Turkish Leadership Posted by Shadi Hamid

Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan has offered to mediate between the U.S. and Turkey. Others, including Patrick Barry and Ezra Klein, have written about the broader strategic implications. I want to underline one thing: Erdogan, depending on how you define things, is an Islamist or was an Islamist at some point. His Justice and Development Party (AKP) is quite clearly a religiously-oriented one. For those who feel that Islamist parties and U.S. national security interests don't necessarily go together, Turkey is proof that this need not be the case. Yes, Turkey can always be dismissed as an outlier, but, just the same, it can serve as a model for what we might expect from other Islamist parties in the region (after all, it serves as a model for at least some reformists within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan).

There is also something else to keep in mind. Turkey is one of the only democracies in the Middle East. It is not an accident that regional leadership goes hand in hand with having a strong, proud democracy. It is hard to imagine Egypt, under its current autocratic leadership, playing a similar role. Governments that are considered illegitimate and weak at home are not in the position to be strong abroad. If President Mubarak of Egypt, for instance, announced an ambitious regional initiative, it would be a statement coming from one person, representing, really, only one person. He has no parliament to back him up. He would in no sense be authorized or supported by his people in doing such a thing (and we know that domestic support is critical for the long-term success of foreign initiatives). Lastly, if one person makes a decision, one person can always change it, so why cast your lot with something so fickle. In other words, in Turkey, the conduct of foreign policy is more institutionalized. It is not entirely dependent on Erdogan. The same cannot be said for the conduct of, say, Egyptian and Jordanian policy in the region.

CIA Director Hayden: U.S. Counterterrorism Doesn't Pass Muster Posted by Patrick Barry

Michael Hayden has some dispiriting news about our worldwide counterterrorism efforts.  In short, they're not going so well:

[CIA] director, Michael V. Hayden, identified North Africa and Somalia as places where Qaeda leaders were using partnerships to establish new bases. Elsewhere, Mr. Hayden said, Al Qaeda was “strengthening” in Yemen, and he added that veterans of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan had moved there, possibly to stage attacks against the government of Saudi Arabia.

He said the “bleed out” from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also extended to North Africa, raising concern that the countries there could be used to stage attacks into Europe. Mr. Hayden delivered his report in a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, and it offered a mixed assessment of Al Qaeda’s ability to wage a global jihad.

He drew a contrast between what he described as growing Islamic radicalism in places like Somalia and what he said had been the “strategic defeat” of Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia — the network’s affiliate group in Iraq.

Compare this sobering assessment to the remarks by President Bush before the FBI a few weeks ago, in which he pointed to the absence of a terrorist attack on the homeland as a sign that U.S. counterterrorism efforts were succeeding, and it's hard not to leave with the impression that the President is living in a shuddered unreality. The fact that no major attack has occurred on U.S. soil since 9-11 is nothing to scoff at, but should it be the primary criteria for evaluating our worldwide counterterrorism strategy? Not when there is a rising tide of "Islamic radicalism, when former insurgents from Iraq are bringing newly acquired talents to bear in Afghanistan, and when al-Qaeda is strengthening franchises in Yemen and Somalia.  While there thankfully has not been an attack on the homeland, the likelihood that such an incident will occur appears to be rising.

That Hayden should describe the diminishing significance of al-Qaeda in Iraq as a "strategic defeat" is also interesting.  As a matter of internal Iraqi security, AQI's reduced significance does amount to a defeat for terrorists, but externally, that defeat looks less strategic than it does tactical.  Elsewhere, al-Qaeda and other terrorist movements appear to be just as strong, if not stronger than they were before 9-11. The broader take-away from Hayden's assessment, and really every assessment from the intel community, is that U.S. counterterrorism policy has been, at best, like squeezing a water balloon - we're produced displacement, but nothing more.

Has the Privatization of National Security Gone Too Far? - Event at New America Foundation Posted by Michael Cohen

 

For those of you interested in the issue of private contractor issue, I will be hosting an event tomorrow at New America Foundation to unveil our new report, Changing the Culture of Military Contracting. Hope to see some of you there!

RSVP here

Has the Privatization of National Security Gone Too Far?

