The Economically Bipolar Generation Posted by Adam Blickstein

In accordance with over medicalized, over psychoanalyzed, overdiagnosed society, it's pretty clear that my generation (Gen Y, the millenials) has suffered from some pretty severe childhood financial trauma. We've been savaged in rapid succession with the one-two punch of decadent irrational exuberance and complete systematic economic collapse. And history can already boast that these weren't any mild swings either. No one really can predict how major trauma in youth will manifest itself in adulthood since individuals cope with such stressors differently. But one thing we do know is that these sort of specters haunt people in some capacity or another throughout their entire life. And the long-term ramifications of my generation's financial afflictions remain extremely unclear.

Is Contracting All Bad? Posted by Michael Cohen

Thomas Frank had a piece last week in the Wall Street Journal about the supposed evils of government contracting that somehow in my gorging on turkey and other Thanksgiving delights I missed at the time. But it really deserves to be highlighted:

Some federal contracting, surely, is unobjectionable stuff. But over the past few years it has become almost impossible to open a newspaper and not read of some well-connected and obscenely compensated contractor foisting a colossal botch on the taxpayer. Contractors bungling the occupation of Iraq; contractors spinning the revolving door at the Department of Homeland Security; contractors reveling publicly in their good fortune after Hurricane Katrina.

First of all it's simply incorrect to argue that contractors bungled the occupation of Iraq. That actually would be the United States government. Indeed, for all the anecdotal examples of malfeasance there are many more examples of government contracting being "unobjectionable" and not wasteful.

Don't believe me: check out what the CBO has to say on this subject:

The costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit performing similar functions. During peacetime, however, the private security contract would not have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force structure.

What this suggests is that the costs for using PSCs is, over the long-term, a cost savings for U.S. taxpayers because of the lack of legacy costs. But what's really objectionable, is that the person for failure in Iraq is placed on contractors and not where it really belongs - on the policymakers who sent them there in the first place.   

To make matters worse, Frank also argues that private companies who work with the government should turn over all pertinent financial information:

Government by contractor also makes government less accountable to the public. Recall, for example, the insolent response of Erik Prince, CEO of Blackwater, when asked about his company's profits during his celebrated 2007 encounter with the House Oversight Committee: "We're a private company," quoth he, "and there's a key word there -- private."

So you and I don't get to know. We don't get to know about Blackwater's profits, we don't get to know about the effects all this has had on the traditional federal workforce, and we don't really get to know about what goes on elsewhere in the vast private industries to which we have entrusted the people's business.

What possible relevance is there between Blackwater's profits and its effects on the traditional workforce? The pertinent information here is not how much money BW makes, but whether they are fulfilling the requirements of their contracts with the US government. Moreover, does Mr. Frank think that every government contractor -- including the legions of NGOs and non-profits that take government funds -- should turn their books over to the federal government for review?

Now I am not a contractor booster, as I recently wrote a report that called on the US government to transition away from the use of private security contractors; but it's crucial that we consider the use of contractors in a fact-based manner and not rely on anecdotal examples of supposed contractor excess.

Over the past eight years, the Bush Administration and Congress has done a terrible job managing contractors; they haven't supported the contractor work force, they haven't valued or emphasized the importance of contractor oversight, they've ignored and weakened accountability measures and they've used contractors without any sort of overall plan for how they can fulfill US government responsibilities and missions.

But for the most part contractors are not really to blame for these problems - indeed many of the same contractors blamed for their supposed failures in Iraq were praised for their success in the Balkans.

The key here is not to demonize contractors and contracting in general. The key is figuring out how to work with more effectively and how to ensure better oversight of their activities. Articles like this one that rely more on anecdotes rather than facts are not helping things. 

