Hanging on in Quiet Desperation... Posted by Adam Blickstein

Secretary of State Rice meets today in London with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband to try and tie up some of the many loose ends regarding Afghanistan, most notably who will be the UN's Special Envoy after Hamid Karzai rejected Lord Paddy Ashdown, apparently known as the "Michael Jackson of postconflict reconstruction", for that post. Lord knows that Afghanistan needs a superstar to assist in the country's reconstruction (perhaps not someone who thinks that giving the Aghan's lot's of rides and toys is enough). But like Jackson's son Prince in 2002, Afghanistan continues to dangerously dangle over the edge between stability and chaos. The three independent reports that came out last week further confirm this. 

But while the U.S. and NATO must do all they can to stabilize the country and create the kind of security that will prevent the resurgence of the Taliban, our European allies remain in a precarious spot, one that might prevent the sort of wholesale strategic reset we need. 

First, few of our European allies will want to increase their troop levels-in accord with a lame duck Bush Administration because their own domestic discord remains high.  This is especially true in Britain, where Labour's unpopularity degrades any chance that the Government will bend out of its way to further ally itself with an unpopular war and unpopular American administration. A second obstacle is the continued realization that Hamid Karzai is a weak leader whose criticism of British troops will only embolden Britain's reluctance to accept the Rice's overtures. This, coupled with Germany's overt and public rejection of Defense Secretary Gates' call for more German troops and Canadian PM Stephen Harper's threat to remove troops, leaves NATO's mission in Afghanistan in an uncertain place. 

Expect no substantial results from Rice's meeting as the British, and indeed most of our NATO allies, will most likely be playing the 'long game' from now until 2009: namely, wait until a new U.S. administration takes power to make any consequential strategic moves, and instead maintain a steady presence there, leaving it up to America to fill in the gaps. Of course with the majority of our forces still bogged down in Iraq with no sign of imminent redeployments to Afghanistan, the situation regretfully displays no sign of improving for the rest of 2008.
 

The Next Powder Keg: Iraqi Provincial Elections Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

We’ve had some interesting exchanges lately between Shadi, Pat, Michael and Matt Yglesias on elections and on this day of all days I wanted to throw another important element into the elections mix.

I think the U.S. is in danger of making another in a long series of catastrophic mistakes in Iraq, and it’s because it’s decided to emphasize elections as a conflict resolution mechanism.  This is something that the United States does far too often in its attempt to solve all of the world’s problems by spreading democracy.

Right now, we are sitting on a combustible set of cease fires in Iraq that are more likely than not to unravel.  The “Awakening Strategy” of aligning with various Sunni tribes and former insurgent groups against Al Qaeda in Iraq has temporarily tamped down the violence.  But it has left in its wake a set of independent well organized and well funded militias.  These groups are not integrated into Iraq’s political institutions in any meaningful way and most continue to view the Shi’a national government as the enemy.

The new conventional wisdom inside American military and diplomatic circles is that sustainable stability can only be achieved by bringing these groups into the political process through provincial elections.  President Bush and Secretary Rice have both made holding provincial elections a central political benchmark in Iraq’s road to reconciliation.  Ambassador Crocker just last month told reporters,

Whether you're looking at the south, and unresolved issues and tensions as to who will wield how much power, or places like Anbar, where the tribes having not participated in the previous elections find themselves in a position of some prominence yet without representation in established political structures . . . it's probably going to be fairly important to have elections within the coming year as a means of regulating this competition,

This makes some sense.  Most Sunnis boycotted the 2005 local elections and the groups that now wield the most power in these territories were too busy fighting an insurgency in 2005 to actually take the time to vote.  No political system can function properly if it is not reflective of the military realities on the ground. 