While the U.S. military has long relied on private contractors, the outsourcing of key national security functions has increased dramatically in recent years. From intelligence gathering and logistical support to personal security services, training, and operational support tasks, the efforts of contractors are now integral to the success of America's security and stabilization missions around the world. Since the beginning of the Iraq War, one dollar out of every five has been spent on private contractors and by most estimates, there are more private contractors in Iraq than uniformed military.

Yet, this increased dependence has not been matched by a commensurate effort in the Pentagon or Congress to regulate this growing virtual army of contractors. Indeed, there has been a virtual abdication of responsibilities when it comes to the management and oversight of military contracting. With a new Administration preparing to take the reins of power there is a unique opportunity to put in place a new strategy for determining the role these private actors will play in helping fight America’s wars.

The Privatization of Foreign Policy Initiative in New America Foundation's  American Strategy Program has produced a report, "Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting" that offers policymakers in Congress, the Executive branch and uniformed military concrete recommendations for dealing with the growing challenge of integrating contractors more effectively into U.S. national security operations. Join us on November 14th for the release of this report and a discussion about the role and responsibilities of private military contractors going forward.

Light breakfast will be provided.

Start: 11/14/2008 - 9:30am

End: 11/14/2008 - 11:00am

New America Foundation

1630 Connecticut Ave, NW 7th Floor

Washington, DC, 20009

Participants

Featured Speakers
David Isenberg
Adjunct Scholar, CATO Institute
Columnist, "Dogs of War"
Author of the forthcoming, Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq

Tara Lee
Partner, DLA Piper
Former JAG Corp counsel
Expert on War Crimes and National Security Law

Michael A. Cohen
Co-Author, "Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting"
Senior Research Fellow, Privitization of Foreign Policy Initiative, New America Foundation

Kevin Lanigan
Director, Law and Security Program
Human Rights First

Moderator
Patrick C. Doherty
Deputy Director, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation

Anatolian Navel Gazing Posted by Patrick Barry

Some good news out of Turkey today - Prime Minister Recep Erdogan has offered to act as a mediator between the Iran's leadership and the incoming Obama administration.  It's anybody's guess what the Obama people will do with the offer, but it's an important gesture that's worth recognizing:

Turkey wants to be the mediator between the new Obama administration and Iran, using its growing role in the Middle East to bridge the divide between East and West, said Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erodogan.

Something which the Times piece does a decent job of drawing out is that Turkey is pretty well positoned for this sort of thing, and not just in the U.S.-Iran context either.  In fact, as Middle East interlocutors go, it's tough to do better:

Turkey argues that it is uniquely positioned to facilitate talks between Washington and Tehran. It is a NATO member, and it secured a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council last month. It is a Muslim country that has renewed relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors in recent years, achieving a breakthrough in May by bringing Israel and Syria together for talks for the first time in years.

Add to this list Turkey's pursuit of EU accession, their friendly relations with Israel, and a government that commands respect from Muslims across the Middle East, and the Turks start to sound like good friends to have in a pinch. 

Turkey talk also gets to a larger issue, which is that If you take the view that America's problems in the Middle East - from Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons to the future of Iraq to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan - are too big to address bilaterally, country by country, then there must an initative that draws in all vested parties to get everyone to exercise convergent pressure on the challenge at hand.  This in turn means getting cooperation from enemies, consent from allies, and coordination from parties with nothing in common.  No easy task either.  In a situation like that, it's helpful to have the support of countries that can act as bridgers, countries that can reconcile the divisions that would otherwise cause the whole operation to unravel.

This leads us back to Turkey.  A bajillion years ago, back when there were Byzantines, they called Istanbul the navel of the world, a metaphor which is at once gross but also useful for understanding Turkey's traditional role as a node for East-West activity.  For centuries, Turkey has managed to fuse together cultures that to everyone else appared irreconcilable.  Today, for reasons political and economic, cultural and strategic, they seem willing to take on that part again.

Nothing Will Change in Foreign Policy? Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

I wrote a bit yesterday about the intellectual laziness that exists behind the assertion that nothing will change in a new administration.  The best example of this in the foreign policy genre is John Barry's piece in Newsweek. 

in foreign policy the reality is that, on the afternoon of Jan. 20, President Obama will face the same challenges that President Bush did that morning. And none presents much opportunity for bold new initiatives.

