The International Order's Shifting Goalposts Posted by David Shorr

Another good discussion on the TPMCafe Book Club -- this week on Fareed Zakaria's The Post American World. Again we arrive at the question of whether the liberal international order is a culturally bound creature of America and its Western accomplices. Michael Lind really got things going with an interpretation of non-democratic powers' standing with regard to the order from the immediate post-War period to the present:

The Postwar version of liberal internationalism is the one envisioned by American internationalists during and immediately after World War II, as well as by traditional liberal internationalists like the first Bush after the Cold War. International security will rest with a loose concert or concerts of nonaggressive, but not necessarily democratic, great powers. And the basic international norm, to which there are exceptions for genocide and anarchy, will be nonintervention in sovereign states.

That's the old liberal internationalism (which, though realistic, is not Realpolitik). The new liberal internationalism is a product of the 1990s. In essence, it is an attempt to universalize the norms of NATO and the EU as the basis for world order, as an alternative to dusting off the never-implemented Postwar system after half a century.

That Wacky, Wacky Gerson Posted by Michael Cohen

In today's Washington Post, Michael Gerson makes the rather creative argument that what Americans are really looking for on Election is a little American cheerleading:

The issue of the lapel flag pin is a good illustration. Obama's explanation for its absence--that it had become a "substitute" for "true patriotism" in the aftermath of Sept. 11--is perfectly rational. For a professor at the University of Chicago. Members of the knowledge class generally find his stand against sartorial symbolism to be subtle, even courageous. Most Americans, I'm willing to bet, will find it incomprehensible after 20 additional explanations, which are bound to be required. A president is expected to be a patriotic symbol himself, not the arbiter of patriotic symbols. He is supposed to be the face-painted superfan at every home game; to wear red, white and blue boxers on special marital occasions; to get misty-eyed during the most obscure patriotic hymns.

It is rather amazing that anyone calls Barack Obama an elitist after reading this drivel.  The condescension displayed here toward the American people is simply breathtaking. Does Mike Gerson really believe Americans are so stupid they can't listen thoughtfully to Barack Obama's explanation of why he doesn't wear a flag pin and assess it critically?  Does he have such little respect for the American people's ability to accept a narrative about patriotism other than narrow, unthinking patriotic fervor?

What's even worse is Gerson's notion that Americans basically want a fratboy President who starts the USA chant at every ball game and has an "America: Love it or Leave It" bumpersticker on the back of his car. You know Mike, we've been down that road . . . didn't work out so well.

If the attributes above are the ones that Gerson thinks most Americans are looking for in a President maybe we should cancel the presidential debates and instead have a cheerleading competition to see who loves America more. To be sure, the reason Gerson believes that this is what Americans want in a President is because Republican candidates have spent two generations trying to convince Americans that blind faith in American greatness is somehow a prerequisite for national leadership. For the party of Lincoln to take such a stance is rich irony indeed. 

Personally, I'll fall back on the courageous words of Adlai Stevenson who reminded us 56 years ago, patriotism is "not short, frenzied outbursts of emotion, but the tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime. The dedication of a lifetime - these are words that are easy to utter, but this is a mighty assignment. For it is often easier to fight for principles than to live up to them."

I'll take that over Stars and Stripes boxer shorts any day of the week.

"He must be wiped out" Posted by Adam Blickstein

In the 5th Annual Time 100, Retired General Ricardo Sanchez's profile of Muqtada al-Sadr has the following tidbit:

In April 2004, al-Sadr's militia attacked coalition forces and took control of most provincial capitals in southern Iraq. In response, President Bush officially declared al-Sadr the enemy and ordered the military to capture or kill him. "We can't allow one man to change the course of the country," stated Bush in a video teleconference. "He must be wiped out." However, within a week, the White House reversed direction and ordered coalition forces to walk away from the mission. Negative media coverage was endangering the planned July 1, 2004, transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, which was heavily tied to Bush's re-election campaign....Today, as Iraq moves toward provincial elections, he is in a position to alter world events. He will inevitably continue as a major political power broker on the Iraq scene. But the die was cast in April 2004

I Want My R2P! Posted by David Shorr

Afraid I can't go along with Mark Goldberg on the Burma situation as a test of the Responsibility to Protect. I worry that a showdown over the principle of national sovereignty could undercut, rather than promote, the process by which R2P takes hold as an international norm. Which raises the question of how that process will work and where it stands. [I owe thanks to Stanley Foundation colleagues Keith Porter and (occasional DA guest) Michael Schiffer for forcing me to think about this.]