Unfortunately rather than act as the natural next step on the way towards stability in Iraq, provincial elections at this time are much more likely to simply be the next major spark that plunges parts of Iraq back into full scale chaos.  Elections are the exact opposite of conflict resolution.  They are, by their very nature, an intense struggle for power.  When they occur in stable liberal democracies they lead to increased tensions and partisanship (Just ask Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, John McCain or Mitt Romney).  But these tensions are resolved peacefully through liberal institutions that guarantee a certain (Though not always perfect) level of fairness.  However, when elections take place in unstable societies that don’t have strong institutions, they can often lead to chaos, especially if there is no confidence in the results (See Kenya or potentially Pakistan in two weeks). 

Given these tendencies it’s not hard to imagine that provincial elections in Iraq would likely have horrific and unintended consequences.  First, there are some practical questions about how one would manage an election.  Two million people have fled Iraq and another two million are internally displaced.  Given this mass migration, it’s hard to conceive of how Iraq would develop coherent voter rolls.

But even taking this consideration aside, provincial elections are still likely to lead to chaos.  In the Sunni parts of the country an internal power struggle is already under way.  Members of the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC) are being targeted for assassination by Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is still a major force.  Meanwhile, there are increasing tensions between the rising Awakening movements and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which controls most of the local provincial councils in the Sunni areas and represents the Sunnis in the national government.  Add to that mix brewing tensions between the “Concerned Local Citizens (CLC)” groups, which are former members of the insurgency and the ASC that consist of the local tribes.  These two groups are usually thought to be one and the same, but they are different and in actuality the leadership of the CLCs is frustrated with the ASC, which they feel has taken much of the credit for their hard work against AQI. 

Adding an all out competition for power, in the form of elections, to this combustible mix is likely to act as an accelerant.  Rather then a clear winner, the elections would likely be marred by vote rigging and violence.  The losers would be unlikely to accept the outcome and would resort to violence to hold on to their position.  What is needed here is a conflict resolution process that actually brings the various sides together to negotiate an agreement on how they will share power. 

Are People's Political Views "Fixed" or "Plastic"? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Sabeel Rahman, a PhD candidate at Harvard and one of the sharpest observers of American politics I know, sent out an excellent email to a list I'm on, which zeroes in on what he calls the "fundamentally different 'political ontologies'" of Obama and Clinton. It's a really interesting analysis, so I asked him if I could post it on Democracy Arsenal. He said yes, so here it is:

One of the central differences is that these two candidates have fundamentally different "political ontologies"--assumptions about how politics works.  As such, there is a real substantive difference embedded in all the rhetoric about who is or is not a "change agent"--and our gut reactions over who we tend to support has a lot to do with who we think has the right unstated assumptions about politics.

The most basic assumption in politics is whether or not we take people's political views to be fixed or plastic.  Thus, there is one camp--let's call it a Schmittian approach to politics--where people's views are taken to be fixed.  When this is the case, politics becomes more about the battle "between friend's and enemies" (in Schmitt's language).  As a result, there are only two real strategies available to generating political victory and/or social change.  First, you can completely reject everything about your enemies, and whip up support among your friends--a sort of rabid partisan strategy.  Second, you can engage those who disagree, but since their views are fixed and not really open to reconsideration, such engagement means bringing them on board by giving them some of what they want.  This is a strategy of least-common-denominator centrism--or "triangulation" in its negative sense.

If you take views to be fundamentally plastic, however, you now are playing a very different ballgame.  Politics now becomes an effort in persuasion.  And persuasion requires (a) bringing those who disagree on board--not by accepting their policy views in a transactional sense, but by engaging in good faith their core disagreements; and (b) seeking to allay those concerns by offering an alternative approach to the given issue. 

If you accept a deliberative approach to politics, there is a second set of assumptions that you have to make about how to persuade those who might disagree.  First, there is a strategy which says "successful policies drive changes in principles".  Second, there is a view that instead it is by arguing for broad principles first that you bring people on board, which then opens up political space to begin experimenting with different policies.  This approach has the virtue of not pegging the value of these principles on the ultimate success of an ex-ante determined policy, of defending a principle on its own merits.