It may be true that Obama will face the same challenges, but he'll also face a different international environment.  An environment where both our allies and our adversaries are more willing to trust the United States and its intentions. Since Iraq, the Bush administration has had little to no credibility on the international scene.  There is an opportunity to reclaim it with the right set of policies that signal to the world that America is ready to lead but also ready to respect the opinions of others.  In short, Obama will be facing the same issues, but he may have more opportunities and wiggle room than Bush because he will likely have more international cooperation and democratic governments who won't view cooperating with the United States as a political liability. 

There is also the fact that while the effects of a major shift in policy will take time to yield results, those shifts may begin very early on.  Take Afghanistan for example.  Afghanistan will be a mess on January 20.  It will be a mess on January 21st and most likely long after Obama's inauguration.  But it is quite clear that time, resources, and senior level attention will be devoted to the issue from the very start.  That is a major shift in policy and priorities from the current administration and it will make a difference.

Moreover, many of the specific obstacles that Barry presents are not really game enders and still leave room for pretty dramatic changes. On Iraq Barry writes,

Building a Healthy Long-Lasting Marriage With Our Allies Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

Rachel Kleinfeld writes about the incredible opportunity that an Obama administration has to take advantage of all the international good will built up by the election.

What does that mean for the first 100 days of an Obama administration? The simple fact of Mr. Obama’s election will build good will with Europe, for a time; we need to capitalize on that immediately to garner more significant troop commitments to Afghanistan from NATO allies and to ensure that their rules of engagement allow them to fight. We should also ask the European Union to send a rapid reaction force to the Congo, to stop the slaughter happening there. By showing respect for Europe’s baby steps toward building its own military apparatus, we can encourage them to invest more in a fighting force that can relieve American troops, and our pocketbooks.

One sure fire way to guarantee that the honeymoon will in fact only last "for a time" is to pursue this approach.  There is clearly massive good will around the world from people who view the election of Obama both as resounding end to the Bush era and a reaffirmation of the very basic American values of equal opportunity.  For years George Bush's international unpopularity was an impediment to cooperation.  Allied governments hesitated to work with the United because, even if they with our policy agenda, the political liability of cooperation with President Bush was a problem.  Often times this was also used as an easy excuse to not make commitments and free ride on American policies that served common interests.   That barrier is clearly gone.

But while Obama's election carries dramatic symbolic value, we also need to demonstrate to our allies that the way we govern and conduct foreign policy will substantively change.  That means not cramming a list of demands down their throats in the first 100 days.  It means building on the goodwill and sending the right signals that we care about their priorities.  We should listen to their priorities early on and do some relatively easy things that send the right message on issues such as international arms control treaties, global warming treaties, international law and development issues.  The signal needs to be sent that we won't be obstructionist on these issues every chance we get and that we're even willing to engage aggressively on them - not because they are our top priority but because we respect the views and interests of our allies and are willing to listen. 

Over time and even in the relatively short term, there is no question that we should ask the Europeans to provide more troops for Afghanistan and also ask them to remove the caveats that some countries have placed on their forces. But let's not forget that they have just dealt with the Bush administration for eight years, and while the general population is easily swayed foreign officials will need more clear proof that there really is a new approach coming from Washington.

We need the Europeans for pretty much all of our central long-term national security concerns.  They are critical players in dealing with Iran and Afghanistan.  Their cooperation on transnational issues such as the economic crisis, energy security, and terrorism is absolutely central.  Rather than assuming that the last eight years are forgotten or seizing on the short-term goodwill to hammer through some specific agenda items, an Obama administration would be best served by carefully and methodically rebuilding the trust we need to sustain these long-term alliances.  Best to turn the honeymoon into a healthy long lasting marriage.

Understanding Electoral Defeat Posted by Shadi Hamid

Watching the fascinating debate on the Right (bookmark The Next Right) in the wake of defeat highlights some of the things we know about how democracy functions – and how dictatorships don’t. One of the few things that will force a political party to adapt to changing circumstances and engage in long-overdue intro/retrospection is a drubbing at the ballot box.   