Team of Non-Ideologues Posted by James Lamond

In order to avoid the now clichéd  "team of rivals" label, lets call Barack Obama’s foreign policy team the “team of non-ideologues."  As the foreign policy line-up was announced today we saw the main foreign policy and national security positions go to Jim Jones as National Security Advisor, Hillary Clinton at State, Susan Rice at the U.N., and Robert Gates staying on as Defense Secretary.  This team is made up of variety commanding individuals, all with differing experiences and world views.  These picks, along with Tim Geithner at Treasury and Eric Holder at Justice, may very well represent how Obama plans to govern.  That is from a logic-based, pragmatic, and responsible approach.

Casualties Drop in Afghanistan for December Posted by Patrick Barry

There was one U.S. military casualty in Afghanistan this month, a statistic that would not ordinarily be at all surprising, since fighting there is traditionally less intense during the winter months.

What does make this news surprising is that it comes amidst a lot of speculation that the Taliban intend to carry on their offensive through the winter (Note: I am just as complicit in this as anyone).  Divining too much from one month's data point is probably unwise, but it may be a sign that the insurgents are not off to the auspicious start they would have liked.

Does Africa Need Democracy? Posted by Michael Cohen

In this weekend's Boston Globe, Joshua Kurlantzick has an interesting piece on the turn away from democracy in a number of African nations - and the corrupting influences that are undermining democratic transitions.

With a few exceptions, like Botswana and South Africa, most of these countries have failed to create truly inclusive or stable democracies. Instead, they have created systems in which leaders, representing one ethnic group or religious group, win elections and then use their time in office to enrich only their tribe or religious cohort. These divisions, exacerbated by elections, make some newer democracies more conflict-prone than old-fashioned autocracies.

It's hard to disagree with Kurlantzick's point except to note that the democratic process is rarely easy and tidy or necessarily follows a linear path. But what is somewhat troubling about Kurlantzick's piece is his solution to the problem:

The rise of failed democracies also provides a lesson for Western leaders, and their democracy-promotion outfits, who thought they had the formula right. Holding elections is not enough; and, though it might be heresy to suggest it, sometimes a strong, unelected leader may prove more effective in the short term.

While Kurlantzick is right to attack the slavish devotion of some policymakers to elections,  he is wrong to lump democracy promotion groups in with this mindset. Indeed, if there is one recurring thought in almost all democracy promotion literature it is the argument that too much focus is put on elections and not enough on the promotion of civil society. For all the criticisms one might make of the Bush Freedom Agenda -- and its own occasionally slavish focus on elections -- their support for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Middle East Partnership Initiative -- has been a welcome addition to the democracy promotion toolbox because of its attention to institution building in emerging democracies.

In fact, Kurlantzick oddly makes this claim:

For some democracy-promotion organizations, this will mean broadening their work, to include promoting inter-ethnic dialogue and supporting other aspects of democracy, like free media, so that they are not relying on polls alone to bring societies together.

No kidding. But this is precisely what most democracy promotion groups are doing on a regular basis.

But the real beef I have here is with the notion that a strong unelected leader might be beneficial in the short-term. In fact, most evidence in sub-Saharan Africa suggests otherwise. Most bizarrely Kurlantzick points to Rwandan President Paul Kagame as the sort of unelected leader who has brought real change to Africa. One would imagine that there are quite a few folks in Eastern Congo who would argue that his country's military forays into the region prove otherwise.

While noting some of Kagame's flaws, Kurlantzick actually highlights this astounding quote:

Kagame is not without flaws. . . But before him, says Mauro de Lorenzo, an Africa expert at the American Enterprise Institute, Rwanda faced disaster. "Look carefully at what happened in Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi, 1990 to 1994," he says. "In each case, the rapid imposition, from outside, of the structures and mechanisms of multiparty democracy leads directly to the unprecedented cataclysm that subsequently engulfed each place. People here [in America] forget or never knew; those who lived through it learned some lasting lessons."

This is simply beyond bizarre. To blame multi-party democracy directly for the problems in these countries is not only wrong, it's borderline perverse. Indeed, this is the sort of language adopted by unelected leaders to explain away their own, undemocratic practices.