Actually, I look at this not as an opportunity to assert R2P, but rather as an indication of how far we still have to go. Ask yourself this: how do you rate the chances of getting into Burma via a Security Council showdown over intervening militarily without the junta's consent (Chapter VII) versus forms of pressure short of the assertion of an international responsibility to intervene? There has been a lot of important progress in chipping away at the sovereignty shield, but R2P doesn't enjoy nearly enough international support for us to simply insist that it be followed.

I think R2P will take hold gradually, rather than being proved by a single situation (or even two or three). That doesn’t mean not pushing in situations like these; the Burmese junta absolutely should not be allowed to fend off international pressure with the sovereignty shield. Indeed, in my evolutionary scheme, the weakness of the case for inviolable national sovereignty -- a very difficult position to argue in the face of dramatic human suffering -- is the sovereigntists' Achilles heel. Even so, we should refrain from any kind of decisive confrontation over a norm that patently is not yet in effect.

So if R2P proponents (I consider myself one) don't, er, force the issue, then how will it ever become stronger? I think we'll get there by accumulated precedent rather than dramatic test cases. It will be the mutual reinforcing of three trends:

• growing presumption of the international community's natural interest in nations' internal affairs (contrasted with inviolable sovereignty)
• increased willingness of countries to put military assets (and political will) on the line
• greater difficulty for offending states to put up resistance.

I'd argue that multiple instances can manifest these trends without any decisive showdown, and that they could build to a point when R2P is a much stronger norm than it is today.

To Talk or Not to Talk Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

There has been a lot of debate recently about whether or not there can be any progress on the peace process without engagement with Hamas.  Thus far the debate has been primarily talk or don’t talk.  But the interesting conversation as far as I’m concerned is about how to talk. 

Ghaith al-Omari writing at Middle East Progress and Brian Katulis posting on the Wonk Room lay out the potential pitfalls of direct engagement with Hamas.  Omari writes:

In any engagement, Hamas—like any rational political actor—will seek to maximize its benefits and minimize its costs. It will use any international dialogue it can achieve to send one overriding message to its local, regional and global constituencies alike: namely, that it can maintain its positions regarding the peace process, Israel and the use of violence, while at the same time gaining international legitimacy. It will argue that it provides at least as many benefits as its secular opponents, without making any compromises. Engaging Hamas without the terms of engagement being clear and without it first paying the political price of admission to the international club—particularly by accepting the two-state solution and disarming—amounts to a political free lunch

I think this makes sense.  Direct engagement by either Israel or the U.S. on full comprehensive peace talks with Hamas completely undermines Fatah and Abbas and sends the signal that Hamas can gain the domestic political benefits of refusing to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, while at the same time being considered a credible international political actor.  At the end, the result would be more an empowerment of Hamas then an opportunity to moderate it.

Still, there is the practical problem of the current violence, which undermines the peace process and causes many to suffer.  Omari argues that through the Egyptians or another Arab state acting as an intermediary a ceasefire with Hamas can be arranged that results in a reduction in violence and greater mobility for Palestinians in and out of Gaza.

He then recommends going ahead more aggressively with the Annapolis process.  This means Israel needs to get serious about a settlement freeze.  And Fatah needs to get serious about building credible and less corrupt long-term institutions that gain greater support from the Palestinian people.  Meanwhile, Israel and the United States also need to do everything they can to empower effective moderates inside the West Bank and Gaza, but not be seen as working too closely with them, which only serves to discredit these actors domestically.  Over time, progress on this front, and the Palestinian Authority’s ability to deliver would discredit Hamas’ hardline views, forcing it to either moderate its positions and come to the negotiating table or risk losing political support.

