm just having a hard time seeing how this plan works. And what's more I don't see how it interacts with US policy. For example, from a political standpoint, the US has made clear that the clock is ticking on its military engagement in Afghanistan and the troop withdrawals may begin in June 2011. If you're the Taliban and you're already winning the war - and your biggest military rival is searching for an exit - why would you make a deal? And from a military standpoint, if you enjoy an unmolested sanctuary across the border in Pakistan and the US military has adopted a population-focused rather than enemy centric tactical approach . . well it seems like your interest in compromise is even more remote.

Along these lines, the Times quotes Vanda Felbab-Brown who is at Brookings saying, "The more there is talk of negotiation, the more the Taliban view it as a sign of weakness. How do you make sure the reconciliation process does not embolden the Taliban to go on the march?" It's a good question and it seems like the answer would be to put greater military pressure on the Taliban, but that isn't the strategy being espoused by General McChrystal.

This is not to say that reconciliation and Taliban reintegration should not be a goal; but it just seems like the way we are going about it is poorly integrated and not terribly well thought out. 

Iran is not the AFC Championship Posted by Patrick Barry

I sometimes pine for a day when the world stops responding whenever Robert Kagan expresses an opinion, but so long as he keeps getting op-eds placed in the Washington Post, I’ll have to keep on dreaming.  What’s so objectionable about Kagan’s latest piece resurrecting regime change?  Surprisingly, it’s not everything.  Let’s start with what he gets right:

It would be similarly tragic if Israel damaged the likelihood of political change by carrying out an airstrike against Iran's nuclear facilities in the coming year. That would provide a huge boost to the Tehran regime just when it is on the ropes -- and for what? The uncertain prospect of setting back the nuclear program for a couple of years?

I agree 100%! An airstrike or military action against Iran would be tragic and ineffective, not to mention hugely damaging to U.S. interests in the region.  But unfortunately, that brief hint of reality is about as close as Kagan gets to turning in his neoconservative credentials.  The rest of the op-ed is replete with the worn-out ideological tropes we've come to expect from neconservatives.

Trope #1: Sudden, dramatic action is preferable to the alternative of [insert current policy here, alongside label of ‘overly-cautious’]

Kagan accuses the administration of proceeding “as if the political upheaval had only marginal significance, and the real prize remains some deal with Tehran.”That’s an odd accusation, seeing as the Obama administration has expressed strong rhetorical support for Iranians’ human rights, attended to calls for the U.S. to do what it can to maintain the flow of information inside Iran, and cautioned against sanctions that could throttle the dissidents.  What Kagan actually wants is for the U.S. to completely abandon dialog with the Iranian government over the nuclear issue in favor of an explicit policy of regime change.  Not only are the benefits of that approach unclear, but the risks are massive.  Any blessing conferred on Iranian dissidents would have an uncertain impact largely because it would simultaneously restore the “‘foreign stooges’ propaganda tool” to the regime.  And in the event that the dissidents’ efforts became protracted, the U.S. would have almost zero ability to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, which by Kagan’s own understanding would be a problem since its leaders are “rushing to obtain a nuclear weapon”

Trope #2: The U.S. only has a small window of opportunity before it is too late [add Reagan quote for effect]

What would a Kagan op-ed be without a strategically placed Reagan quote?  This time Kagan turns to the ‘Gipper’ to suggest that the Obama administration has reached a decisive, but fleeting “‘tear down this wall’ moment.”  So after just saying that the green movement has shown itself to be a durable challenge to the regime, Kagan asserts that the window for regime change is fleeting? There’s a simple explanation for why those ideas seem contradictory: they are.  It also shows why these sort of “now is the moment” analogies are useful if you're Rex Ryan, but not if you are trying to make sense of democratic transitions.  As Max Bergmann wrote in December, authoritarian regimes fall not because of “a military rebellion led by an insurgent force that suddenly storms the capital,” but the “gradual erosion of support by mass movements.”

Trope #3 There’s good reason [insert something unknowable] to believe the results will pay huge dividends to the U.S.

Here I’m tempted to just post Matt Duss’ take in its entirety.  It’s a masterful take-down.  I would point out that it’s particularly aggravating to see Kagan trot out the argument that “regime change in Tehran is the best nonproliferation policy.”  What little we do know about the oppositions stance on Iran’s nuclear program suggests that the issue won’t necessarily be resolved by simply installing the greens in office.  Last April, opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi was quoted as saying “no one in Iran will accept suspension,” when asked about Iran’s right to enrich, and the program is very popular domestically.  So when Kagan treats regime change as the key to unlocking the impasse on Iran's nuclear program, he goes way beyond basing a conclusion on something unknowable. He willfully glosses over the facts to justify his already thin argument for regime-change. 