We lost bad in 2002 and 2004, so we were forced to re-build our institutional and intellectual infrastructure, a process which continues today (let’s hope it continues with the same intensity as before). The Republicans lost last week, and I expect that, as a result, the ideas of Ross Douthat, Reihan Salam, David Frum, and the young Turks of groups like The Next Right and Rebuild the Party, will gain increased currency in conservative ranks. This is a healthy process.

At the risk of stating the obvious, this is also why authoritarian regimes are quite bad at adapting to the preferences of their citizens. There is never any real incentive to engage in policy innovation, because there are no channels of direct electoral accountability. There is, however, a real incentive to not engage in policy innovation. You have a situation where the most qualified, uncorrupted political appointees (in, say, a country like Egypt) are most likely to be sacked the soonest, for the very reasons that they would have been successful if they had the good fortune of living in a democracy. Intelligent, well-meaning technocrats (or, worse, visionaries) serve little purpose in the confines of an authoritarian system lubricated by bribes, backstabbing, and patronage. These are the types that rock the boat.

A related problem has to do with opposition parties in authoritarian polities. In the absence of real elections, the opposition does not face any threat of “losing” an election. They will lose regardless of their performance, so “performing well” (for example, coming up with practical program for addressing unemployment) becomes less important than it otherwise would be. This is why the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has become a big, somewhat immobile elephant of an organization, capable of protecting its organizational prerogatives, but unable or unwilling to demonstrate any kind of bold innovation on a variety of key challenges facing the country. What they probably need is a real, rather than an artificial, electoral drubbing. 

Then we have a country like Jordan which more often than not holds relatively free and fair elections (I emphasize the word "relatively" here). That, of course, is good. What is less good is the fact that these elections don’t matter as much as they should, because parliament's powers are quite limited, and because electoral laws make it impossible for the opposition to win anything close to a majority. Still, elections in Jordan do matter. But in the case of widespread election fraud, as we saw in 2007, the lessons of election losses become less clear. Did the Islamic Action Front do worse than expected because of failures on their part (which would necessitate introspection and revising their whole political approach), or did they lose because the government massively rigged the elections (which would necessitate more minor tactical revisions, as well as spending a large amount of time blaming and attacking the government)?

In an authoritarian country, it is difficult for opposition parties to engage in full-on political introspection, because it is always more likely their loss was due to government interference adn electoral fraud.

The Lazy No Change Stories Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

One obviously easy and intellectually lazy thing to do when a new President is elected is to start complaining about how difficult things are and how there won't actually be any real change.  It's much easier to imagine the status quo world than it is to think about the dramatic changes a President might make, and thus pretty easy for reporters to write stories about how nothing is going to change.  The other option is to speculate about how everything will be turned topsy turvy on day one, which is equally unrealistic.  Thus, we end up with two articles declaring simultaneously that Obama will instantaneously close Guantanamo and not really change the Bush administration's torture policies.

Let's take a deep breath and figure out what we actually know:

A.  Until the past week Obama has been fully focused on the campaign. Obviously robust preparations were being made for a transition and that is good news for all of us.  But it's hard to imagine that as a candidate President-elect Obama was making any major policy decisions.  He hasn't even picked his cabinet yet.  After all, you'd think he'd want to get recommendations from the people he is bringing on to run things before making final determinations on major policy questions.

B.  The best predictor of the new President's policy priorities are the plans and agenda he laid out on the campaign trail.  They aren't a perfect reflection of where things will end up. Agendas change, reality changes, and governing is different than campaigning.  But when you see a candidate lay out some pretty clear differences on issues like Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, proliferation, torture, energy policy, etc...  Well, you expect that there will be some pretty clear changes from how things are being run right now.

C.  The world is a messy and complicated place.  Government moves slowly and you can't change everything in a day.  Obama said as much during his speech at Grant Park.  Major initiatives take time.  They don't breezingly pass through congress. Complicated diplomatic negotiations with a country like Iran might take some time to develop and there will undoubtedly be hiccups along the way.  Misunderstandings and stalemates but hopefully also points of agreement and progress. 

So please no more uber lame stories about how absolutely nothing is going to change or everything will.  Reality doesn't work that way.