Kurlantzick's heart is in the right place here - he sees quite properly the problems in focusing on elections versus larger institution building. But this is not a zero sum game. To ensure democratic viability and, most important, accountability from elected leaders, there must be in place some sort of democratic competition. To assume the best intentions of unelected leaders is a surefire recipe for continued undemocratic rule.  Finding the right mix and the right political timing for elections is frequently tricky, but let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater and make the turn toward endorsing autocratic rule.

The response to Africa's democratic u-turn is not to make elections the end-all, be-all, but instead to continue the focus of America's democracy promotion on strengthening civil society and nascent democratic institutions while never losing sight of the importance of elections in clarifying and legitimizing democratic transitions.

Rolling Back the Fog at Justice Posted by Adam Blickstein

Plenty of others have dissected Eric Holder's record, both in substance and rhetoric, so I'm going to try and steer clear from digging too deep into his past. But one thing has become clear in the reaction Holder's nomination, and indeed within reaction to most of Obama's nominees: these are seasoned professionals with long track records who couldn't be further from the cronyism and malfeasance that occurred under President Bush. But one problem with putting seasoned professionals into these posts is that long track-records don't tend to please 100% of the traditional and online punditry 100% of the time. Of course I think it's completely instructive to try and deduce how nominees like Holder will perform in their respective capacities by examining their histories, but this exercise is also fraught with the peril. It tends to create a sort of self-fulfilling disappointment since many times, folks trying to discern the philosophies of future cabinet officials invariably find reasons to be pessimistic rather than find footholds for optimism. And the Attorney General's office, with its broad legal authority and history of abuse and disorder under President Bush's reign, is particularly vulnerable to this type of analysis.

For me, the greatest asset of Holder's nomination, is that, with over 20 years at Justice, he intimately understands both the pre-Bush, pre-politicized culture there.  In fact, Holder would be the first Attorney General since Dick Thornburgh became AG in 1988 who's actually spent a substantial part of (and actually made) his career at Justice itself. That in and of itself makes Holder a unique and important pick, one that is as much of a "cultural" departure as it is ideological. In a department that is so vital to both protecting the nation and the constitution, but one which has been rotted by a political infestation and a blanketing "fog of law" from failed leadership under Ashcroft/Gonzalez/Mukasey, having such a deep institutional knowledge is critical for both internal and external reasons.

Napolitano Goes to Homeland Posted by Moira Whelan

In foreign policy circles, the Homeland Security department is often regarded with fear…fear that you might end up having to work there. With Janet Napolitano, a department often viewed as a backwater could surprise everyone, if the innovation it could show is in any way reflective of what we've seen from Napolitano.

I’d read quite a bit about Napolitano as potential short-lister for AG, and it’s clear her legal credibility is unrivaled. Clearly, an asset at DHS. Upon hearing the rumors that she would be nominated for Homeland Security, I tapped into some friends from Arizona to ask about her reputation as governor since in my opinion, the job requires a pretty sophisticated understanding of many things, not to mention, outstanding leadership abilities. Suffice to say, rave reviews came back, and as a result, I offer a few high points of the Napolitano nomination I haven’t seen in other media reports...

A Progressive Case for Gates Posted by Max Bergmann

The appointment of Secretary Gates is sure to irk many progressives – and for good reason. Gates was a part of the Bush administration, he oversaw the implementation of the President’s “surge” strategy, and has supported missile defense. While many progressives acknowledge that Gates has said some reasonable things (on Iran and Russia) and has been a positive influence within the Bush administration, many argue that this does not justify keeping someone on who was simply not as bad as the rest – especially when you have an opportunity to bring in someone more progressive.

But in keeping Gates, Obama, is actually indicating that he is very serious about instituting significant reform of the Pentagon.