A Major Difference on Foreign Policy Posted by Shadi Hamid

We can't cede any ground on national security to the Republicans. We can't buy into their narratives, and we certainly shouldn't try to replicate their "toughness." We need a candidate who will say - clear and unapologetically - we're Democrats, and proud of it, and, yes, there is another way on foreign policy. So, on this Super Tuesday, one of the questions we should be asking ourselves is which candidate offers a chance to launch a full-court press and destroy the embedded Republican advantage on national security once and for all.

Obama made this point very convincingly in a recent speech in Denver, and I think it points to a very significant difference between the two candidates: 

It’s time for new leadership that understands that the way to win a debate with John McCain is not by nominating someone who agreed with him on voting for the war in Iraq; who agreed with him by voting to give George Bush the benefit of the doubt on Iran; who agrees with him in embracing the Bush-Cheney policy of not talking to leaders we don’t like; and who actually differed with him by arguing for exceptions for torture before changing positions when the politics of the moment changed. We need to offer the American people a clear contrast on national security, and when I am the nominee of the Democratic Party, that’s exactly what I will do. Talking tough and tallying up your years in Washington is no substitute for judgment, and courage, and clear plans. It’s not enough to say you’ll be ready from Day One – you have to be right from Day One."

Who Are You Calling Stupid? Posted by David Shorr

I suppose we could have predicted it -- the chorus of political "analysis" and news coverage that has declared that the 2008 elections will not be about the Iraq War or foreign policy, because once again "It's the economy, stupid!"

Frankly, I think you have to consider the American electorate stupid to believe that our national election can only be about one or two issues at the most. I won't even mention the many obvious ways in which domestic and international issues have become intertwined (in part because Heather already has). My point is that at a moment of heightened public engagement, our fellow citizens not only can but want to hear about more than one or two issues. Voters are not going to forget about Iraq or the troubling state of US relations with the world, and these issues are not going to vanish from the national debate.

"I want to be an American" - Obama fever taking over Europe Posted by Shadi Hamid

Granted, this is anecdotal, but still. A friend was telling me that one of her Dutch friends, after watching the Obama South Carolina victory speech, said

"I was listening to it and I wanted to be an American."

This is amazing. In my travels abroad, all I've heard is anger, frustration, and hatred toward America. But here is someone who listened to Obama and saw the possibility of a different kind of America, one that he could believe in. I'm used to defending America at every turn and pleading innocence whenever people bring up the Bush administration's various crimes ("it wasn't me. Despite the fact that I support U.S. democracy promotion, I'm not actually a neo-con"). But not so much anymore. Weirdly enough (and again this is anecdotal and based only on my circle of non-American friends and colleagues here in England), but anti-Americanism seems to have gone down ever since Obama's dominated the headlines.

Everyone I meet here almost inevitably brings up Obama, often without prompting and usually followed by an accented attempt at "fired up, ready to go." I was at an, um, costume party the other night, and this German guy, almost two minutes after meeting me, started gushing about how excited he was about Obama. Then this other Irish guy started quoting Obama speeches and going on about how pumped he was for Super Tuesday. And I was like, what the heck is going on here? Am I in some parallel universe? And, for a moment at least, I was. I saw a glimpse of a universe where people see America not for what it is, but for what it still can be. Some people still believe in us. It in these moments that I really begin to appreciate the opportunity we will have in January 2009 to start again, to start over.

A Defense Budget Without a Defense Strategy Posted by Max Bergmann

The release of the Bush administration's defense budget, like all of their previous budgets, increases defense spending without making any hard choices. This is the highest level of defense spending since WWII. But it is not just the numbers that we should be concerned with. Just as worrying is the complete incoherence of the Bush administration on defense policy.

The Bush administration came in to office pushing the concept of military "transformation." Warfare was going to be transformed through new technology and they set out investing in new advanced conventional weaponry that would emphasize firepower and speed. Their approach to warfare vividly played out in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we relied on a light footprint and overwhelming firepower that left us unable to stabilize either country.

