Institutions Not Individuals Posted by Michael Cohen

Cong. David Price (D-NC) is quickly becoming one of my favorite US Congressman. Not only did he co-sponsor legislation expanding the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to cover private security contractors (a long overdue effort to ensure greater accountability of PSCs) but he has an excellent article in this month's Washington Quarterly that makes a number of important points about the future of U.S. democracy promotion,

There is a lot of good material here, but this graf is worth noting:

Democracy is not just about elections. What is equally essential to lasting democracy is what happens between elections. Democracy requires strong institutions in legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. An important threshold is reached when a free and fair democratic election is held. Yet advancing voters’ concerns through peaceful, constitutional, and responsive means requires moving beyond elections to the practical work of developing the capacities of democratic institutions.

Too often, U.S. democracy promotion efforts have failed to penetrate beyond the rhetorical or superficial, and the Bush administration’s track record in this regard is decidedly mixed. The most consequential mistake has been to assume that democracy could spring fully formed from the barrel of a gun, most notably in the case of Iraq. Bush’s failure to avoid the errors of his predecessors, despite acknowledging and disavowing them, has also been damaging. Like many executives before him, the current president has allowed a myopic, short-term view of foreign affairs to obscure our national security vision.

. . . Admittedly, U.S. commitment to democracy abroad cannot always be absolute, after all, the United States is a nation with a complex and extensive agenda on the international stage. Yet, it is imperative that the United States be far less ready to sacrifice the democracy agenda for other goals. Supporting the growth of democracy extends beyond supporting democratic reforms and pressing non-democratic leaders. It must also include the difficult, sustained work of building and supporting democratic institutions.

This is precisely the sort of road map that our democratization efforts should be following - and while it may to some seem intuitive, it has been inconsistently advanced as a part of America's democracy promotion agenda.

Read the whole thing here.

Kagame the Democrat? Posted by Michael Cohen

A couple of days ago I linked to a piece by Joshua Kurlantzick, which extolled the virtues of Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda as the sort of enlightened yet unelected leader who could help seed democratic renewal and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. An excellent piece in the New York Times offers ample evidence as to why the myth of unelected "democratic" strongmen is just that - a myth.

According to the Times, under Kagame's leadership, Rwanda is once again seeding violence in mayhem in Congo and they are doing it in an underhanded and undemocratic manner:

Several demobilized Rwandan soldiers, speaking in hushed tones in Kigali, Rwanda’s tightly controlled capital, described a systematic effort by Rwanda’s government-run demobilization commission to send hundreds if not thousands of fighters to the rebel front lines. Former rebel soldiers in Congo said that they had seen Rwandan officers plucking off the Rwandan flags from the shoulders of their fatigues after they had arrived and that Rwandan officers served as the backbone of the rebel army. . .

Rwandan government officials are involved, providing bus fare for the men to travel to Congo and updating the rebel leadership each month on how many fighters from Rwanda are about to come over.

And why is Rwanda keeping their involvement in Congo under wraps: "Rwanda’s leaders are vigilant about not endangering their carefully crafted reputation as responsible, development-oriented friends of the West." The Times story also goes on to detail the rampant plundering of Eastern Congo by Rwanda businessmen and the veneer of freedom that defines the nation:

Rwanda may have a lot going for it — a high economic growth rate, low corruption, a Parliament with a majority of seats held by women. But many people here say they do not feel free. When the former government official was interviewed at a Kigali hotel, he abruptly stopped talking whenever the maid walked by.

Its worth a read; and serves as an ample reminder that so-called benevolent unelected leaders are often anything but.

Protecting Contractors Posted by Michael Cohen

One of the most significant and potentially damaging provisions of the recently agreed upon Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Iraq is the removal of immunity from Iraqi law for private security contractors (PSCs).

As I've written before, there is serious danger in this policy being implemented. Many of the most experienced contractors may decide that the risks of being thrown in an Iraqi prison are not worth a paycheck and as a result the US may come to rely on third-country or local-country nationals, who often lack proper experience and training. A deprofessionalization of the PSC corps in Iraq won't be good for anyone; not for US diplomats and certainly not for Iraqi civilians.

However, in a rather troubling editorial yesterday the New York Times is decidely non-plussed about the situation.

Companies warn that the agreement will make it much harder for them to hire Americans and others to provide security in Iraq. If true, it is still an acceptable price to pay to show this country’s commitment to the rule of law.