EU Resumes Partnership Talks with Russia Posted by The Editors

This post is from Eric Auner

Yesterday, the European Union, which rarely agrees on anything, agreed almost unanimously to resume partnership talks with Russia that had been suspended following Russia’s August War with Georgia.  Lithuania was the only dissenter.  In the words of Finland’s foreign minister “realpolitik has influenced this…it is in Europe’s interests to restart talks.”  This is part of an apparent trend of re-engagement with Russia, as evidenced by Michael Mullen’s meeting with his counterpart Nikolai Makarov last month.  It seems that Western powers are heeding the advice of Henry Kissinger and George Schultz when they wrote that “it is neither feasible nor desirable to isolate a country spanning one-eighth of the earth’s surface, adjoining Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and possessing a stockpile of nuclear weapons comparable to that of the United States.”  Various foreign policy challenges, including recent violence in South Ossetia and the financial crisis (which has strongly affected Russia), will demand broad cooperation between all involved. 

Both the EU and the United States must ensure, however, that closer ties are largely conditional on good behavior by Russia.  All Russian aggression should have real consequences.  Furthermore, there is always a danger that Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources will divide Europe and prevent it from responding forcefully in the case of some future crisis.  For the time being, however, this recent move by the EU is an encouraging step.

Re: Historic Election Posted by Shadi Hamid

Thanks to David Shorr for pointing us to this bipartisan statement on “revitalizing international cooperation.” I always look forward to reading what comes out of the Stanley Foundation. They’ve worked hard to demonstrate that it is possible for Democrats and Republicans to come together on key foreign policy concerns, this being no exception. That said, I want to comment on a couple sections from the statement, which I think are especially interesting for discussion:

Because the United States has an ambitious vision about the spread of human rights, prosperity, and democracy, we must recognize that it will only be achieved over time. Such recognition points toward engagement in a steady and measured effort rather than the pursuit of precipitous revolutionary change.

Agreed. Middle East democracy is not going to happen overnight. At the same time, because the region has proven exceptionally resistant to democratic reform, any successful effort in this regard will require tremendous political will and a commitment from policymakers to really think innovatively. I worry sometimes that gradualist approaches can result in postponing difficult, and urgent, decisions. For example, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is 80. His health is suffering. There is no institutionalized mechanism for succession. Couple that with increased popular discontent, reflected in the upsurge of spontaneous protests and riots, and a deteriorating economic situation, and it could very well get messy.

Committing ourselves to real support for democracy and democrats in the Middle East is urgent for other reasons. Obama has a window of opportunity. Like all windows, this one will close. For the first time in recent memory, Arabs and Muslims are cheering on an American president (and, for that matter, praying for him). One of their longstanding grievances has been American support for dictatorships in the region. This isn’t to say we’re going to stop working with the Egyptian government (we need their cooperation on key national security issues). But it is to say that we should be making clear - not just with rhetoric but through policy changes on the ground - that we care about the state of human rights and political reform in the region. Otherwise, Middle Eastern audiences will start to lose faith in the in the prospect of real political change.

Also, it’s not as if we currently have a neutral position, and it’s just a matter of waiting patiently for Arab civil society and political parties to organize and put pressure on their own governments. Currently, we support these repressive governments with billions of dollars of aid. In other words, the U.S. is, as things stand now, an obstacle to structural political reform in the region.

Over time, leaders who are repressive internally or aggressive and disruptive internationally will encounter an international community less tolerant of their actions. The long war will also open up political space and offer outside inspiration and support for local populations hungry for democratic change—making it less likely or necessary for the United States to intervene to achieve these goals.

This is generally true for most cases. It has not, however, been true for the Middle East. Leaders in the region have been repressive internally for more than five decades. But the U.S. and other Western powers have been more than just tolerant. They have actively supported these governments despite increasing evidence that they're not serious about internal reform (Egypt’s freedom house scores are worse today than they were in 1976. Jordan’s scores are significantly lower today than they were in 1992). Ideally, the U.S. wouldn’t have to intervene to achieve its goals (on human rights and democracy), but, as I mentioned earlier, the United States has generally been an obstacle to reform in these countries. This means that we would have to “intervene” to remove ourselves as an obstacle.