Yet things appeared to change with the replacement of Rumsfeld with Gates, the promotion of David Petraeus and the elevation of counter-insurgency doctrine, and the decision to increase the size of the Army and Marines - after resisting for the previous six years. Each of these developments seemed to reflect a clear rejection of Rumsfeld's vision of military transformation and an acknowledgment that a military must do more than just destroy things. It also must be able to protect and secure populations – a mission that we were not adequately prepared for. Such a shift in strategic focus should have had a dramatic impact on budget priorities. Yet it hasn’t.

Instead the Bush administration’s current defense budget looks remarkably similar to the budgets under Rumsfeld. Despite the seeming moderation of Gates, we continue to lack any clear strategic direction on defense spending. The Bush administration has still only cut two major weapons program during its tenure (both were for the Army) and we continue to spend billions on weapons programs that reflect security concerns of a bygone era. As Larry Korb and I recently wrote in a recent CAP report called Restoring American Military Power: Toward a New Progressive Defense Strategy for America:

Our military is lopsided. Our forces are being ground down by low-tech insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the most immediate threat confronting the United States is a terrorist network that possesses no tanks or aircraft, while the Pentagon—the world’s largest bureaucracy—remains largely fixated on addressing the problems and challenges of bygone era. This focus has left our military unmatched on the conventional battlefield but it also left the U.S. military less prepared to deal with the emerging irregular or non-traditional challenges that we as a country are most likely to confront.

There are some obvious systems to cut: the DDG-1000 Navy Destroyer, the V-22 Osprey, either the F-22 Raptor or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, National Missile Defense and space weapons programs.  But it is also important to realize that the next administration is not just going to be left with a real budget mess, but a Pentagon that is strategically adrift.

The Need to Prioritize Elections Posted by Shadi Hamid

I have to say that I get really troubled by the assertion that “elections alone don’t make a democracy.” Of course, it’s true as far as descriptive statements go. But the implications are troubling. I know this isn’t what Patrick was trying to say in his post, but too many others are saying it – that the U.S. has made a mistake by emphasizing elections, and, therefore, the U.S. should de-prioritize elections. 

The problem cited in Patrick’s post (which references a recent HRW report) is that “dictators around the globe are disguising their abusive, authoritarian regimes in democratic garb” by holding elections and winning them. Well, yes. The problem here though isn’t the emphasis on elections but, rather, that the U.S. has turned a blind eye to elections that were clearly rigged and manipulated, as has been the case in places like Egypt. If we’re going to talk a big game about elections, we have to take this to its logical conclusion and ensure the elections are free and fair. Of course, if we encourage elections and then accept their results even when they’re little more than glorified window-dressing, then this is not a good thing for anyone, and this where Patrick's point is very well taken.

With that said, instead of backing down on pressuring autocratic regimes to hold elections, perhaps we should exert additional pressure to ensure that said elections are serious events that meet the standard of “free and fair.”

To address another point which worries me when I hear it, Matt Yglesias writes that “the rule of law, in particular, is crucial. But while we have a lot of knowledge about, say, the rule of law we don’t have much know-how about instilling it elsewhere. So you see a lot of emphasis on elections.” Again, on the merits, this may be true and Matt's correct to point to this as a problem. However, the danger is that this type of logic will lead us to the sequentialist fallacy that before talking elections, we should focus on strengthening rule of law. Asking a dictator to strengthen rule of law is sort of like asking Christopher Hitchens to write an objective account of the history of Mormonism. In layman’s terms, rule of law reform necessitates diffusion of power and spreading responsibility across autonomous governmental institutions. It is unclear why a dictator would want to undermine his own power base and ability to subvert the very same institutions that we want him to strengthen. On a more conceptual level, the underlying premise of dictatorship is that the dictator is not subject to the rule of law.

The only way to address this is by making the ruler accountable to another powerful force in society – the electorate. In short, from this vantage point, rule of law should be seen as complementary to holding free and fair elections (i.e. it's very difficult to envision a scenario in the Middle East where you would have rule of law without some semblance of free and fair elections).