It is astounding that the Times would cite commitment to "the rule of law" as a rationale for placing U.S. private security contractors at the mercy of the Iraqi legal system, particularly in light of the most recent report of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. The UN draws these conclusions about the Iraqi criminal justice system:

“Many detainees have been deprived of their liberty for     months or even years, often under precarious physical conditions, without     access to defence counsel, or without being formally charged with a crime or     produced before a judge. Continuing allegations of widespread torture and     ill-treatment of inmates are of particular concern.”

That this would be considered an "acceptable price to pay" for any American citizen is hard to imagine but such hyperbole should not seem surprising from an editorial that falsely accuses security contractors of being akin to "private armies" and describes American PCSs as being "infamous among Iraqis for their “spray and pray” approach to security: spraying bullets and praying they hit the enemy."  It is a charge that is very difficult to reconcile with the reality of how contractors have acted in Iraq and the low number of civilian casualties for which they have been responsible.

The Times is certainly correct to demand greater accountability for PSCs. In fact, they rightly call on Congress to pass legislation that will expand the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to private contractors employed by the State Department. This would provide the accountability that Iraqis and Americans have been demanding for years - and to which the PSC industry has offered little resistance.

But the blase attitude with which the Times and others (including the same DoD and State Dept that has hired and utilized PSCs for nearly 5 years) have demonstrated toward contractors -- and their possible imprisonment and prosecution in a legal system that has little respect for the sort of due process provisions we take for granted -- is both shocking and unseemly.

The contractors that we hire and send into harm's way merit the same consideration and protection as any other American citizen. It's unfortunate that in a rush to condemn the Bush Administration for its mishandled occupation of Iraq and its over reliance on contractors many have chosen to ignore that fact.

When non-westerners die, does the media notice and other eternal questions Posted by Heather Hurlburt

Over at bloggingheads, Daniel Drezner and I debunk the mainstream media frenzy-du-jour that progressives are split over the Obama Cabinet (thanks to MW and others who pointed this out first); ponder the regional implications of the Mumbai attacks; and complain about the excessive and obscuring focus on western victims.  I've been meaning to point out grumpily somewhere, and the Arsenal seems like the place, that 400 people died in communal conflict in Jos, Nigeria over the same period last week and hundreds of Indians have died in previous terrorist attacks this year, not to mention the fifty Iraqis killed in bombings in the last two days. 

On a lighter note, we invite commenters to give our infrequent dialogues a catchy name.  Figured our loyal democracyarsenal crowd would want in on that.

Mumbai attacks resemble past LeT operations Posted by Max Bergmann

I was re-reading a 2003 book on Kashmir by my old grad school adviser, Sumantra Bose, and came across a pretty relevant description of the methods of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) – the group now accused of being behind last week’s attacks. The flurry of suicidal guerrilla raids that took place in Indian controlled Kashmir between 1999-200 often usually consisted of two-man guerrilla groups that would burst into an Indian military camp or other target building and would begin “firing indiscriminately from automatic rifles and lobbing grenades.” Most of these attacks were blamed on the LeT. Bose writes on p. 142:

“LeT denies that its raids are suicide missions – preferring to call them “daredevil” actions – since the group follows an ultra-orthodox version of Sunni Islam that strictly prohibits suicide, but the raids nonetheless have an undeniably suicidal character. The attackers almost never return from these penetrate and kill missions – their aim is not to save their own lives but to maximize the frightening psychological impact on the enemy by inflicting death and destruction on their targets.”

Bose notes that there were a large number of these types of attacks, and while most were directed at Indian security personnel, on a number of occasions attacks were targeted against civilians within Kashmir.  The attacks last week in Mumbai clearly resemble these past LeT attacks.

His book is highly recommended for anyone interested in what it will take to resolve Kashmir and achieve peace between India and Pakistan.

Lessons for Executive Summarizers Posted by Patrick Barry

It's no secret that poppy cultivation and opium production are a huge problem in Afghanistan, but the UNODC's latest Opium Survey for Afghanistan, which showed that cultivation declined 19% this year has raised the eyebrows of people like Spencer Ackerman and Mark Leon Goldberg.  Goldberg reports that the survey attributed this decline to both enhanced counternarcotics efforts and a drought.  As you can see, this is right from the UNODC's Executive Summary:

The full opium survey shows that cultivation reduced more than expected thanks to successful counter-narcotic efforts in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan.

This decline was also a result of unfavourable weather conditions that caused extreme drought and crop failure in some provinces, especially those in which agriculture is rainfed.

