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March 28, 2005

Progressive Strategy, Weekly Top Ten Lists

Step 1: Don't Blame the Victim
Posted by Heather Hurlburt

OK, tired of finding different groups to blame for Democrats' inability to get over the wall on national security.  Here's my proposal for a ten-step program to get Democrats back on the map:

Step 1.  Don't Blame the Victims (grassroots progressives).  Beinart lost a lot of credibility with me when he published an op-ed blaming the problem on liberal Iowa voters.  It's our job to help them figure out what to think about national security... isn't it? 

Step 2.  Stop caricaturing what both progressives and the general public want in foreign policy.  They think much more sensibly than we give them credit for -- and then don't find candidates who express what they think.

Step 3.  Send all senior-level party functionaries and would-be candidates off to learn something about the fundamentals of foreign policy.  Don't let 'em back until they have.  Oops, that would require...

Step 4.  Create progressive institutions that are focused not on media grandstanding, arguing with other progressives or debating how many Security Council seats can fit on the head of a pin, but actually educating our own and giving them products they can use.

Step 5.  Send all progressive foreign policy experts off to learn something about the country we live in, how our political system works, and how to talk to normal people without condescending, so that they can then populate the institutions created in step 4.

Step 6.  Every progressive takes a personal vow to learn something about our military, how it works, what its ethos is, and how it affects our society at all levels -- as well as what it does well and less well in the wider world.

Step 7.  Reformed policy experts can work on crafting what Suzanne mentioned in her post -- a larger agenda that speaks to the core values and beliefs of our voters, into which we can slot all our favorite policies and programs because the larger concepts would reassure voters that they can trust us.  (Suzanne mentioned several concepts that don't cut it.  Let me add another from the campaign:  "Strengthen core alliances."  I'm a liberal, for heaven's sake, and even I know that alliances are not an end in themselves but a means to do things we want done.)

Step 8.  Said constructs then have to be framed (you knew I'd get to Lakoff eventually) in a way that vaults over the wall of fear and mayhem that our opponents and the media have conspired to construct in regular folks' minds about the world.

Step 9.  Reformed party bigs then concentrate on making this agenda an organic part of an overall progressive agenda, and send out candidates who look credible.

Step 10.  Progressive rank-and-file then has to take a deep breath and get into this.  Then, if it still doesn't work, we can follow Peter Beinart and blame our troubles on those Iowa progressives.  But not before. 

Progressive Strategy

Progressives Anonymous
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

I agree with everything Derek says, and have tried to deal with some of these questions in two past articles:  Battle Hymn of the Democrats and Smart Power.  I don't have answers, but some of things we ought to think about are:

We need to convey toughness not just in what we say but in how we say it - as this Administration has shown repeatedly, when it comes to national security being forceful but wrong often goes over better than being nuanced but right.   Whether we like it or not, this truth needs to influence what we say and who we choose to say it.

We should not lose sight of the core principles that have fueled every foreign policy success progressives can claim during the 20th century.  Though some don't like the term, I think of these ideals broadly as "liberal internationalism" - promoting human rights, democracy, free trade, economic development, etc.   That conservatives have coopted and distorted these ideas does not mean we should just hand them over, criticizing the promotion of liberty as "too ambitious" and a diversion from core Amerian interests.   Stepped up container inspections and a bigger army are both critical, but they are not the unifying backbone for a clear alternative to conservative policies.

Say what you want about George Lakoff, we still have a lot of hard work to do on framing.   When people ask about the core principles of a progressive foreign policy, the answer cannot be a stronger UN, or indeed anything with the clunker "multilateralism" in it.  I don't pretend to have the answer here - we need to keep throwing things out until something sticks.   

To get the ball rolling, how about "democratic consolidation."  The idea would be to draw a contrast to the fragmented, transitory conservative approach - shifting emphasis from one hotspot to the next; relying on ephemeral coalitions of the willing; lacking the staying power to deliver on the long-term work of solidifying democracy; sowing divisions among should-be allies; undercutting institutions that promote the global rule of law.  Consolidation would be the opposite:  shoring up democracies in all stages of development; strengthening international institutions that can help spread democracy and its necessary corrolaries like economic development; isolating and squeezing the remaining anti-democratic outposts around the world.   This may not be the right formulation, but we ought to be looking hard to find what is.