Lastly, it's important to note that rule of law reform, if approached in isolation, is difficult to assess and can take a very long time. Now, it may be easy for us to take a “patient,” “gradualist” approach to democracy promotion. We may be willing to wait. Presumably, however, this view may not be as attractive to the citizens of dictatorships who have to endure repression on a daily basis. I imagine their patience is wearing thin. I’m not sure if it’s really fair to tell them “well, before we let you guys have elections and vote for the wrong party, you have to, um, have rule of law first.”

Happy Birthday Ilan Posted by Michael Cohen

Thanks to the wonders of facebook (my new favorite site after democracyarsenal of course) I discovered that tomorrow is Ilan Goldenberg's 30th birthday.

I also discovered at Facebook that Ilan's peers have ranked him #2 for being "most cuddly."

Ilan's cuddliness, notwithstanding, he was truly 'present at the creation' of NSN (and unlike Dean Acheson no one would ever accuse him of losing China) and through his tireless efforts we're still going strong. So happy birthday Ilan!

Democracy Promotion Bush-Style Posted by Michael Cohen

The New York Times had an excellent piece on Sunday about the challenges facing America's democracy promotion agenda in Central Asia. Contrary to the President's recent, rosy rhetoric (how's that for alliteration) on the spread of freedom around the globe, the facts on the ground in Central Asia speaks to a far different reality:

In the last three years in these former vassals of the Kremlin, the exuberant vision of nurturing pluralistic societies and governments responsive to popular will - enunciated by President George W. Bush's public calls for democratization - has met so many obstacles that it has been quietly recalibrated. Throughout the region, journalists and opposition figures have been harassed, threatened, beaten, imprisoned and sometimes killed. American policy has accepted less ambitious goals.

Democracy promotion is not gone. But it has taken its place in a wider portfolio of interests. These include access to oil and gas, improving trade and transportation infrastructure and expanding military, counternarcotic and counterterror cooperation - all informed by a sense that in the competition with Russia and China for regional influence, the United States has lost ground.

Forgive me for momentarily sounding like a realist, but this sounds about right. Of course America should be promoting democracy, but we have to recognize that the spread of democracy is one of many American interests and we must balance it with other important foreign policy goals. The President's messianic and largely empty call on behalf of democracy promotion never seemed to reflect this necessary balancing act. This has only served to weaken American credibility when we've been forced to reduce our commitment to freedom in the face of challenges to our other national interests.

Now having said that, it does seem to me that America should be focusing its efforts at democracy promotion on building the civic institutions necessary to sustain not only democracy, but also the free exchange of ideas. It's a point my blogmate Patrick Barry made just a few days ago.

All of that makes this choice nugget from the aforementioned NYT piece that much more inexplicable.

In oil-rich Kazakhstan, the pattern has been similar. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who runs the country like a family business-and-television empire and has been enveloped for years with allegations of corruption, won 91 percent of the vote in a December 2005 election that independent observers said was flawed.

Before the election, a human rights worker who published allegations of presidential corruption on a Web site was mugged. The attackers tore open his clothes and used a blade to carve a large X - the mark of the censor - on his chest. The government also confiscated newspapers that published articles on presidential corruption.

The State Department urged Nazarbayev to respect press freedoms. But, like the message to Azerbaijan, that message became mixed when the American ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe appeared to dismiss the crackdown's significance, when she addressed a Kazakh official during a speech.

"When I was in Kazakhstan a couple of weeks ago I had the interesting pleasure of reading some of this (sic) newspapers that have been seized," the ambassador, Julie Finley, said to a session of the organization's council in Vienna, Austria, in November 2005, according to the transcript. "Maybe you saved some readers some waste of time, anyway."

Sheesh, that's just awful. It's one thing to look the other way when a nominal ally subverts democracy, but to actually praise it? Just for the record Julie Finley not only still has her job but she enthusiastically supported Kazakhstan's application for chairmanship of the OSCE.

And just in case you're wondering about what qualified Julie Finley for ambassadorship to the OSCE:

Ambassador Finley was National Finance Co-Chairman for Bush-Cheney '04 for the District of Columbia and Co-Chairman of Team 100 for the Republican National Committee from 1997 through 2004.

Democracy in action!