Gates has advocated some very bold progressive reforms during the last couple of years. He has broken with the Rumsfeld emphasis on military transformation and has repeatedly talked about the need for the Pentagon to move away from procuring unnecessary weapons that are hugely expensive and have little strategic role. He also took on the Air Force’s “fighter mafia” by firing two top Air Force officials and appointing Gen. Norton Schwartz – a non fighter pilot – to be Chief of Staff. As Slate’s Fred Kaplan argues,

In his nearly two years at the helm of the Pentagon, Gates has delivered a series of speeches on the future direction of military policy. He has urged officers to recognize the shift in the face of warfare from the World War II legacy of titanic armored battles between comparably mighty foes to the modern reality of small shadow wars against terrorists and insurgents. More than that, he has called for systematic adjustments to this new reality: canceling weapons systems that aren't suited to these kinds of wars and building more weapons that are; reforming the promotion boards to reward and advance the creative officers who have proved most adept at this style of warfare; rethinking the roles and missions of the individual branches of the armed services; siphoning some of the military's missions, especially those dealing with "nation building," to civilian agencies.

By keeping him on, Obama is telling Gates to start implementing the reforms that he and progressives have been advocating for years. This is true especially on the defense budget. Since Gates is continuing on as Secretary of Defense he will now be empowered to bust out the scalpel and begin a difficult review process. Many had feared that the Pentagon would attempt to undermine a new Obama administration by dropping a $450 billion request for additional spending on weapons systems in the first months of his administration. This would have put Obama in the politically awkward position of being accused of cutting defense spending as one of his first foreign policy acts and would have set the battle lines over any potential reform of the defense budget. Not the sort of confrontational start that one would want. Gates essentially shields the Obama administration from that charge and hamstrings the elements within the Pentagon that would have sought to play politics to undermine a reform effort. Gates, as a Republican holdover in a Democratic administration, has an aura of bi-partisanship that makes him much more difficult to attack.

The question then that remains then is will Gates actually implement the far-reaching reforms he has talked about? I wrote in October after Gates had called for a massive change in the Pentagon’s strategic approach toward weapons systems:

why doesn't Gates actually begin the procurement review process now and submit to the next administration his recommendations for what systems are necessary and what are not. He is after all the Secretary of Defense RIGHT NOW.

But Fred Kaplan, once again, makes a fair point,

From the start, he knew that he wouldn't have time to make a lot of headway in these campaigns—which, within the military, represent fairly radical ideas. His intent was to spell out an agenda, and lay the groundwork, for the next administration. Now it seems he's going to be in the next administration.

It seems fairly clear that Gates was kept on (and has agreed to stay) in order to implement the reforms he had advocated. The New York Times this morning seemed to confirm this, reporting that Gates was “selected in large part because [he has] embraced a sweeping shift of resources in the national security arena. The shift, which would come partly out of the military’s huge budget.”

It is also important to note that Gates’ term will also probably be relatively brief, as he will in all likelihood make way for a more progressive leader – like Richard Danzig, a rumored nominee for be Deputy Secretary of Defense – in a year or two. Hopefully by that point Gates will have already done much of the heavy lifting and his successor will inherit a reform process that is already well under way. If that is the case, then Gates will have advanced the progressive vision on military affairs further than just about anyone could have hoped for.

General Jim Jones - National Security Advisor Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

To effectively evaluate the appointment of General Jim Jones, it's very important to first understand what the national security adviser and National Security Council actually do.  For that, I'd recommend this piece from Ivo Daalder and I.M Destler (Though written in 2000, it's the best explanation I've seen of the function of the NSC).  As they explain, the most important task of the NSC is

coordinating the policy process so that, simultaneously, agencies get a full and fair hearing and the president can make clear foreign policy choices in a timely manner.

To do this, you need a strong and fair mediator as national security adviser.  Someone who can be trusted by the other agencies (especially State and Defense) to present all the options to the President fairly, while being careful to not take sides too loudly.   You need someone who is strong enough to ensure that there is a clear process for decision-making and that the paper flow to the President is well organized.  You need someone strong, who is respected by the other national security principals, to ensure that they don't try to win the argument by bureaucratically outmaneuvering the national security adviser.  Finally, as the national security official with most access to the President, you need someone that the President truly trusts and respects.