Instinctively, as progressives, we view talking directly to those we disagree with as a low-cost pragmatic approach to solving problems or at least looking for areas of possible agreement.  But in this case, as opposed to Iran for example, there is a real cost.  In the case of Iran, outside of the institutions of the Iranian state, there aren’t any credible powerbrokers.  So, the choice is either to engage in talks on common issues of concern or to just continue down the current path of antagonism.  But in the case of the Palestinians there are two alternatives and it’s important to take into account the internal political impact that directly engaging Hamas in long-term peace negotiations, without forcing it to first make the politically difficult compromise of recognizing Israel and renouncing violence, would have on Fatah.

Stop Loss and the Surge Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

A couple of stories that should be of concern this week as a reminder of the current state of the military and what the surge is costing.

The number of soldiers forced to remain in the Army involuntarily under the military's controversial "stop-loss" program has risen sharply since the Pentagon extended combat tours last year, officials said Thursday...

The number of soldiers held in the Army under the stop-loss program reached a high in March 2005 of 15,758. That number steadily declined through May 2007, when it hit 8,540. But since then, the number of soldiers subjected to stop-loss orders began to increase again, reaching 12,235 in March 2008.

And there is this.

More than 43,000 U.S. troops listed as medically unfit for combat in the weeks before their scheduled deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan since 2003 were sent anyway, Pentagon records show.

This reliance on troops found medically "non-deployable" is another sign of stress placed on a military that has sent 1.6 million servicemembers to the war zones, soldier advocacy groups say.

Iraq Remains an Unbalanced Policy Equation Posted by Adam Blickstein

One can claim that any faltering policy area, whether it be education, health care, or energy, can be fixed through expending unlimited resources, maintaining vigilant patience and demanding an open-ended time table. This might be an acceptable portion of any policy, but it is just that: merely a portion of the whole. Yet in regards to Iraq, this is the sole predicate to the rationale behind maintaining a presence there. This is why, in the abstract, the typical Bush Administration and John McCain argument that we need more time and patience and resources (both human and monetary) in Iraq rings hollow.

McCain on Hamas Posted by Michael Cohen

So there was something else pretty crazy that John McCain said last night on the Daily Show. When talking about the Middle East, he claimed that he would be "Hamas's worst nightmare."

Putting aside the pathetic, Bush-esque frat boy bravado, let's think about this for a second. Which President has done more to help Hamas in its entire twenty-year blood-stained history? Well that would be George W. Bush.  Back in January 2006, it was the Bush Administration that pushed for elections in Gaza against the wishes of both Fatah and the Israelis. Indeed, Hamas's route to political power was paved by Bush's messianic belief in freedom.

Now when we look at the candidates for President in 2008 who is the most like George Bush. That would be John McCain. So tell me again why John McCain would be Hamas's worst nightmare?

Lest We Forget Posted by Michael Cohen

With all signs pointing to a Barack Obama victory in the Democratic primary battle there is already talk of the party convention in Denver. Apparently the night that Obama would give the acceptance speech is the 45th anniversary of Martin Luther King's I Have A Dream speech. it's the kind of historical nugget that gives you goosebumps, particularly when you think about how far we've come as country.

The party of secession, the party of the bloody shirt, the party of Jim Crow, the party of segregation, the party of Bilbo and Wallace is about to select an African-American man named Barack Hussein Obama as their party's standard bearer. Damn!

McCain's Iraq Revisionism Posted by Michael Cohen

So I'm watching John McCain on the Daily Show this morning and Jon Stewart asked the presumptive GOP nominee how he would go in a different direction than President Bush. Here was McCain's answer: "spending, climate change and the failed strategy that was employed in the war in Iraq."

The first one is sort of misnomer, the second one I'll give him but the third one is straight out deception. Even if John McCain did disagree with the failed strategy in Iraq (and as Max points out that is highly debatable) HE DOESN'T DISAGREE WITH THAT STRATEGY NOW.

Isn't that a bit more relevant? I'm just amazed at the notion that McCain would even peddle such thin gruel, although I suppose he is counting on folks not making the connection between what he has said in the past AND WHAT HE IS SAYING TODAY. Indeed, if you look closely it is virtually impossible to find any daylight between his position on the war and Bush's but maybe this line of argument will throw people off.