Progressive Strategy

We need a 12 step program. Now.
Posted by Derek Chollet

Since the 2004 election there has been a surge in longish think pieces about progressives and national security, starting with Peter Beinart's cover story in the New Republic (which, by the way, has brought him a very hefty advance to turn into a book), and more recently Matthew Yglesias's article in the American Prospect.    Both of these essays provide useful historical perspective and plenty of insider gossip, and help define what efforts like this blog (and its host institution) are all about.   We could write on this subject for days -- and I hope we do -- but let me focus on a couple thoughts that came to mind when re-reading these articles.

First, it is true as Beinart stresses that the dominant interest groups within the Democratic party still do not see national security as a vital part of the progressive mission (or, a successful progressive mission), and those that do tend to lean far to the left of mainstream America (think MoveOn).  I actually think that the former issue is more of a problem than the latter -- many Americans are uneasy with the Administration's performance on national security, as the latest polls about support for the Iraq war illustrate.

Yet too many progressives still believe that national security is not "our" issue.   We still approach these questions as boxes to check.  Take this example: the Kerry-Edwards campaign was more focused on national security issues than any Democratic campaign probably since 1960, yet too often it still treated these issues as things we had to pivot off of to hammer Bush on our perceived bread and butter: health care, education, taxes, the environment, etc. etc.  People actually said behind closed doors things like "once we give this speech/make this argument/end this debate on Iraq or terrorism, we will be able to pivot onto other issues."  Many political advisers thought that we could end the debate with one killer line of attack, and then never have to deal with it again.  A big part of our challenge as national security progressives is to make the case that these issues are not just ones that we can remain credible on (or dispense with through one thoughtful speech), but ones that we can actually win on.

A second part of our challenge is to bridge a cultural divide - not the ones most political commentators talk about, but the enduring gap between progressives and the military.  This is as much about experience and disposition as it is about specific policies.  Progressives actually think a lot about and are comfortable with foreign policy (diplomacy, foreign aid, institutions, etc); but we have less confidence in national security (defense).  Often this divide is obvious, often it develops in more subtle and even unintentional ways -- this is what I was getting at in last week's dust-up with Suzanne about the wisdom of promoting some sort of civilian post-stabilization corps. 

By far the best article written about this gap was after another painful election loss (2002) by our own Heather Hurlburt.  What's most depressing about her piece is how right she was then, and how little has changed today.  But I guess acknowledging that we have a problem is the first step toward recovery.  What other steps do we need?

Africa

More CNN, Less Fox News
Posted by Michael Signer

I agree wholeheartedly with Suzanne's endorsement of the idea of an all-Africa cable channel (sorry, it's just too rainy and gray here in D.C. to "spar"), for a specific reason -- what we need more of in our foreign policy-making is good old information.  But the channel's going to have to be done right to add to, rather than subtract from, our views on Africa.  I once toiled in the vineyards of prime-time cable documentaries, and I can tell you that keeping the wheat and chaff together ain't easy.  It's encouraging that they say they want to show "another side of Africa."  But I have to say the history of cable TV doesn't inspire me with optimism.

Facts, obdurate and uncooperative as they can be, can do a world of good in our more ideological areas of policy.  One of the legion reasons the theocons' (Andrew Sullivan's pungent label) insane ressentiment in the Schiavo case is so frustrating is they utterly ignore the reams of facts about her medical condition, her purported wishes, her past life, that courts considered in deciding to allow her husband to make the agonizing decision he made.  But facts are boring, and, worse, gum up theological reasoning.

We tend to see Africa only through the lens of pathology and crisis.  In approaching this incredibly diverse continent, for instance, the Bush Administration has focused almost exclusively on the AIDS epidemic.  Nothing wrong with that, of course.  But Africans also work in skyscrapers and wear business suits, make complex family decisions like the rest of us, host teeming expatriate cultures, generate complex religious hybrids of Christianity and native creeds, create exciting cultural exports, whether in arts or commerce -- but these facts rarely make their way through the thicket of the American media.

My pet theory for why Guns, Germs and Steel was such a blockbuster was its exposure of a subtle condescension in most of us when considering why Africa tends to have so many economic and military problems.  Rather than blaming it on the Africans themselves, Jared Diamond convincingly showed we should blame the climate and longitude.  And how striking was that?