The first Bush term was an example of the disastrous consequences of a weak national security adviser.  Condi Rice was close to President Bush, but she was bureaucratically inexperienced compared to heavyweights such as Rumsfeld, Cheney and Powell.  The result was that Cheney and Rumsfeld would use other avenues to get to the President and influence decisions behind her back.  Rumsfeld went as far as not sending reprsentatives to interagency meetings.  Cooperation broke down between the various agencies.  One of the results was the completely disjointed and ineffective planning for the postwar period in Iraq, which truly did require cooperation from Defense, State, Treasury, Justice and other agencies.  Another, was the fact that the decision to go to war was made without all the principals getting to clearly and fairly make their case.  What mattered more in decision-making was not the quality of the argument, but how close you were to the President and whether you could gain access.  And thus more often than not Cheney and Rumsfeld won out.

Jones, on the other hand, seems to have exactly the traits that Rice lacked.  As a General he has a long history of experience with the national security bureaucracy and understanding how to work within it.  Setting up an organized decision-making process is a key part of the national security advisor's job description, and no institution is better at setting up clear decision-making processes than the military.  With his level of experience and the respect he commands, I also can't imagine the other principals trying to actively undermine the policy coordination process he sets up.  Moreover, as Matt Yglesias writes

He’s a career military guy who wasn’t known during that time for doing much “off the record” sharing of his views on policy issues — he followed orders, impressed people enough to keep getting promoted, and either kept his views to himself or else only shared them with people who are extremely tight-lipped.

I think that is exactly the type of guy you want running the NSC. He is not going to draw a lot of attention to himself. This really is a position where most of the work needs to be done behind the scenes and requires much less of a public persona than say Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense.  In fact, it's also worth remembering that Brent Scowcroft is known for running one of the most effective NSC's in recent times and he to came from a military background.  He generally took a similar approach, with James Baker spending much more time in the limelight, while Scowcroft worked behind the scenes.

Jones also has other strengths.  His experience as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is probably the best preparation any General can have for understanding diplomacy.  It also gave him a first hand look at the war in Afghanistan - a situation that will be at the top of Obama's agenda.  And of course, as Democrats work to actively build a stronger relationship with the military, choosing a General as the President's top national security aide sends a powerful message. 

Overall, I think this is a very compelling choice.

Foreign Policy and "First-Order" Questions Posted by Shadi Hamid

I’m a bit worried that some people mistook my post on the “inappropriateness of a left-right spectrum on foreign policy” last week. In some ways I did, as Dan Lehr put it, “[celebrate] the end of the old ‘left-right/war-peace’ dichotomies.” But this does not mean that other dichotomies, or dichotomies in general, are inappropriate. Brent Scrowcroft and I may agree on many things now, but this convergence, in my view, is an accident of recent history. It tells us little about our competing visions of a global system, about the ends of foreign policy, and, then, how means and ends are to be matched. Grappling with these same issues, and taking a more positive view, Ilan says

There is relatively universal agreement among [liberals, liberal hawks, and realists] that we need to begin withdrawing from Iraq, focus more on Afghanistan, opt for direct diplomacy with Iran, reengage with the world, improve our image, strengthen our alliances, close Guantanamo and deal with global warming and energy security.

He is of course right. But the fact that agreement on these issues would be cause for relief, or perhaps even celebration, is itself a grim indictment of our foreign policy discourse. The lowest common denominators are quite low. That aside, my bigger problem with this emerging “consensus” is that it fails to address what one might call “first-order” questions. Glenn Greenwald, in a very interesting post, touches on this here.

For starters, were we against the war because of its consequences or despite its consequences? I worry that the answer to this question is no less clear today than it was several years ago. This is not necessarily a bad thing. I don’t have a clear answer myself. Was there something morally wrong with launching the Iraq war in and of itself, and, if so, what is the nature of the "moral" component in this case, but, more importantly, in so many others? Is what makes such wars immoral the fact that they are pre-emptive, or is it that preemption, as a matter of fact, fails much more often than it succeeds? In other words, if pre-emption was successful from a pragmatic standpoint, would it be less immoral? Or would the very fact of its efficacy negate, or supercede, moral considerations?