In Dubai, Kissing a Girl on the Cheek Can Land You in Jail Posted by Shadi Hamid

A friend just told me that his flatmate, a British citizen named Ayman Najafi, is facing a month in jail and deportation for allegedly kissing someone in a Dubai restaurant. I met Ayman a couple months ago in Dubai and we hung out a bit. It’s weird to find out that someone you know is being tried – and going through an undoubtedly difficult personal ordeal – for what he has told the court was nothing more than a peck on the cheek. This is more than a bit frightening: most American expats living in the Gulf, myself included, kiss on the cheek as a customary greeting with members of the opposite sex. Even that, now, can be grounds for arrest.

Most, if not all, Arab countries lack what we would call “rule of law.” Invariably, there is perpetual confusion regarding what is allowed and what isn’t, and, perhaps more importantly, who it’s allowed for. Not all citizens are treated equally, to say nothing of situations where the majority of legal residents aren't even citizens in the first place. I live in Qatar now, and I find that no one knows for sure the exact rules on “public indecency.” When I lived in Jordan, the matter of criticizing the monarchy – something I’ve done on a number of occasions – was always a bit hazy. When did it become illegal, and how exactly would know when you had crossed the mysterious “red line”? One time, an American friend of mine living in Amman didn’t get the red lines right: he was wisked away by the secret police, blindfolded, and interrogated for taking pictures outside a government building.

This is the trouble with countries that are far from democratic, where the “citizen” is at the mercy of arbitrary rules that are often imposed at a whim by an always shifting assortment of largely unaccountable leaders. What this produces is fear mixed with uncertainty - a toxic combination - the sense that everything you’ve earned can be taken away from you in a moment. And you will probably not be granted anything resembling due process.

Dubai has been trying to have it both ways: essentially importing/buying/ and otherwise appropriating what they think makes the West great without accepting the liberal democratic institutions which served as the catalyst and foundation for much of that success. This is a recipe for a unique, and ultimately destructive, kind of schizophrenia.   

Israel Flap & Iran Diplomacy Posted by David Shorr

Now that Josh Rogin has given us a window into the post - Biden-Netanyahu pressure being applied by House Minority Whip Eric Cantor, I want to parse the prominent this-undercuts-efforts-on-Iran piece of the argument. The way I see it, the administration's current diplomatic full court press is laboring mightily to send a strong international message that Iran faces a choice is between implementing the agreed October 1 uranium deal or being isolated. Whether or not conservatives share this assessment -- and I've heard Robert Kagan credit the effort with making Iran the issue, rather than the US -- it is a separate analytical question to ask how US-Israeli relations play into the dynamic. In that light, it's hard to see how tensions between Washington and Tel Aviv pose make it any harder to keep the pressure on Iran.

The name of the game in the nuclear diplomacy and the push for a new UN sanctions resolution is to gain the support of key governments that are reluctant to apply strong pressure on Iran. It feels silly to have to say it, but Israel does not fall into that category. Politics, whether domestic or international, is about expectations and surprises. It's a surprise and thus a significant development when, say, Russia calls for sanctions on Iran. Israel's position on the matter of Iran's nuclear program is, um, pretty well known.

In fact, when framing the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically, you could argue that Israel's security -- while always a prominent concern for the United States -- it is not the best basis for building a broad international coalition. (Why do I feel like I'm, in the words of Denzel Washington's character in Philadelphia, "explaining it to you like you're four"?) Anyone who believes we can line up a lot of international support on the grounds of ensuring Israel's security needs to get out more. Again, the issue isn't America's reasons for stopping Iran's nuclear program but the rest of the world's reasons, which have to do with the breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation norm, a wider regional arms race, and heightened instability in the Middle East.

This is obviously a tricky moment in the US-Israeli relationship and the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Trying to claim that the new tensions undercut the Iran effort is a stretch, at best, and intellectually dishonest at worst.

Why Horse-Trading on the Terror Trials is a Bad Idea Posted by David Shorr

Is it just me, or does it seem really bizarre to be considering backpedaling on counterterror policy at the same time that it's having notable success in finding, killing, or capturing terrorists (oh, and also getting credit for it in the polls)? Here's my real question: do progressive poliitical figures realize how a shift to military commissions would undercut progressives' ability to present an alternative to tough-talking conservatives? I see an astounding disconnect between the way that "going to the dark side" was so discredited just a few years ago, and yet somehow its arguments still carry so much weight in the current debate.

Why am I so exercised about this? Well, let's look at what was said on the Sunday shows on the subject:

Well, obviously there are a series of things that have to weigh. You are right, the original decision was to try him in New York. Local authorities were receptive there at the beginning, they changed their view on that. That has to influence our thinking. The question becomes what are their -- what possible venues would there be? And is it worth reviewing the entire decision? The attorney general said at the beginning, when he announced those -- the venue and the trial in Article 3 courts that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, under the protocols that he and the Department of Defense had developed, could have been tried in either a military commission or an Article 3 court. So we have a range of options.

White House Senior Advisor David Axelrod on CNN’s “State of the Union”

It's not just about KSM coming back into military court, it was a major misstep to put him in civilian court in NY, it made no sense. We need laws on the books that will allow terrorist detainees to be held without trial, give them due process, treat them as prisoners, not common criminals.

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) on ABC’s “This Week”

When I put these two together, what I come up with is that reversing the civilian trial decision would be a big fat, "what were we thinking?" What progressives really should be saying is "we refuse to let our justice system be terrorized." What a shameful spectacle for such a strong republic -- a two-centuries old system of government by law -- to go to such lengths and give a bunch of gruesome glory-seekers special treatment. Should we really be pulling these guys (and gals too, we know now) out of the shadows in which they hide and then give them a venue all their own? We've got this totally backwards; this is a chance for the United States to show the contrast between the majesty of justice being done and despicable sadists with the delusion that they can remake the world by murdering innocents.

Supposedly, a lot of this horse-trading is focused on a deal to close the Gitmo detention facility. Again, does this really make sense, to remove a symbol of misguided US efforts to work outside the bounds of law at the price of another fear-driven end run? If Senator Graham believes Gitmo should be closed, then there shouldn't be a need to trade for it.

While we're at it, since when is every defendant or prisoner in our justice system a common criminal? Is this a flaw that we're just noticing? Do we need a new system to deal with mass murderers? And this is the real point, the military commissions have a troubled history and virtually no track record of success in prosecuting terrorists. It really is ridiculous that a court system that has proven its ability to prosecute terrorists, including handling sensitive evidence, should be discussed so skeptically. It should be the other way around.