But it does raise an issue that has been confusing me for quite a while. Generally after you win a party nominating contest (which is made up more of "true believers") you tack back do the middle in order to reach out to independents and centrists. But John McCain has taken the opposite approach; he's tacking to the right!

On Iraq, he's basically doubled down and argued that leaving is a "surrender to Al Qaeda." He just gave a speech aligning himself with conservatives on the appointment of right-wing judges and he has done a pretty poor job of distancing himself from Bush's failed economic and health care policies. If anything he seems to be arguing for their continuation.  With Obama on the verge of wrapping up the Democratic nomination, McCain has basically blown the two months he had to separate himself from Bush and lay out an affirmative case for a McCain presidency.

In the fall, the Democrats will peddle the line that John McCain represents four more years of George Bush's failed policies - and he has done little to disabuse the electorate of this notion.

Tell me again why Democrats are worried about this guy.

How to Help in Burma Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

The levels of devastation in Burma seem to be mindboggling.  CNN is now reporting that there may be more then 100,000 dead.  I've spoken to some friends in the human rights community and right now there is still very little information.  But they suggested CARE's relief program for Burma as a good place to contribute funds. 

Media Finally Calls Water Boarding Torture! Posted by Adam Blickstein

Andrew Sullivan uncovers a major moment for the press:

The victims were handcuffed, bound with duct tape and subjected to various means of torture during interrogations, including "simulated drowning through repeated submerging of victims' heads in water for extended periods of time," the court papers said.

Alas, the article calls water-boarding torture while describing the actions of a drug gang in New York, not the policies of the Bush Administration at Guantanamo. Why the hypocritical rubric?

The Counterinsurgents Posted by Patrick Barry

Spencer just capped off his series (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4) profiling the rise of counterinsurgency theorists with an interview with the "King David" of COIN, General Petraeus.  Among other things, the article raises doubts over whether we should rush to dismiss him as the 'sycophant savior' of the Bush Administration. 

The thing progressives should considere, is that Petraeus' conception of the military may actually be something that compliments, not contradicts, our arguments about where the Pentagon's priorities should be.  Just look at where Petraeus and his adherents have placed most of their emphasis: investment in personnel, rather than big-ticket items. Just take a look at this passage from the very first piece in the COIN series:

"Drawing on arcane military and academic histories of largely forgotten "small wars" in places like Malaya and the Philippines, the counterinsurgents place a premium on using the minimum amount of violence needed to target a shadowy enemy; on intimate knowledge of foreign cultures to cleave civilian populations from an insurgency; on distinguishing enemies that can be co-opted from "irreconcilables" that must be killed; on using proxy forces whenever possible; and on the central recognition that military force can never substitute for a political strategy that offers better, deliverable alternatives to a population than those presented by an adversary.

These are the lessons that the counterinsurgents believe need to be applied -- first in Iraq and Afghanistan, and then institutionalized throughout the military. To them, institutionalization is key: it's something that the military avoided in the generation between Vietnam and Iraq, so as not to entangle the U.S. in any more counterinsurgency campaigns -- even as adversaries adjusted to America's conventional military dominance. During the Clinton years, the Pentagon focused on buying "more high-tech jet fighters, artillery systems, and sensors, while there was very little [emphasis] on low-intensity warfare," Yingling said. "Even as we're operating in Somalia, the Balkans, and elsewhere, where we're trying to develop security forces and build governance capacity, we were disconnected from our experience in the 1990s.""

An emphasis on people over machines and hardware hews pretty close to not only the positions taken by center-left organizations like CNAS (who appears to employ every COIN acolyte not working in Government), but also those of more solidly liberal groups like CAP.  NSN's own Max Bergmann co-authored with Larry Korb, a report emphasizing the need for investment in personnel instead of the conventional weaponry that has dominated defense budgets even after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 

Such an approach recognizes that current and future threats to the U.S. will arise from the most unstable parts of the world, where our best assets are people, not fancy equipment. Rather than increase our military spending to stratospheric levels to counter potential military rivals like Russia or China, we should hedge against those possibilities, and match our resources to more plausible challenges.  Many progressives, myself included, can get behind this platform, and Petraeus' own views are amenable to it. 