This new channel promises to tell stories about Africans' lives -- not just present a lowest-common-denominator cavalcade of misery, despair, and sexually carried diseases.  If it's more CNN, and less Fox News, it just might have a chance.

March 27, 2005

Africa

Africa Hits Prime Time
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

The New York Times is reporting on a new cable channel devoted to Africa that plans to launch later this year.  The idea is to array news, music, movies, reality programs and other shows from Africa or on topics of African interest, but tailored to a U.S. audience. 

I have no idea if this will succeed commercially, but it is the kind of thing we all should get behind.  I have sat through so many seminars and discussions where audience members berate journalists for failing to adequately cover certain kinds of foreign policy issues, and African stories top the list of what seems get neglected.  The writers and editors invariably reply that their reporting follows the interests of their audience, and that Americans simply don't care about what goes on in places like Africa.

A niche cable channel won't change that overnight, but it could make a small difference.   If just 1% more Americans knew Darfur existed it would make it harder for the Administration to duck and weave in response to disaster unfolding there.   If 1% more Americans understood the economics of the global cotton trade and the devastating impact that anti-competitive U.S. subsidies for cotton farmers have on African livelihoods, the Administration's policy might change.

Companies that profess to want to make a difference around the world in ways that extend beyond short-term relief for the tsunami victims should consider getting behind this channel.   Without cost-effective distribution and advertiser support the venture will fail.  With it, there is a chance that the Africa network will both win viewers, and help to shape informed views.

Preaching about Africa's woes will never work.   Information and entertainment that offers a picture of what's interesting and vibrant about the African continent just might. 

March 26, 2005

Justice

Failure to Prosecute Deaths in Detention
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Many liberals like blogger Steve Clemons are up in arms about the Pentagon's decision not to prosecute the 17 soldiers investigated in connection with three separate deaths of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Army investigators had recommended that all 17 be charged, and human rights groups are said to be outraged by the decision not to act against them.

One side-effect of the decision is yet another potent illustration of the utter baselessness of conservatives' supposed fear of the consequences of joining the International Criminal Court.  Conservatives have long argued that by joining the Court we would subject our own servicemembers to prosecution for actions undertaken in as part of U.S. military interventions around the world.  The Court's proponents have long countered that the ICC's jurisdiction is limited to cases where the country in question is unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute the wrongdoing - mainly situations where the country lacks a functioning legal system.  Court proponents maintain that such a finding would never be made in regard to a judicial system as developed as that of the U.S.

Those opposed to the U.S. joining the Court worry that in a case like that of these 17, where U.S. authorities declined to prosecute, the ICC could somehow step in.  Yet the Court's rules are clear that once an investigation has taken place, the ICC cannot second-guess the decision not to prosecute.  So, no matter how outraged human rights advocates may be, even if the U.S. were to join the Court the military will dispense its own justice, free from review or intervention by the ICC.

Although conservatives have yet to identify a plausible scenario of ICC meddling in U.S. military justice, their opposition to the ICC is untrammeled and is having a destructive affect on U.S. policy toward Darfur in particular.  While the Administration claims to want forceful action to counter what it has dubbed genocide, it has allowed anti-Sudan measures to languish for months in the UN Security Council for fear that a proposed referral of Darfur war crimes to the ICC will further legitimize that court (this snippet from a State Department press conference lays out the Administration's convoluted position). 

Darfur still offers the Administration a chance to begin to gracefully back down from a position that looks increasingly untenable as the ICC continues to build credibility.  By simply abstaining from a Security Council resolution putting Darfur at the ICC, the Administration would avoid outright reversing itself, but at the same time prevent its anti-ICC policy from shooting its Darfur policy in the foot.

March 25, 2005

Terrorism

Looks Like John Kerry Was Right on Tora Bora
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Conservatives went after John Kerry during the campaign for suggesting that the Administration let Osama Bin Laden get away during the late 2001 battle at Tora Bora. 

Yet the latest Pentagon information, released pursuant to a FOIA request by AP, suggests that - contrary to what the military had said earlier - Bin Laden did indeed escape from Tora Bora.  The document pertains to a Guantanamo detainee who helped the terrorist mastermind get away.  Its too late for John Kerry, but the Administration should not be allowed off the hook for this one.