Sometimes You Got To Call It Like You See It Posted by Michael Cohen

I've been meaning to write something about Ross Douthat's really toxic op-ed in the New York Times today about Iraq, but Daniel Larison has done my handiwork for me. Douthat argues that: 

Our nation might be less divided, and our debates less poisonous, if more artists were capable of showing us the ironies, ambiguities and tragedies inherent in our politics — rather than comforting us with portraits of a world divided cleanly into good and evil.

I don't really disagree with Douthat's underlying argument - too often the machinations of American politics is shown in the most simplistic terms imaginable. But here's the thing: Iraq or as I like to call it "the worst foreign policy disaster in American history" is not the test case that proves Douthat's point. Cue Larison:

Yes, the problem might be that we do not have artists capable of rendering contemporary architects of a war of aggression that was based on shoddy intelligence, ideological fervor and deceit in a sufficiently subtle, even-handed manner. If only Hollywood were better at portraying the depth and complexity of people who unleashed hell on a nation of 24 million people out of an absurd fear of a non-existent threat! Life is so unfair to warmongers, is it not? Then again, the reason our debates are so poisonous and our nation so divided might have something to do with the existence of utterly unaccountable members of the political class that can launch such a war, suffer no real consequences, and then reliably expect to be defended as “decent” and “well-intentioned” people who made understandable mistakes. The unfortunate truth of our existence is that villains do not have to come out of central casting for comic book movies. They are ordinary, “decent” people who commit grave errors and terrible crimes for any number of reasons. Many great evils have found their origins in a group’s belief that they were doing the right thing and were therefore entitled and permitted to use extraordinary means.

Exactly. There is some serious whitewashing of history for Douthat to complain that Hollywood is simplifying the history of the Iraq War by portraying it in black and white terms, when this is pretty much the exact way that the Bush Administration sold the war in 2002/2003 . . . as a simplistic good vs. evil narrative.  If Douthat is really confused as why our political debates are so coarsened, perhaps he might want to dwell more on that irony.

FWIW, I would also add that I don't think George Bush is an evil man; instead he's a dim witted, intellectually incurious, close-minded, dry drunk bully who believed that by going to war in Iraq he was protecting the American people . . . and chose to ignore every available piece of evidence that indicated that his 'strongly-held beliefs' were wrong. I don't think Condi Rice and Colin Powell are evil people; I think they are cowardly individuals who deep down in the heart probably knew that the war in Iraq was a mistake, but for largely personal and professional reasons allowed themselves to be complicit in this terrible conflict. (In some ways both of these individuals seem far worse than Bush, which I'll admit is a strange emotion).

Is that evil behavior along the lines of Hitler, Stalin or Mao - of course not. But is it horrible behavior that should be judged in the harshest possible terms? Yes. And should those responsible for the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of thousands of people be excused because their intentions were pure? 

Do I really have to answer that?

Douthat complains that "radical sympathy, extended even to people who presided over grave disasters, is in short supply all across America at the moment." What's unclear to me is why this should even be considered a problem. My sympathy extends to the lives of those Iraqis and Americans who were gravely affected by the "decent, well-intentioned" actions of Bush Administration officials. As for those officials responsible for that war - and for the lying, misleading, lack of post-war planning and failure to admit mistakes and change course that defined that conflict - to hell with them. 

The more opprobrium the better.

Five Strawmen* About Afghanistan Posted by Michael Cohen

Today in the Washington Post, Michael O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan have written one of the strangest and most confusing op-eds about Afghanistan (and that really is saying something). Its an effort to 'pop' five myths about the war in Afghanistan; but instead it relies on strawman arguments that are practically tangential to the war in Afghanistan.

Take myth number three for example, "The U.S. military is for war-fighting, not nation building." First of all, how is that a myth about the war in Afghanistan? But ignoring that semantic point check out how O'Hanlon and Sherjan prove their point, "Among top civilian and military leaders there is no real disagreement about whether the armed forces should engage in these types of activities. . ." And then the authors go on to "prove" their case by noting that nation-building has the support of US leaders from Petraues to Rumsfeld. If you're wondering how that proves the US military is for war-fighting, not nation building your guess is as good as mine. For example, if I find a political party whose top leaders believe that climate change is a giant hoax it doesn't make them correct. Or if the nation's top political and military leaders believed that invading Iraq in 2003 was a smart move . . . well you get the idea. These guys seem to have consensus/fact confusion - a recurrent disorder for those who live in the Washington DC metropolitan area.

But there's more, O'Hanlon and Sherjan argue that Afghanistan is easier than the situation in Iraq because "the people of Afghanistan do not despise foreigners." The authors then go on to cite Afghan favorability ratings of the US that are around 50 percent. 

When I read stuff like this it makes me think there should be a rule that when any policy analyst uses polling data from Afghanistan - and doesn't differentiate by region - they should be forced to stand in a corner. . . or at least should be forced to stop commenting on Afghanistan. I'm the furthest thing from an Afghan expert, but even I have a general understanding that citing poll numbers, which show overall approval of the US effort in Afghanistan without differentiating between say a Pashtun in Kandahar and a Tajik in Mazar or Herat is like citing polling data in 1963 that shows Americans supported the civil rights movement . . .without differentiating between Northern and Southern views. As the authors surely must know these sorts of regional differences actually matter. Case in point, this polling data from last year, which shows the stark divide in support for the Taliban between Kandahar and the rest of the country.

But this kind of simplistic reasoning is at pace with an article that argues improved health data and cell phone usage proves that Afghanistan is easier than Iraq (huh?); or asserts that major troop withdrawals can begin in 2010 - and doesn't offer a single explanation of why or how that might actually be possible.

I suppose this "analysis" should hardly seem surprising from two people who wrote a book titled "Toughing It Out in Afghanistan" but rather than providing a compelling rationale for why the current mission in Afghanistan makes sense op-eds like this confuse rather than clarify that debate. 

But then I'm sure regular DA readers are shocked to see cheerleading for US military interventions on the opinion page of the Washington Post.

* Thanks to eagle-eye Eric Martin for pointing out that I am a poor proofreader . . 