But don't go thanking God and counternarcotics officers just yet.  A comparison of the Executive Summary with the Executive Summary contained in the actual report (believe it or not, they aren't the same) shows that there are SIGNIFICANT differences in their explanations for the reduction, including some that would lead you to a less-than-happy set of conclusions:

Since 2007 opium cultivation declined by 19% to 157,000 hectares this year, for several reasons. First, as shown in our August Report, restraint at planting (but not eradication), has been successful. Pressure by governors, shuras and village elders has kept cultivation down in many provinces. Second, and most importantly, the dynamics of farm prices. As (Afghan) supply has once again exceeded (world) demand, prices for opium (both fresh and old) are down 20% in nominal terms (and much more at constant prices).

The distinctions here are absolutely critical for understanding the current dynamics of Afghanistan's opium trade.  We'll start with the second cause, because it helps explain the first.  World opium prices are down 20%, indicating that supply far outpaces demand.  This glut in opium supply has consequences for cultivators and traffickers, as declining prices translate to less revenue.  Since evidence suggests that the opium supply chain is at least partially controlled by the Taliban and other warlords through taxation and extortion, declining prices mean that less revenue goes to fund the insurgency.  A logical way for the Taliban, associated warlords and drug traffickers to rebalance supply and demand is for them to reign in production, which goes to explain the steep drop in cultivation.  So what one Executive Summary made out to be a sign of counternarcotics efforts, the other shows is just a market correcting itself. 

You would think that the UN wouldn't want to publish executive summaries that wildly mis-characterize the findings contained in other UN executive summaries.  Of course, since I still haven't read the 187-page report, I'm not 100% sure that I'm mischaracterizing it either.  Let's hope not. 

Pragmatism Posted by Shadi Hamid

To add to my post the other day on the role of ideology in foreign policy, I just want to say something about “pragmatism,” since we are hearing that word a lot. The emerging consensus, as Glenn Greenwald puts it, is that “we have now entered an era where pragmatism and competence trumps all considerations and old ‘ideological’ disputes are thereby rendered obsolete.” Along these lines, Dan Lehr says “pragmatism is forcing ideology to take a back seat.” This is probably true. Ideology has taken a back seat. But this does not mean ideology is gone or irrelevant. All it means is that our current political discourse has opted to de-emphasize questions of ideology for reasons that may have little to do with the actual, and supposed, decline of ideology.

Jim Arkedis argued last week that “no matter who’s in the Oval Office for the foreseeable future, I think we’re ending the left/right divide and putting a premium on smart pragmatism.” I am, to be honest, not totally reassured by the rise of “smart pragmatism." It brings to mind our pre-9/11 foreign policy, which while infinitely better than our post-9/11 one, is not necessarily the standard to which we should strive (for that argument, see here). In some sense, everyone is “pragmatic.” What differs from one person to the next, however, is what and where their “non-negotiables” are. Where are the red lines of foreign policy? There are always red lines because there are certain things we won’t do even if they're in our pragmatic “self-interest.” And there are always things we'll choose to do even if they go against our narrowly-defined national “self-interest.”

The fact of the matter is liberal Democrats and conservative realists have different red lines, in part, because they are animated by different principles. In short, while principles or “ideology” may not seem to matter as much now, that has little bearing on the question of whether they will matter at some point in the future. They will come to matter more if and when we move away from lowest common denominator agreements and start to talk fundamentals and “first-order questions,” which is something I think we'll have to do eventually. 

Bruce Riedel on Pakistan, India and a Kashmir Solution Posted by Patrick Barry

This past summer, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science published a piece by Bruce Riedel, which explained why resolution of India and Pakistan's dispute over Kashmir is essential if the region hopes to reduce terrorism, and attain a modicum of stability.  In the wake of the Mumbai attacks, this excerpt seemed especially relevant and prophetic:

"In a worst-case scenario, a terrorist incident like the July 2006 metro bombings in Mumbai or the hijacking of IA 814 could spark an Indian military response against targets in Pakistan allegedly involved in the planning and orchestration of terrorism. And that could lead to nuclear war."

So the question is, now that the 'attack' has taken place, what next?  It's true that if an investigation uncovers evidence of high-level Pakistani involvement in the Mumbai attacks, we can safely say that productive negotiations between the two countries over Kashmir, leading to warmer relations, are no longer possible.  Even before the attack, I would say that short-term prospects for a settlement were almost non-existent.  But still, are matters so far beyond salvaging?  Afterall, the initial responses to the crisis from both countries have been commendable.  India has shown remarkable restraint given the circumstances, with foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee firmly stating that "[n]obody is talking of military action."  Pakistan too has taken some important steps. While they have not issued a reply to the initial set of demands put forth by the Indian Government, national security briefings will begin today, involving Pakistan's parliament, and notably, the ISI - a sign that at least the ISI's leadership is treating this matter seriously.