Ultimately the problem is that we still can't be sure who General Petraeus is. Is he the 'political general' derided by conservatives and liberals alike? Or is he a tactical wizard whose ideas are revolutionizing the military?  On the one hand, Petraeus has argued, somewhat legitimately, that he is just the implementer of a strategy that he has no ability to set.  But then what do we make of the troubling reports that he has actively politicized his role, crafting and promoting a Bush Administration plan that runs counter to our long-term security interests? 

What is certain is that his appointment to CENTCOM means that he no longer can duck these pressing concerns.  At his confirmation hearings, we'll be able to tell precisely what caliber of general he is. 

Multilateral Like Bush Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

Max and I have a piece today over at the New Republic on John McCain's historical record of working with allies.  The basic summary:

Try as he might to distance himself from George Bush's abrasive foreign policy, John McCain has too long of a record to outrun. On Russia, Iran, and North Korea, he will have a policy of confrontation and escalation. His dismissive approach towards international institutions (and at times our closest allies), as well as his long history of verbally belittling other countries, cast real doubt on his ability to handle delicate diplomatic situations. In short, John McCain's claim that he is the right man to break with the Bush administration and build a "global coalition for peace and freedom" simply strains credulity.

This is part of a broader trend.  After McCain's much hailed foreign policy speech in late March he was lauded by the press for breaking with Bush's policy.  But as more and more independent analysts take a look at McCain's foreign policy record and they are all coming to the conclusion that his record completely contradicts the idea that he would be much different on foreign policy then President Bush. 

Fareed Zakaria recently wrote about McCain's dangerous great powers policy.  Ron Brownstein has made the point that aside from trying to make excuses for the 100 years comment by arguing that his intention was for a South Korea like presence, McCain has not actually articulated a plan for getting to this magical level of no violence in Iraq.  Matt Yglesias has come to the conclusion that McCain had embraced a hawkish neoconservative influenced foreign policy during the late 1990s and the 2000 campaign (Before Bush).    The record is extensive and it speaks for itself.

Research Project: Pentagon FOIA Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

The Pentagon has released all the documents it gave to the New York Times regarding the military analyst media machine story.  We need help from our readers.  Let me know if you find anything interesting.

Not the Worst Idea Ever Posted by Michael Cohen

It pains me to disagree with Shawn Brimley on much of anything, but to his argument against using contractors to train the Iraqi military I have to make an exception. Military training is one of those areas where private contractors have traditionally done a pretty solid job and earned high marks. For example, military contractors are currently training the new Liberian military and police forces.

Indeed as a state function that is not "inherently governmental" there is a certain logic in  outsourcing military training to the private sector, particularly if they do it more effectively. Better to focus the military on those tasks they are not only better equipped to handle, but also that are "inherently governmental" and incapable of being outsourced to the private sector.

To be blunt, our military has a very narrow and effective skill set; waging war. And I would argue they do it quite well. Training other nation's armies is not what our military does best and I'm not sure I see the logic in asking them to do it when there are others in the private sector who have stronger skill sets and better capabilities. Now of course there needs to be proper oversight (a sorely lacking area in this administration) but certainly that is a hurdle that can be overcome in . . . say a Democratic Administration.

There are many reasons to be critical of the use of contractors in the Iraq War, but frankly much of the burden belongs on the Pentagon and State Department for not thinking through the implications of their use on the battlefield.  Throwing the baby out with the bathwater and not using contractors when they are able to play a positive role doesn't make much sense to me.

McCain's Missile Defense Plan...Czechoslovakia???? Posted by Moira Whelan

A little nugget from MSNBC:

A little nitpicky, but he's still citing a country that no longer exists... McCain just said the United States should set up a missle defense system in Czechoslovakia. Should we assume he meant the Czech Republic?

Note to MSNBC: When you screw up Shia and Sunni over and over, and don't know who's in charge of wars, it is not nitpicky to point out that John McCain has had 15 years to learn that the Cold War is over.

The Worst Idea Ever Posted by Shawn Brimley

So I was trying to enjoy my weekend and the great weather in DC (since we'll get about 5 days of fabulous weather before five months of 90+ degrees and humidity that will sap your soul), until I saw a piece by Walter Pincus with the following headline: "U.S. Seeks Contractors To Train Iraqi Military."