Israeli Settlements -- Food for Thought Posted by David Shorr

As a general matter, I'm way too smart (or cowardly or prudent or chicken) to say very much publicly on Israel and the Palestinians. The progressive foreign policy wonk community has many genuine Middle East experts to do that, including on this blog.

Speaking of which, a few weeks ago Joel Rubin summarized his trip to Israel and the Herzliya conference with some insightful reflections on Israeli politics. After the past week's sad spectacle, I want to offer just one thought (that'll get the proportion just about right). The more I ruminate over the problem of how to draw forth international cooperation on the world's big problems -- my full-time preoccupation -- the more I recognize the vital interplay between international politics and domestic politics. Obviously the dynamic has always been there, but given powerful current trends of diffusion of power, dilution of authority, and political leaders' limited freedom of action, it's all the more important now.

Which leads me to my question for the day. Thinking of the Israeli settlements, what is the relationship between perceived domestic political constraints and policy imperatives? What do you do when the irresistible force of a necessary foreign policy action meets the immovable object of a domestic constituency? We usually assume the domestic political constraint is the trump card, don't we. That's the nature of democracy, right? Domestic accountability is real; international accountability, not so much. I dunno, but I think we're going to run into this question more and more often. We should probably give it some thought.

[Bonus question: the title of this post was also the name of a classic Dupont Circle eatery. Anyone remember it?]

My Ode to Caspar Weinberger Posted by Michael Cohen

Spencer Ackerman is doubling down on the notion that Bob Gates is the BEST. SECDEF. EVER. Personally, I think these kinds of lists don't tell us very much. While I suppose Gates is in the top tier, it's just too early to tell . . . and it's a bit of a stretch to argue that his defense budget was "one of the bravest ever." Not terrible, sure. But brave . . . 

And FWIW you could make a strong case that Dick Cheney was one of the best Sec Defs ever (boy, that hurt to write).

But Spencer has written something that consistently rankles about the tenure of Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of Defense . . . and it merits a response:

Weinberger because the Reagan defense build-up was a central event in the life of the Pentagon and so was Goldwater-Nichols — but the Weinberger Doctrine of overwhelming force proved to be obsolete-to-detrimental half a decade after Weinberger left office. 

No, no, no. Sheesh, this is a complete mischaracterization of the Weinberger Doctrine. Below are the six key elements of what Weinberger said in his National Press Club speech discussing criteria for the use of military force.

1) The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.

2) If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.

3) If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives.

4) The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

5) Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

6) The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

As you will see, overwhelming force is never explicitly mentioned in the Weinberger Doctrine - but more directly how much force the United States uses is far less important than the when, where and why of how the US chooses to act militarily. What's more the Weinberger was hardly obsolete five years later; it largely informed US defense policy for 15 years. 

And it was hardly detrimental. Take a moment to consider what would have happened if the Bush Administration had actually considered the tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine before we went to war in Iraq? Indeed, that war violates every single principle of the Weinberger Doctrine - and the Powell Doctrine by the way. And who again was Secretary of State when the Iraq war occurred? 

You can probably say some bad things about Caspar Weinberger's tenure as Secretary of Defense, but the Weinberger Doctrine is definitely not one of them.

And while we're on the subject of the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine this is as good a time as any to link to my article last summer on why this doctrine is deeply relevant to modern discussions about the use of military force.

More On Strategy . . . Posted by Michael Cohen

Spencer Ackerman has offered a thoughtful response to my earlier post on the lack of strategic thinking emanating from the Obama Administration and his comments give me an opportunity to clarify my thoughts. Spencer, perhaps in a glass half full sort of way, sees a method to the Obama Administration's madness, but I think he tends to place far too much on emphasis on words rather than actions.

One can certainly argue that Bob Gates has talked about re-calibrating civilian and military elements of national security, but if you read between the lines what you might actually see is a Secretary of Defense calling for the military to maintain its primacy in national security decision-making. As I wrote over the summer in the pages of Dissent:

Secretary of Defense Gates caused a buzz in 2007 when he declared the need for a “dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security.” But nowhere did he call for the Pentagon to shed any responsibilities. Indeed, in his next breath, Gates made clear “I’ll be asking for yet more money for Defense this year.” At the same time, he noted the incongruous sight of “field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils.” Gates remarked that these skills will need to be “institutionalized and retained” in the military. 

More recently, it's hard to square Obama's call for a changed mindset or even a modest and restrained foreign policy when you have the military's key planning document - the QDR - argue that the US seeks to prevent and deter conflict by, "Extending a global defense posture comprised of joint, ready forces forward stationed and rotationally deployed to prevail across all domains, prepositioned equipment and overseas facilities, and international agreements." This is a recipe of imperial overstretch and an effective long-term strategy process at the highest levels of government would hopefully point out how crazy this is and how disproportionate such a vast global military footprint is to actual US interests and the legitimate threats to our nation. 

But as I tried to point out earlier, there is no long-term strategic planning process in this Administration. I can't help but think that part of the reason for this is that Obama's foreign policy apparatus is manned by people who don't necessarily see what the QDR is suggesting as a bad thing.  (And for what it's worth, my understanding is that there are at least some folks at the highest levels of the NSC who recognize that this is a serious problem in need of immediate rectification).

And I have to say while Spencer is correct that Adminal Mullen has laid out "the early phase of the first vision for the responsible use of military force from a Joint Chiefs Chairman since Colin Powell" - that vision is, in my humble opinion, completely wrong. Look at what Mullen had to say:

We must not look upon the use of military forces only as a last resort, but as potentially the best, first option when combined with other instruments of national and international power. 

We must not try to use force only in an overwhelming capacity, but in the proper capacity, and in a precise and principled manner. And we must not shrink from the tug of war -- no pun intended -- that inevitably plays out between policymaking and strategy execution. Such interplay is healthy for the republic and essential for ultimate success.

I'm sorry, but to me this is pretty close to the mindset that got America involved in Iraq in the first place; the last thing America needs after the disaster of Iraq is a further loosening of the constraints on the use of military force.  If Mullen's view are reflective of the president's than I'm lot more depressed about the direction Obama is going to be taking American foreign policy.