Nuggets from New Muslim Brotherhood Leader's Al-Jazeera Interview Posted by Shadi Hamid

As some of you know, the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest and most influential Islamist group in the Middle East, recently elected a new leader. His name is Mohammed Badie and he's perceived to be staunch conservative. He is regarded by some as a "Qutbist," in part because he was an associate of Sayyid Qutb's in the 1960s (yes, Arab leaders are almost universally very, very old). In between my blogging on this, you can continue to follow my coverage of the Brotherhood and the post-election fallout here on twitter.

So, anyway, as you might expect, a lot of people are getting worried and talking about the Muslim Brotherhood's conservative turn or impending "radicalization." Before getting ahead of ourselves though, it may be worthwhile to look at what Badie has actually said, since ascending to his new post. There was one particularly interesting, long, wide-ranging interview with al-Jazeera last week. The transcript, courtesy of Abdel Monem Mahmoud, is here, but it's in Arabic. So I've gone ahead and translated some of the more relevant/ intriguing portions:

Badie on the nature of the Brotherhood: "We are not a political association as some think; we are a group that carries Islam in its totality.”

Badie on allegations that Brotherhood internal elections were not free and fair: "Yes, there were concerns. Yes, we need to review some of these issues."

Badie on charges that he and other conservatives effectively ousted two of the Brotherhood's more prominent "moderates" - Mohammed Habib and Abdel Monem abul Futouh - from the organization's leadership: "I want to say that my third grandson’s name is Habib because I love Dr. Habib and I very much love my brother Abdel Monem and what is between me and them and between the Brotherhood and them is love and respect."

Badie on regime repression: "We in this past phase were under enormous pressure... and it prevented us from being able to present what we have to offer to the Egyptian people."

Badie on all the negative press the Brotherhood's been getting: "Why do people focus on the negative and not the positive, such as the fact that we had a leader, in good health, who left his leadership post out of his own volition?” (referring to the fact that the previous General Guide voluntarily resigned from office and called for elections to select his successor, something which almost never happens in the Arab world).

Badie on whether he hates President Mubarak: "Who says such things!? This shouldn’t even be presented as a question in the first place!”

Badie on members of the Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in violence in the late 1940s, in particular the assassination of Prime Minister Nuqrashi: "Yes, this happened and it was a mistake on the part of an individual and these individual actions were rejected by the leadership of the Brotherhood.”

Badie on takfir (the practice of declaring a Muslim to be non-Muslim and therefore making his blood licit): "When some of the shabab (young activists) fell under dire repression in prison, they felt that these repressive actions (e.g. torture) could not been done by real Muslims.This led to a violent reaction on their part, and led them to promoting ideas and rulings which were in contradiction with the law of God."

The Pentagon Always Wins Posted by Michael Cohen

So apparently the President is preparing to announce at the State of the Union tomorrow a three year freeze on discretionary spending as a means of "signaling seriousness" about tackling this deficit. For the record we're talking here about $15-$25 billion a year out a more than $1 trillion budget. 

You got to love Washington; a proposal to signal seriousness on the deficit that actually does nothing serious to tackle the deficit. And just to show you unserious this proposal really is . . it exempts DoD, Homeland Security, veteran's benefits and somewhat shockingly foreign aid.

None of this should be surprising, because after all when it comes to cutting the deficit; the Pentagon always wins . . .

The Eikenberry Cables Posted by Michael Cohen

There is not much I can add to the publication of Ambassador Eikenberry's cables in the New York Times, other than if you want the best explanation of why counter-insurgency will not work in Afghanistan . . . read what our man in Kabul has to say.

The Afghan government is fundamentally uninterested in governing and believes the US will stay forever; sending troops will only increase their dependence on US forces; there is no corresponding civilian surge, either by the US or the Afghan government to hold and build; the Pakistanis aren't going to take out the Quetta Shura and I could go on. Basically what you have here is a searing indictment of the military's fetishized dreams of doing counter-insurgency in Afghanistan from a guy who has some credibility on the issue.

With that in mind, I'm gobsmacked to read my friend Spencer argue that the president "clearly" integrated Eikenberry's warnings into his Afghan policy. What? Even if you buy Spencer's notion that the US and NATO is circumventing the Afghan government because the "bulk of U.S. development and governmental support will occur outside of Kabul" (which for the record, I don't), this is a small-bore tactical argument. Eikenberry's thesis is a strategic one . . as in the US strategy is f'ed up and won't work for all the reasons I've mentioned above. Spencer's argument is the geopolitical equivalent of putting lipstick on a pig.

Crikey, if you don't have Afghan Army support to "hold" areas cleared; if you don't have Afghan and US civilian support to "build" in those same areas; if you don't have Pakistani buy-in to take out Afghan Taliban safe havens then who cares if you have located development and governance initiative outside of Kabul or you are trying to improve the civilian structure of US and NATO . . . because your overall strategy is incoherent and destined to fail. This is the point, by the way, made so brilliantly by Harry Summers in On Strategy. 

Personally I'm amazed that Eikenberry is remaining in his position; not only because I have to imagine that his relations with Kazai are a tad frosty . . . but also because he so clearly believes that our policy in Afghanistan is doomed to fail.