I don't want to suggest that the worst is over, that this is no longer a highly delicate situation.  There could easily be missteps, and if it turns out that Pakistan's government played any role in the attacks whatsoever, Pakistan and India might be headed for all-out war.  But the initial responses give me reason to hope that tensions might ease. If that's the case (and there's no question that is a huge if), I don't see a reason why efforts at rapprochement - over Kashmir, or any other issue - couldn't resume.

Bush Logic Posted by James Lamond

In his recent interview with Charlie Gibson, the President spoke of regrets and do-overs in a sad attempt to shape his legacy.

Here is part of the exchange:

GIBSON: You've always said there's no do-overs as President. If you had one?

BUSH: I don't know -- the biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq. A lot of people put their reputations on the line and said the weapons of mass destruction is a reason to remove Saddam Hussein. It wasn't just people in my administration; a lot of members in Congress, prior to my arrival in Washington D.C., during the debate on Iraq, a lot of leaders of nations around the world were all looking at the same intelligence. And, you know, that's not a do-over, but I wish the intelligence had been different, I guess.

GIBSON: If the intelligence had been right, would there have been an Iraq war?

BUSH: Yes, because Saddam Hussein was unwilling to let the inspectors go in to determine whether or not the U.N. resolutions were being upheld. In other words, if he had had weapons of mass destruction, would there have been a war? Absolutely.

GIBSON: No, if you had known he didn't.

BUSH: Oh, I see what you're saying. You know, that's an interesting question. That is a do-over that I can't do. It's hard for me to speculate.

The President's responses are just disturbing on two levels.

First, his logic.  President Bush completely contradicts himself by first saying that the intelligence failure is his biggest regret, but if the intelligence had been correct, he still would have gone to war.  Does that make any sense?  He regrets that the intelligence was wrong, but if it was right he would have done the same thing.

Second, Bush is trying to erase his responsibility for the failure in Iraq by placing the blame on the flawed intelligence.  While others may have believed the manipulated intelligence the Bush administration offered, he is the one who rushed to war and completely mismanaged it once he was there.  He does not seem to regret his doctrine of "preventative war" and spreading democracy to the Middle East, his dismissal of allies, the lack of preparation for war, or the complete lack of understanding of the country in which he was invading.  These combined with the the utter mismanagement of the war effort by the Bush administration is what led to the disaster, we see today- not just the fact that there were no WMDs in Iraq.

By reading the president's responses in the the interview, one would think that the only problem in Iraq is that we didn't find WMDs.  The truth is that there is so much more went wrong with the war than just the intelligence.  It was also the failed policies of the administration.  Ultimately the blame falls on the president himself.

Terror Incentives and the Decline of Tourism Posted by Shadi Hamid

Jeff Goldberg in a recent post on, um, "how to stay alive in a terrorized hotel," recommends that travelers "stay in hotels that have already been bombed or otherwise attacked. Mumbai is a fairly safe place for travelers right now."

This is a really interesting point. After cities get hit by attacks, tourism usually declines significantly. The response that most people to have to, say, a terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheik is, "well, let's not go to Sharm until things cool down." The "rational" response is actually to go to Sharm immediately after an attack, since it's unlikely that terrorists will bomb the same city in consecutive weeks or months (or even consecutive years). I'd actually be interested to see data on this.

From a more macro standpoint, if enough people took Goldberg's advice and either 1) kept their booking for Sharm after the occurrence of an attack, or 2) decided to go to Sharm right after the attack for either safety or symbolic reasons, then the incentives for terrorists would change. In many contexts, a major objective of terrorist attacks is to hurt the target country's economy by hurting the tourism industry. This is particularly the case in countries, such as Egypt, that disproportionately depend on the tourism sector. If launching a terrorist attack failed to have an adverse effect on tourism, then that, by itself, would probably not dissuade terrorists from attacking in the short-run, but it would likely affect their calculations in some fashion in the long-run and would probably affect the selection of targets.

The other aspect of this is the relationship between a terrorist group and the target government. One of the main points of leverage terrorists have with a given regime is that they can hold the tourism industry hostage. This obviously affects the government's response to terrorism but also on civil and political rights more generally. I don't know enough about the data in this regard to say how a smaller rather than a larger decline in tourism after a terrorist attack would affect government policy, but I imagine there would be a significant effect of some kind.