And look Spencer may well be correct that "broad strategic constructs are taking form" but I just don't see it. I see a lot of discordant pieces and words that are being contradicted by actions. What I do see is an escalation in Afghanistan that only perpetuates the stranglehold that terrorism has over our foreign policy debates and a direct contradiction of the great speech that John Brennan gave last year in which he called for "the fight against terrorists and violent extremists" to be "returned to its right and proper place: no longer defining—indeed,distorting—our entire national security and foreign policy, but rather serving as a vital part of those larger policies." What I see is nibbling around the edges on defense spending; increased resources for civilian agencies and a rhetorical focus on development but none of the sort of big picture, systemic thinking that the country needs. 

I don't mean to sound like a party pooper here, because I think there are many things that the Obama folks have gotten right on foreign policy, but I come to this issue with the view that America desperately needs to re-think its national security strategy - to rebuild civilian agencies, de-emphasize the role of the military, rebuild the global governance architecture, define US interests less broadly and usher in a new restrained and more modest approach to foreign policy. Very little that I've seen so far makes me think that any of this is happening as quickly or as decisively as it should. But of course that's just one man's opinion - I'll be curious to hear what my blog mates and commenters think about all this . . 

Where Have All the Strategic Thinkers Gone? Posted by Michael Cohen

There was a pretty interesting article in the Washington Post today about Hillary Clinton's tenure at State Department and it pretty much confirmed my suspicions about our Secretary of State - she's a great public diplomat and administrator, but not much of a strategic thinker.

As Stewart Patrick noted, she struggles with priorities and questioned whether she has a "grand strategic vision." This was basically part of the deal when Obama picked her; Hillary would serve as a great "face" for America to the world; she would invest time and energy in public diplomacy, something that was critically important after the tumult of the Bush years.  But at the same time it was hard to expect much from her from a strategic standpoint. After all, she doesn't have an IR or even foreign policy background and doesn't appear to have spent a lot of time thinking about the future of American foreign policy.

It was very striking, for example, that the article recounted the experience of a young State Department FSO who was pushing the idea of engaging with "non-governmental power centers in Pakistan" while Clinton expressed skepticism. The story has a happy ending as the FSO was promoted, but the fact that the Sec State didn't agree about the importance of this issue is surprising. At a time when non-state actors are rising in importance - and Pakistan's non-governmental sector has been at the forefront of pushing for democratic change and adherence to the rule of law - it's hard to understand Clinton's skepticism. If this anecdote is any indication, she seems to be quite the foreign policy realist (although granted it's hard to draw too much of a conclusion from just one anecdote)

It wouldn't necessarily be a bad thing to ask the Secretary of State to focus on public diplomacy if President Obama had placed strategic thinkers in other areas of the national security bureaucracy, but he hasn't. Jim Jones and Bob Gates are obviously smart men, but one doesn't get the sense (particularly from the former) that they are focused on recalibrating US strategy. Indeed, one could fairly ask where are all the Obama campaign aides that were pushing the idea of a new mindset for American foreign policy - because they don't appear to be in the higher reaches of Obama's foreign policy team.

If you look at Obama's foreign policy to date, this has clearly been a problem. You have John Brennan saying back in August that we need to get away from the jihadist terror fixation that defined the Bush years . . . and yet then you have Obama sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan and spending the lion's share of his foreign aid request in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.  We're now 14 months in to the Obama presidency and we still haven't seen a national security strategy, or the results of the QDDR process - just a QDR that continues the US reliance on military power and the overly broad definition of US global interests.

I realize that it's a lot to expect for things to change overnight and clearly the process of changing the mindset of American foreign policy is the work of generations. But I do worry that Obama has failed to put the pieces in place to realize this goal and that he seems intent, at least for now, to nibble around the edges of American foreign policy. But at a time when a new orientation for the way America's interacts with the world is desperately needed indefinitely delaying more systemic change is a recipe for continued strategic drift. Obama has surrounded himself with smart, competent individuals in his key foreign policy positions - but smart and competent is not what America needs today.

Some Iraqi Odds and Ends Posted by Michael Wahid Hanna

Sunday was a good day for Iraq but it is unwise to draw overly broad conclusions based on this one day. And I am holding off on commenting about the government formation process until we get official results from the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC). But I did want to comment on two very important points because they have often shaped and warped the nature of commentary and analysis on last Sunday’s elections.

First, the question of Sunni participation has become garbled with the passage of time, perhaps due to Iraq’s unorthodox political calendar in 2005, when the country held three nationwide votes in succession: a January 2005 parliamentary election for a transitional national assembly, which was tasked with drafting a constitution; an October 2005 referendum to ratify Iraq’s constitution; and a December 2005 parliamentary election, which resulted in the seating of the current parliament and the selection of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Sunni Arab participation in the first of these elections was abysmally low. This was the result of an announced boycott of the political process by various Sunni Arab political and insurgent groups and the very real threat of retaliation against those who dared to vote in Sunni Arab areas. The effects of this boycott were magnified due to the fact that the country was organized into one electoral district as opposed to province by province voting. This was done for administrative reasons due to the inability to organize a more complicated election at that time, but the choice had very grave consequences for the political process and only served to amplify the lack of Sunni Arab participation.

This was not the case in the December 2005 elections when Sunni Arabs turned out to vote in numbers that corresponded or exceeded the levels of turnout in other provinces. Of course, Sunni Arabs also turned out in other mixed areas of the country, but the demonstration of Sunni Arab participation in those elections is most clear when looking at the results from the four Sunni-majority provinces (the demographics of the contested province of Tameem (or Kirkuk) are something of an unknown, although the Kurds almost certainly constitute a majority at this time): Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salahaddeen.

Here are the official numbers from that election as released by IHEC:

The bottom line is that Sunni Arabs participated in the December 2005 elections. Keep that in mind next time you hear that Sunni Arabs boycotted the previous parliamentary elections because it is not accurate.

Second, I wanted to address the issue of voter turnout and participation. Most stories have led with the percentage of voters who turned out on Sunday, citing the approximately 62% released by IHEC. But this number is not particularly useful for comparative purposes and is, in fact, somewhat misleading. This is a result of the increase in voter registration rolls since 2005. This has been a politically-sensitive issue, particularly in Kirkuk, but without getting into too many details, the method for registering voters has changed since that time and is now based on passive registration. As such, the more relevant figure for comparison’s sake is the total number of voters. As you can see above, that number for in-country voting was under 12 million in December 2005. But according to an IHEC representative, total voter turnout on Sunday exceeded (Arabic) 12 million after figuring in 272,000 out-of-country votes. So the level of in-country participation appears to have held steady as opposed to suffering a serious decline, which has been the general implication of much of the press coverage.