UN

Cleaning House on UN Sex Scandals
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Really interesting piece this morning about a new report from the UN on what to do about the problem of sexual abuse by peacekeepers.  Recommendations are hard-hitting and right on target:  they require tough punishments by home countries, digorgements of payments for the offenders' peacekeeping services, support for babies born to peacekeepers, assistance for victims of abuse and incentives for compliance with the system. 

Most of the credit for this goes to the Jordanian Ambassador to the UN, Prince Zeid Raad al Hussein, long one of the most assertive, open-minded and effective diplomats in the UN system.  He totally "gets it" and the report is a powerful illustration of what can be accomplished at the UN by working with enlightened representatives from the developing world.  Since it is overwhelmingly poorer nations that contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations, it was essential that this issue not be tasked to a group of Western experts to handle.  Annan put it in the right hands, and Zeid has delivered. 

Zeid is also politically savvy.  While the article does not say this, he spent time several weeks ago on Capital Hill making the rounds to build support for his report and instill confidence that the UN is doing what's needed to address this scandal.  Those efforts will prepare the ground for a positive response, helping to rebuild trust between Washington and Turtle Bay.  Now it is up to the UN membership to adopt and police his recommendations.  If that works, this process could be an excellent blueprint for tackling other problems at the organization.

March 23, 2005

Defense

It's Not Either-Or
Posted by Suzanne Nossel

Derek - I completely agree on the need to bolster support for our military - spanning across more training, better equipment, veterans health care and benefits, and predictable and less burdensome tours of duty for reservists.  I also agree that the military has performed admirably under difficult circumstances in an infinite array of roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As for them doing it best, your logic is circular:  they do it best because there's no one else who does it at all. During the early days in Iraq there was a lot of carping about the military being pressed into jobs they were ill-suited for or did not want to do.  That they've risen to the occasion does not mean that shoe-horning a military organization into such a wide array of demanding civilian functions is the best long-term solution.

Having one organization responsible for everything from rewiring schools to guarding prisons to launching bunker busters almost guarantees that some things will be done badly.   In an organization with a military culture, civilian roles are always going to play second-fiddle.   There may also be aspects of military culture (the training, the hierarchies, the codes of loyalty and silence) that don't translate optimally into civilian functions.  There are also problems of perception that arise from bundling all these functions into one:  some occupation soldiers in Iraq were responsible for conciliating disputes by day, and storming safe houses in the same town by night.   It's impossible for one person to be both a trusted political interlocutor and a violent enforcer at the same time.

A dedicated stabilization force would also be a way of drawing in elites, helping to bridge the socio-economic and political divide between our existing military and those that set and influence the policies they implement.  Surely this is better than preying on ever more vulnerable and less suitable populations as military recruits.

Upshot is I don't think the very real and pressing stresses on our military ought to stand in the way of long-term thinking about how to approach stabilization operations.  What I am proposing is not a short-term fix, and doesn't allay the need to address the imminent problems you cite.   But one shouldn't stand in the way of the other.

Defense

First support the citizen-soldiers we've got!
Posted by Derek Chollet

Suzanne, I'm all for creating more avenues for public service, but I don't agree with the premise that the mission you mention -- stability operations -- is one that the military has proven "ill suited" to do or hasn't done well.  Ask the military men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan what they think.  I bet they'd say that they know how to do this kind of mission, that they have done it well, and that they can do it best, thank you very much.  They are overburdened, to be sure, but this is because of failures made by elected officials and civilian policymakers.  I think they're right.  Moreover, many of the skill sets that we want to attract (engineers, cops, health care specialists, educators, etc) we already have -- in the National Guard and Reserves, over 80,000 from the Army alone are in Iraq today.  Some argue that because of the skills they have developed in civilian life, the Guard and Reserve soldiers are better suited for many aspects of stability ops than their active duty counterparts.

Yet the question is how, given the stress on the force, we continue to recruit and retain these citizen-soldiers.  Just this week the Army Guard raised its enlistment age eligibility to 40 (from 34).   It is playing with different incentives to keep soldiers in the force.  This is one of the biggest issues we will confront in the coming years.  The modern military is being reshaped as we speak, and if progressives want to have any relevance to our future national security, they have to be a part of it.  Before we start to build new structures, let's fix the ones we've got.

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