I couldn't believe what I was reading!

'U.S. commanders in Iraq are for the first time seeking private contractors to form part of the small military teams that train and live with Iraqi military units across the country, according to a notice for prospective bidders published last week.

The solicitation, issued by the Joint Contracting Command in Baghdad, says the individuals that a contractor recruits -- who would include former members of the U.S. Special Forces and ex-Iraqi army officers -- will be trained in the United States with military transition teams (MiTTs) and shipped as a single team to Iraq. The recruits will live on Iraqi military bases "under Iraqi living conditions and participate with MiTT special operations and convoy duties," the solicitation says.

Thus far, the MiTTs have consisted of specially trained teams of about 10 to 12 U.S. soldiers led by a field-grade officer that were embedded with Iraqi army units from the division level down to the battalion level. The MiTTs have included officers and noncommissioned officers from different service branches tasked with teaching and mentoring their Iraqi counterparts to make them self-sufficient."

So let me get this straight. American strategy in Iraq depends on us being able to transition into a so-called "overwatch" posture in which our presence will consist mostly of a robust training and advising presence. Such a posture depends on the success of these so-called MiTTs… so… we are going to get contractors to fill slots on these teams?

I mean, you can't make this stuff up! Who thought it was a good idea to outsource our exit strategy to Blackwater!?!

If true, this idea could very well be one of the worst of the war! And that, my friends, makes this a pretty darn bad idea in my book.

Dr. iRack over at Abu Muqawama has good detail.

National Security Politics Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

I couldn't agree more with Michael's op-ed in the politico.

Come election time, one can expect “cut and run” attacks on Democrats to escalate, but this might be the first presidential campaign since the ’60s in which national security could be a net plus for Democrats.

With the electorate favoring Democrats on a host of domestic issues, the political risks for Republicans are significant. If Democrats can go into 2008 with the confidence to talk about foreign policy and national security issues — and without being afraid of GOP counterattacks — we might truly be on the verge of a long-term political realignment.

There is a historic opportunity here that I've written about a number of times.  But it isn't just going to fall into Democrats' laps.  They need to avoid the usual pitfalls of just pivoting back to domestic issues or addressing the Iraq War strictly in the frame of domestic costs.  Instead, they need to address the issue directly and demonstrate how their foreign policy will be better for America and better for humanity.  And if they really want to solidify the advantage, they'll need to follow it up by governing effectively. 

Fire on the Mountain Posted by Adam Blickstein

The Chaiten volcano, currently erupting in Chile, has resulted in the evacuation of thousands from nearby towns. It is also producing some amazing pictures:

via Flickr

via UPI

 

Uncovering Truth on Torture from Overseas Posted by Adam Blickstein

Another twist in the continuing story of torture at Guantanamo:

British intelligence knew in advance that a former London janitor [Binyam Mohamed] now awaiting trial by a U.S. military commission in Guantanamo Bay would be tortured in an Arab country to extract evidence, his lawyers allege.

His lawyer Clive Stafford Smith said the British authorities had a duty to reveal what they knew, in order to support his case that terrorism allegations against him are false and based on torture.

A British parliamentary committee said last year there was a "reasonable probability" that intelligence passed from Britain to the United States was used to interrogate Mohamed.

The details of Mohamed's case are quite brutal. I'm not sure what culpability British officials would have if their own intelligence was used in the process of torture (or if there was pre-knowledge of torture) of a British-resident detainee held by Americans at Guantanamo, but it seems clear that this case could be significant for a few reasons. 

While the Administration essentially extracted itself from international law and the Geneva Conventions and therefore claims it placed itself outside its jurisdiction, cases such as Mohamed's could create a de facto 'war crimes investigation," independent of America's purview. Bringing such a case outside U.S. jurisdiction could create a whole new paradigm that allows previously unknown or unconfirmed information to be released. Such a judicial process might not necessarily hold specific officials legally responsible for authorizing torture or other illegal activities, but  the proceedings might work to further affirm previously made assertions of torture and mistreatment by finding out what other countries knew, and how they may have been complicit, through the release of specific evidence and testimony. 