Change We Shouldn't Believe in, but Should Try to Exploit Anyway Posted by Patrick Barry

For the last week, Gregg Carlstrom has done an impressive job of highlighting all the reasons why U.S. observers should avoid chest-thumping over the wave of arrests of Taliban leaders by Pakistani authorities. Responding to a rather sanguine piece by Bruce Riedel in the Daily Beast on the benefits of this crackdown for the war effort in Afghanistan, Carlstrom has this to say:

On the Taliban arrests, there are two major theories about Pakistan's motives. One says Pakistan rounded up "moderate" Taliban leaders, those who favored reconciliation talks, so they would be replaced by a more "extremist" faction loyal to the ISI. The other argues that Pakistan plans to use the detained "moderates" as conduits back to the Taliban. (I guess there's a third theory, that the arrests stem more from Obama's diplomacy than Pakistani self-interests, but I find that dubious.)

Both of these theories are good for Pakistan. One is good for the United States. Neither is good for Afghanistan: In both scenarios, Afghan interests will be subjugated to Pakistani interests during reconciliation talks.

One of the main critiques of the previous administration’s Pakistan policy was that it paid little mind to understanding Pakistan’s motivations. This inattention allowed President Musharraf to play a double-game with the U.S., extending assurances that he was committed to routing the Taliban with one hand, while actively working against U.S. policy for the sake of Pakistan’s interests with the other.  It would be a shame if this administration forgot that lesson, all because Pakistan decided to arrest some militants for reasons that are a mystery to us.

That said, I think it's a mistake to look at Pakistan's possibly nefarious intentions and write off the possibility that its crackdown may yet accrue some long-term benefits to Afghanistan. After all, regardless of what you think about Pakistan's motivations, it's pretty safe to say that with these arrests, there has been a change in its behavior.  A tactical change, perhaps, but still a change.  There may yet be an opportunity here for the U.S. and Afghanistan to press that shift to their advantage.  Whether that's doable will depend on a range of factors.  Some of those are within our control. A great many more are not.  One thing you can say with confidence: failing to consider what drives Pakistan to act would, in all likelihood, doom any such effort from the start.  

Biden's Visit to Israel Posted by Shadi Hamid

I hope to have a proper post up on Biden's visit to Israel soon. In the meantime, I've been live-tweeting the visit, which you can follow here.

Is There a "Tyranny-Terror Link" in the Middle East? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Steven Brooke and I have a new article out in Policy Review suggestively titled “Promoting Democracy to Stop Terror, Revisited.” We make the case for a causal relationship between the lack of democracy in the Middle East and the incidence of political violence and terrorism. If such a relationship exists, then the case for supporting democracy abroad becomes not only more important, but more urgent. In others words, it cannot keep on being postponed until we have single-payer healthcare or until Mr. Ahmadinejad cools down. We will have to live with terrorism but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do what’s necessary to make its occurrence less likely.

There is a trend in progressive circles toward separating support for democracy abroad from any explicit national security rationale. This, we argue, would be a costly mistake. Put differently, we believe there is a strong empirical basis for the claim that our safety and security, and that of our allies, is directly tied to prospects for political reform in the Arab world.

And from the perspective of politics (as opposed to policy), democracy promotion needs a national security rationale, otherwise politicians simply won’t care – and, currently, they don’t.

We began conceptualizing and writing this article long before President Obama demonstrated his relative lack of interest in democracy promotion. Some have grown accustomed to calling Obama a “realist,” of some sort at least. However, realists are capable of aggressively supporting democracy abroad – as long as they recognize it as being critical to U.S. national security interests. And that is what we tried to do here - to assume nothing and make the national security case for democracy promotion, something we hope would appeal to “realists” and “non-realists” alike.

In the coming days, I’ll be writing more on the empirical side of our argument. Steven and I approached the piece from the standpoint of the political scientists we are. To our surprise, we  found that quite a few past studies on the “tyranny-terror link" are plagued by rather straightforward measurement problems, one example being F. Gregory Gause’s oft-cited 2005 Foreign Affairs article "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism."

For those who like teasers, here's one from our article:

Any long-term strategy must take into account an emerging body of evidence which shows that lack of democracy can be a key predictor of terrorism, and correlates with it more strongly than other commonly cited factors like poverty and unemployment. If understood and utilized correctly, democracy promotion can become a key component of a revitalized counterterrorism strategy that tackles the core problem of reducing the appeal of violent extremism in Muslim societies. It has the potential to succeed where the more traditional, hard power components of counterterrorism strategy have failed.

The link between lack of democracy and terrorism also has consequences for American domestic politics. It provides a unifying theme for Democrats and Republicans alike, one that honors our ideals while helping keep us safe and secure. To the extent that politicians have had difficulty selling democracy promotion to the American people, the “tyranny-terror link” provides a promising narrative for U.S. policy in managing the immense challenges of today’s Middle East.

As they say, though, read the whole thing.

It's Still George Bush's World Posted by Michael Cohen

Believe me, as scary as it is for you to read that headline it's even more depressing for me to write it! I've just started writing a weekly column for AOLNews and in my sophomore effort I argue that we're still operating in a global environment created by George Bush . . . and that will be the case for some time.

Americans may not fully appreciate the damage wrought by the Bush years in how America is perceived as well as its diminished moral authority and political suasion. These problems can't be fixed overnight and may have permanently affected U.S. interests, capabilities and power around the globe. Moreover, the obsessive focus of the Bush years on terrorism not only masked the rise of rival states and the growing importance of a number of transnational issues, but it shielded the United States from its own decline in relative power and influence.

What can Obama do to repair this damage?

He needs to focus on creating a new global architecture for dealing with challenges that are increasingly transnational in nature; on rebuilding civilian agencies to extend U.S. influence and engagement; and on reorienting the country's foreign policy and national security decision-making toward non-military approaches to international affairs. But above all, he needs to take a long, hard look at how the U.S. defines its global interests and perhaps recognize that America can no longer afford to be engaged so robustly in every global challenge.

Read the whole thing here

To Military Commission Advocates: Ye of Little Faith in American Strength Posted by David Shorr

There's a lot to say about the potential shift of the KSM trial from the civilian courts to a military commission, and a lot that's been said. First off, the good people at Human Rights First tell us not to give up the fight; as long as this still seems to be in play, we should all call the White House and tell the administration to stick to its guns and prosecute the cases in our regular justice system. [You'll have to wait until Monday business hours to reach the WH comment line by phone, but meanwhile you can send a message through the web site.]

Then there's excellent analysis on this blog -- Michael Cohen parceling out the culpability for this horrible mess, and Pat Barry asking whether national security eminences like Colin Powell will be as ready to help fight the next policy battle. For my part, I want to emphasize what a major concession to fear-based politics this move would be. This would represent not merely a tactical retreat, but a strategic defeat. If ever there was an issue on which progressives should be playing offense, this is it.

When it comes down to it, all these shrill chicken little cries show the right wing's lack of confidence in American strength. For all our supposed pride in our system of government, the implicit argument for military trials is that the system can't handle these 100-feet-tall terrorists (the ones we already have in custody, remember). Never mind that our regular court system has a much better track record; at latest count, the score is Judiciary 200 - Military Commissions 3.

I mean, where does this go next? What is the next level of toughness that will be a test of whether we're sufficiently building up, er, taking the terror threat seriously? At this point, "tough on crime" is the new "soft on crime." Next thing we know, the right wing will insist that terror suspects be remanded to the custody of Delta Force.

But I digress. The point is that the far right has tossed aside any consideration of effectiveness, track record, or principles of the rule of law. This country has a political system in which the military reports to civilian masters (in a word, us) -- fighting our wars and defending our security and interests. In the terror trial debate, it seems like the military is treated as a sort of toughness bank; we need some toughness, let's get it from the military. The implication is that the civilian governing authorities, which are supposed to be broader in function and ranking above the uniformed services, can't handle the custody and prosecution of a handful of death-loving, glory-seeking sadists.

As we build up the terrorists into some kind of superhumans, are we losing sight of how this diminishes us? It seems to me that this shows a profound lack of faith in our system, our values. Think of the contradiction at work here: America is a mighty and upstanding nation; it should cower in fear.

The thing about worst-case scenarios is that they are a slippery slope toward darker and darker predictions. Where do you stop? What keeps them moored in reality? And this is the really disturbing thing, the politics of the terror threat are propelling this great nation toward a policy based on a freak-out.

The American national security case for forging Middle East peace Posted by Joel Rubin

The U.S. has more than 200,000 troops engaged in conflicts across the Middle East and Southwest Asia, has grave concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction there, depends heavily on oil exported from the Persian Gulf and is attempting to end the "clash of civilizations" mentality that has plagued American-Muslim relations for the past decade.

All of these facts have a direct impact on American national security interests.

Therefore, with the imperative of protecting American national security in mind, President Obama concluded in 2009 that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would help to bring stability to that region while supporting America’s long term security interests.

Importantly, this position did not conflict with either the Israeli or Palestinian public’s position on peacemaking.  It is well understood that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians support a two state solution and are willing to make territorial compromises to get there.

It is also important to note that the administration’s position on Middle East peacemaking did not take place in a vacuum. Obama’s national security philosophy overall is rooted in the pursuit of policy goals through active American diplomacy, engagement and pragmatism.

And it now turns out that this is also a winning approach domestically, as it has become clear that Americans trust the president on national security. Yet even more importantly, Americans want to see results.

If there has been a lesson from the past year out of the health care debate, it is that Americans like to see their presidents both set and accomplish goals. The lack of a health care bill on the president’s desk, despite his calls for one, has hurt the president politically.  On the other hand, the decision to send more troops to Afghanistan — and its implementation — has helped the president politically.

The numbers bear this out. Don’t ask me. Ask Gallup, whose January 2010 poll corroborates this view.

In that poll, Obama scored better with the American public on national security issues than he did on domestic issues. Specifically, 49 percent of all Americans approved of Obama’s handling of terrorism and 47 percent of foreign affairs, compared to 40 percent for the economy and 37 percent for health care.

Nonetheless, despite the policy strengths and political support for Obama’s pursuit of Middle East peace, Israel’s staunchest defenders in Washington failed to strongly support him when he needed it most, thereby helping to doom the centerpiece of his national security policy on the Middle East in 2009.

Why is that? In particular, why did these groups and individuals politically undercut the Obama administration’s efforts to restart the peace process, especially when its resolution was so clearly aligned with American national security interests?

Ultimately, while the Palestinians are not blameless for the diplomatic stalemate, it is the Israelis and Americans who hold the overwhelming power in this relationship — meaning that the Americans and Israelis carry the main burden of resolving the conflict. It is therefore time for the United States. to expect more out of Israel when it comes to supporting American national security goals.

Yet unfortunately, the most recalcitrant American opponents of a restarted peace process, as well as the silent majority of Americans who enabled the pushback against the Obama approach, missed the forest for the trees.  They made arguments about why Israel couldn’t be expected to do what the president was asking them to do on settlements and negotiations, and instead never took into account the impact that this would have on American national security.

In a healthy relationship, both sides give a little. This truth was clearly lost on these Obama opponents, whose actions helped neither Israel nor the U.S. Obama’s approach is good for Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States, and it is past time for America’s Israel supporters to stand with the Obama administration in helping it to achieve its Middle East peace goals.

The moment is urgent. American security priorities are being damaged daily by the lack of a resolution to the conflict. The failure to have Middle East peace undermines American diplomatic credibility in the region, gives an excuse to extremist groups to foment anti-Americanism, and hampers America’s ability to be the guarantor of regional security and stability.

This situation must be reversed.  The status quo on the Middle East is a victory only for those who oppose American national security priorities.  The status quo is also a recipe for domestic political failure. Just look at the health care debate, which if it has taught us anything, it is that good policy seen to its conclusion is good politics.

It is time therefore for the United States to forge a Middle East peace in order to advance its national security interests, and it is time for American supporters of Israel to help the administration complete the job.

(This piece first appeared in the Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle here.  The author's views are his own and do no necessarily reflect those of the National Security Network.)

A Paranoid McCarthy Posted by James Lamond

Andy MCarthy’s uses a common argumentative technique in his response to the news that Obama advisors may recommend to hold military commissions for the 9/11 plotters.  He dismisses what is perceived as the debate at hand as a foregone conclusion and tries to shift the conversation towards the next, related matter.  In this case it is trying to shift the focus of discussion from civilian trials verses military commissions to warning his readers that this all a secret ploy to close Guantanamo.  His claim is that the use of military commissions was a decision made by Obama long ago.  Making today's story not much of a victory for conservatives.  He sees today's announcement as all being part of political posturing in order to make Obama look like a  reasonable and compromising individual, so that in the end it appears to be a deal –you get military commissions and we get to close Guantanamo.  