The British government has already claimed that "the UK is under no obligation under international law to assist foreign courts and tribunals in assuring that torture evidence is not admitted." But it will take a court to either confirm or reject this claim, and attempt to help clarify the 'fog of law'.  Occurring outside the Administration's ability to claim executive authority and the federal courts proclivity to err on the side of the Executive branch could be an important opportunity to further uncover information on the true nature of our detainment, extraction, and interrogation programs at Guantanamo and elsewhere. 

Iraq or Afghanistan Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

Just another reason why you can't look at Iraq in a vacuum.  Progressives have been making this argument for years at the more meta level, and in recent months Admiral Mullen has acknowledged that we aren't doing everything we can in Afghanistan because of Iraq (Something that should have been acknowledged by this Administration a long time ago).   But it is more significant when you start getting very specific numbers on precise troop shortages.

The Pentagon has concluded it can't send additional troops to Afghanistan until sizable numbers of forces withdraw from Iraq, a senior military official said Monday.

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan believe they need an additional three brigades of American forces, between 10,000 and 12,000 troops, to combat the Taliban and to speed the training of Afghanistan's security forces.

The requests will go unmet until U.S. troop levels in Iraq start coming down. The military "can't move a substantial amount of additional forces into Afghanistan unless there are additional forces which come out of Iraq," the official said. "We might be able to generate a little bit more, but not 10,000 to 12,000 more troops."

The comments were an acknowledgment of the challenges facing the Pentagon as it scrambles to find enough troops for counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. troop levels in both Iraq and Afghanistan are already at or near their highest levels since the start of the two wars. The administration's decision to freeze troop levels in Iraq after the last of the 30,000 "surge" troops depart this summer has left Pentagon officials with few options for finding more forces for Afghanistan.

Baghdad Disneyland Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

I defer to Spencer.

Unbreakable Union of Free Republics! Posted by Adam Blickstein

Russia's first post-Soviet military parade, to be held this Friday, three days after Dmitry Medvedev is inaugurated President and the day after Vladimir Putin's named Prime Minister, is retro in more ways than one:

The annual Victory Day parade that marks Nazi Germany's defeat may look impressive, but some Russian commentators think much of the military spending has been squandered through corruption, cronyism and mismanagement....Putin's Kremlin has poured $150 billion into its armed services, yet those services remain saddled with old weaponry and facilities...The bottom line is that "the Russian military forces are in a bad state, and the situation is getting worse."

Even so, Putin remains resilient:

"For the first time in many years heavy military equipment will be used. This is not sabre-rattling. We are not threatening anyone.... This is a demonstration of our growing defence capability," Putin said.

Between a Ran and a Hard Place Posted by Ilan Goldenberg

This LA Times article perfectly encapsulates the unenviable position in which the Iraqi government currently finds itself - stuck in a tug of war between Iran and the U.S. in which there is little incentive to take sides.

Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's spokesman backed away Sunday from Iraqi officials' accusations of Iranian interference, saying that a committee had been formed to determine whether there is merit to U.S. charges that its eastern neighbor is arming and training Shiite Muslim militants here.

But hours later, spokesman Ali Dabbagh told journalists that his comments at a news conference had been misinterpreted. In a telephone call with Reuters news agency, he said proof existed and the committee's job was to compile the evidence to submit to Iran.

U.S. officials are encouraging the Iraqi Government to take a more confrontational approach to Iran, but for all the bluster there is little incentive for Iraqi Shi'a politicians, many of whom spent their exile years in Tehran, to actually agitate a powerful neighbor like Iran.  Still, they aren't eager to confront the U.S., which has essentially put them in power.  So you end up with this mucked up tight rope act. 

A rational policy response to this whole situation would be for the United States to recognize that eliminating Iranian influence is all but impossible.  The best thing to do is agree on some kind of final settlement in Iraq that is at the very least tolerable to Iranian interests, so that at a very minimum Iran does not choose to play the role of spoiler. In an ideal world, Iran could actually play a constructive role as it did last month in negotiating the Basra ceasefire . 

But to get there, you need substantive and meaningful discussions at the highest level between Iranian and U.S. representatives.  Instead, what you get from the Bush Administration is saber rattling and meaningless  talks that are so limited by tight diplomatic instructions that they are predestined to fail.