But i guess that Colin Powell, Robert Gates, Ali Soufan, John Ashcroft, Steven Simon, Alberto Mora, Thomas R. Pickering, Lawrence Wilkerson, William S. Sessions, Morton Abramowitz, did not get the memo that it was a done deal, because they have all come out in recent weeks and months to embrace civilian trials as the best way to bring terrorists to justice. In addition, Colonel Morris D. Davis, the former chief prosecutor for the Department of Defense Military Commissions at Guantanamo Bay and Marine Col. Jeffrey Colwell, acting chief defense counsel at the Defense Department's Office of Military Commissions have embraced civil trials.  In fact Major Garret reports, via Spencer, that: "A senior administration official deeply involved in White House deliberations about the future location and judicial venue of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other alleged 9/11 conspirators told Fox a decision on the case is 'weeks away' and will not be made or announced before President Obama leaves for Guam, Indonesia and Australia on March 18."

The Rule of Law Gets Shivved Posted by Michael Cohen

In what has to be the most depressing/least surprising news in recent memory the Obama Administration appears to be very close to relenting to Congressional and public pressure and reversing the decision to prosecute Khalid Shiekh Muhammed and 4 other al Qaeda defendants in civilian courts. Instead, the Administration will prosecute each of these alleged terrorists in military tribunals. 

Now there is going to be a lot of criticism in the liberal blogosphere - and elsewhere - of President Obama for this decision. Some of it is deserved. But there is rich irony indeed in the notion that Obama will take the hit for his. Now as my bloggingmate Heather Hurlburt will almost certainly argue the Obama Administration screwed up the public relations badly on this - and she's right. But in fact when one looks across the political spectrum it was perhaps the Obama Administration that stood up the most consistently - though imperfectly - for the promulgation of the rule of law. (Though granted we're talking about a rather thin pool).

First and foremost, blame must obviously be directed at President Bush, Vice President Cheney and their many acolytes inside and outside government who pushed for this illegal system of military tribunals. It's bad enough that they left this mess for Obama to clean-up, but after losing power they then used the malevolent argument that civilian trials for terrorists would put the country at risk to push for its continuation. Shame on them and shame on a political party that would so matter of factly toss the rule of law into the gutter.

Second, where were the Democrats? Sure there were many who advocated for civilian trials and who demanded an end to military tribunals and the closure of Gitmo. But when Obama wanted to close Guantanamo Bay in May of last year, profile in courage Jim Webb solemnly declared "We spent hundreds of millions of dollars building an appropriate facility with all security precautions on Guantanamo to try these cases. I do not believe they should be tried in the United States." Harry Reid wasn't much better saying, "We will never allow terrorists to be released in the United States."

When the Senate voted to strip funding from a military spending bill only 6 Democrats had the courage of their convictions to stand up for the rule of law.

Third, my mayor Mike Bloomberg deserves a good kick in the shins . . . for the one he delivered to the Obama Administration. After initially agreeing that it would be appropriate to host a trial for KSM in New York he quickly turned tail when New York voters indicated concern. Instead of trying to reassure skittish voters or seek out a compromise, Bloomberg told Obama no dice. My senior Senator (Chuck Schumer) didn't help matters much either when he reportedly told the White House to drop any idea of a New York state trial for the 9/11 mastermind.

Finally, how about a Bronx cheer for the American people in so easily bowing to the alarmist rhetoric of political opportunists warning of a dire consequences for actually upholding the rule of law. This is the worst sort of NIMBYism and while certainly one has to blame political manipulation for all this, clearly voters are more than happy to play along.

So in the end, the depressing conclusion to all this is that a good part of our political class isn't really that interested in promoting the rule of law when it comes to dealing with the threat of terrorism.  That so many Americans are willing to go along with this; and that so many politicians are either willing to use the fear of terrorism to abrogate the rule of law (or are unwilling to stand up for it) is not all on Barack Obama. It's on America.

How Does This Win Us Respect on National Security? Posted by Patrick Barry

I think it's safe to say that the Obama administration is aware that by deciding to try KSM using a military commission, they will piss off a lot of progressives.  What I'm not sure they understand is that the choice would also come as a huge disappointment to a slew of foreign policy and military leaders perceived to be above the political fray. Colin Powell, Steve Simon, Ali Soufan.  You name em'.  These guys put their credibility on the line in support of civilian trials, and now what? Where will they end up the next time the administration faces a major fight on national security (You can bet it will)?  Obama's advisers should ask themselves whether the political ground won through such a decision will be worth the consequences of leaving some of their top national security supporters fluttering in the wind.

Is America Becoming a Banana Republic Watch - The Tom Coburn Version Posted by Michael Cohen

Courtesy of Matt Yglesias comes our latest Banana Republic entry - Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn. It turns out that Tom Coburn has a rule: if any legislation comes before the United States Senate that isn't fully paid for, he'll block it. Now of course it would be one thing if Coburn simply voted against such legislation, but because of the enormous amounts of power that the Senate gives to one cranky man (see Bunning, Jim) Tom Coburn can singlehandedly stop dead in its tracks any piece of legislation that he doesn't like.

Take for example the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, a rather small $40 million initiative to help post-conflict recovery efforts in Northern Uganda and also assist in efforts to capture the batshit crazy (and deeply evil) head of the LRA, Joseph Kony. One of the many horrible tactics of the LRA is to kidnap young children, brutalize them and then force them to become soldiers. This Human Rights Watch report chronicles some of the terrible suffering of children captured by the LRA.

Now to be clear, the bill doesn't actually appropriate money - that comes later in the budgetary process. But that's not good enough for Tom Coburn who objects in principle to any measure that might possibly expand the deficit. (Just to give you a sense of how inoffensive this legislation really is, even deeply cranky Oklahoma Senator, Jim Inhofe supports it - as do each of its 63 co-sponsors).

According to the ever-principled Coburn, "Doing good things - you can do them one of two ways: you can do something good and hurt our children (by adding to the deficit), or you can do something good and help out kids."

Just so we're clear on the delicate moral balance that Tom Coburn abides by as a public servant. 

• Not doing good means saddling future generations with $40 million in deficit spending
• Doing good means holding up legislation that would help end the suffering of African children.

But look Tom Coburn has a point: saddling future children with $40 million in debt is pretty much the greatest evil perpetrated by mankind. 

When one of your two legislative branches is governed by rules that allow one man to stop the wheels of governance out of an irrational aversion to even $40 million in federal spending . . . then you are well on your way to being a banana republic.

The Kyl v. Lugar Show Posted by Kelsey Hartigan

While the administration is taking its time to make sure the new START agreement is a strong treaty that advances our national security interests, some conservatives have preemptively weighed in on the substance of the agreement.  There’s the minor detail that negotiations haven’t actually wrapped up yet and the text hasn’t been released, but that hasn’t stopped Jon Kyl & Co. from latching onto baseless speculations that fit within their political agendas. 

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry, noted during his interview with The Cable, "The administration is appropriately holding out for what we need to make the treaty verifiable and that will help it pass." (This, as Max Bergmann points out is pretty annoying, considering negotiators now have to cater certain boisterous politicians who have insisted on politicizing our national security.)

While U.S. negotiators remain steadfast, however, speculations regarding Josh Rogin’s story on START and the Senate calendar have created quite a stir. Unfortunately, the key addendum to this story was buried at the bottom and likely overlooked. 

Aware that the new START constitutes a national security imperative, a spokesperson for Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-NV, announced last week:

 "Senator Reid has long been expecting to receive and consider the START treaty during the 2010 calendar year. We have seen nothing to this point that would alter this expectation.  Arms control treaties have always been handled in a bipartisan manner and, once the Senate receives all the details on this particular treaty, Senator Reid is confident this tradition, which is critical to our national security, will continue."

In a separate interview, Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Robert Casey, Jr. shared his take on the new START agreement with Rogin, "I think we can do it and I think we should," Casey said. "Often in Washington the pronouncement of what's dead and what's alive is fiction. I think we can pass it and I think we should try to pass it."

While the junior Senator from Arizona hasn’t actually said he plans to vote against the treaty, the spectacle he has created in the interim has left a lot to be desired…namely, facts. Fortunately, Kyl is in the minority and the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee understands the importance of the new treaty.  
 

Richard Lugar, R-IN, the ranking Republican for the Senate Foreign Relations committee told The Cable, "I remain hopeful that it will be signed and that there will be time assigned on the floor for debate and a vote this year," said Lugar, who added he would support the treaty "unless there are extraordinary changes beyond those that I've heard about."

If Kyl wants to set himself up against Senator Lugar, fine by me—considering Lugar’s established record on arms control, I’m guessing it would be quite the show, or at least one that’s finally worth watching. 

Why are Islamists Popular? Posted by Shadi Hamid

Commenting on a paper I co-wrote on Islamist engagement, Gregg Carlstrom wrote:

If it's "difficult to gauge" why Islamist parties are popular, we can deduce that at least some of their supporters are motivated by an interest in good governance. In other words, some people support these groups because they're effective political parties who happen to be Islamists, and not the other way around.

A couple of interesting things worth mentioning here: we don't really have a clear sense of why people vote for Islamist groups although anecdotal data, in abundance, suggests several important factors. It may very well be the case that the fact that Islamists are Islamist is incidental to why some vote for them.

However, it's difficult to disaggregate the Islamist factor from other variables, since the Islamist tag is a reliable signal for other things - that the candidate in question is honest, clean, and will take the time to meet you if you walk into his office (when I spent time in their offices, I noticed that Islamist MPs in Jordan always took the time to meet with constituents while secular politicians often couldn't be bothered. One former MP told me that he spent so much time meeting with constituents that it cost him his marriage). 

Over time, being Islamist has become much more than just being Islamist, if we understand the word in the narrow sense of someone who wants Islamic law to play a more prominent role in public policy. This has its corollary in the American context. We don't necessarily vote for Democrats because of their party label, but because their party label tells us something about the policies they're likely to advocate.

Everybody Calm Down Posted by Patrick Barry

I’m sympathetic to arguments that the stakes in Afghanistan are higher than some of the war’s critics will commonly admit, particularly for the future of NATO.  But this comment, from former NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson crosses the line:

“Be assured, if the Taliban and their allies can defeat the most successful defense alliance in history, why would they stop at Afghanistan? And they won’t. And we all know all that. So why can’t we join the dots between going in and coming out? ... We are going to be the next target set for the extremists.”

I can understand the need to bolster support for the mission in Afghanistan among NATO allies, particularly in light of the collapse of the war-supporting Dutch government.  But there’s little reason to think that following withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban will unleash hordes of militants on the streets of Prague or London. 

A less hysterical argument would be to point out that Europe arguably faces a greater threat from the ungoverned areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border than the United States, with more than half of the major plots or attacks in Europe between 2004 and 2009 connecting back to the region in some fashion (Thanks Paul Cruickshank).  But it’s pretty hard to see how demonstrating ‘toughness’ or ‘resolve’ in Afghanistan will magically solve the problem of disaffected immigrants cavorting with jihadis and then returning to their European homes to hatch terrorist plots. 

Romney's Kansas State Problem Posted by Patrick Barry

Kansas State University is quietly becoming DOD's preferred venue for saying nice things about the State Department and USAID and warning about military dominance of US foreign policy, and that's a problem for Mitt Romney. Admiral Mullen, yesterday:

“US foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands and not enough on the State Department.”

Mullen's speech followed a 2007 Kansas State address by Secretary Gates, which called for a "dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security." Though not exactly news (Gates and Mullen have made such comments on several occasions), the timing could not be worse for the Mittster.  This is because nestled among the bizarre foreign policy ideas catalogued in Romney's new book, No Apology, is his recommendation that diplomatic relations be turned over to an "ambassador from CENTCOM or any of the other regional military commands.” So, just as the Pentagon is reiterating its concern about the dangerous militarization of U.S. foreign policy, Mitt Romney is releasing a book arguing that U.S. foreign policy should be militarized even more?  Yikes.

Here's to you Mr. National Security or Foreign Policy Professional Posted by Patrick Barry

Because, when the Cheneyites tried to get you down, you kept trucking.

Because you stayed cool, even when Frank Gaffney attacked your threat assessments,

Because whatever Michelle Malkins says, you were right about the threat from right-wing domestic extremists.

Because, while Mitt Romney may want to replace you with 'Ambassadors from CENTCOM,' we know you still matter.

Who loves you?